PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM



CHINA IN FLUX

Mao's Second Decade

The Pursuit of Purity

The Role of the Military

Moscow and Peking

BOOKS

NOVEMBER
DECEMBER | 1969

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOV-DEC 1969
VOL. XVIII 6

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

How to Subscribe: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

Editor: ***Abraham Brumberg***
Managing Editor: ***Marie Thompson House***
Associate Editors: ***Clarke H. Kawakami,***
Gordon Sterner

Cover: Joseph Hockersmith

COMMUNIST CHINA

China in Flux
1 The Second Decade of Maoist Rule, *by Parris H. Chang*
12 The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution, *by Richard M. Pfeffer*
26 The New Role of the Military, *by Stephen A. Sims*
32 Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle, *by Maury Lisann*

BOOKS

42 Pages from History, *by John Wilson Lewis*
45 Leaders, Friends, and Adversaries, *by John E. Rue*
49 Upheaval on the Mainland, *by Stanley Karnow*
51 Moscow and the Malay Triangle, *by Leonard Bushkoff*
54 The Cuban Revolution, *by Carmelo Mesa-Lago*
58 Marx Transformed?, *by Stanley Rothman*
60 Politics in Eastern Europe, *by Viktor Meier*
62 Reviews in Brief

NOTES AND VIEWS

66 Correspondence
70 Index to Vol. XVIII

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China in Flux

EDITORS' NOTE: October 1, 1969, marked the 20th anniversary of Communist rule in China. In contrast to the first decade of the Maoist regime, which saw the successful consolidation of Communist power on the mainland and the achievement of considerable progress in the economy and in China's international status, the second decade has proven to be a time of troubles and setbacks both at home and abroad. In the first of the following articles, Mr. Chang surveys the record of the last ten years, examines the make-up of the new leadership installed at the Ninth CCP Congress of last April, and endeavors to assess the probable direction of its policies. Without question, the most momentous development of the last decade in China has been Mao's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." In the second article, Mr. Pfeffer presents a new and challenging interpretation of that upheaval, seeing it as an attempt by Mao to fuse "explosive idealism and intense power" in a struggle to preserve his own vision of the "good society" as the goal of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Mr. Sims then focuses on the enhanced role of the military in the governance of China and the potentialities of the People's Liberation Army for filling that role. Finally, Mr. Lisann offers an interesting, if somewhat speculative, analysis of Soviet attempts to influence the course of the power struggle between Mao and his opponents in the Cultural Revolution, viewing Moscow's apparent inclination to intervene in support of pro-Soviet elements in China as a portent of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Second Decade of Maoist Rule

By Parris H. Chang

Twenty years ago, when the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) was proclaimed in Peking on October 1, 1949, China was a country that had been ravaged by decades of civil war, foreign invasion and social upheavals, a country whose economy had been disrupted and many of its industrial centers damaged or destroyed. Within ten years after they took power, however, the Chinese Communists had succeeded in recreating a centralized and efficient, albeit totalitarian, apparatus that unified and exercised effective control over the Chinese mainland. They had also brought order out of economic chaos and launched a succession of ambitious development programs which not only restructured the nation's economy but laid the foundations for building a substantial, modern industrial base. Furthermore, the Peking

Dr. Chang is a Research Political Scientist at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). He is currently engaged in preparing a book-length study on the rise of the military in the Chinese political system during the 1960's.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regime had impressively demonstrated its military might to the Western world in the Korean War of the early 1950's.

Thus, by October 1959, when Peking celebrated with great fanfare the conclusion of "a great decade" of the Chinese Communist revolution, China had risen to the status of a major world power. Leaders in many of the newly-independent and developing societies were looking towards Communist China as a source of inspiration and as a model to be emulated, and most outside observers were genuinely impressed by the remarkable achievements wrought by the Chinese Communist leadership,[1] even though those achievements fell short of the proclaimed goals of the regime.

As the Peking regime celebrates its 20th anniversary on October 1 this year, its situation stands in striking contrast to that of ten years ago. As a consequence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) and the political turmoil it generated over the past three years, the once coherent and self-confident leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been shattered, and the tightly centralized party apparatus of the first decade has been fragmented and replaced by a new regionally-based and military-dominated power structure. China's economy, after barely recovering from the serious dislocations of the Great Leap Forward of 1958, has also been adversely affected by the disruptions of the past three years, forcing the apparent abandonment of the third Five-Year Plan, which was scheduled to enter into operation in 1966. In external affairs, too, the last decade has seen Communist China fall into a state of increasing diplomatic isolation, with her international prestige and influence undergoing a marked decline.

This article proposes, first, to survey the major developments both on the domestic scene and in the foreign relations of Communist China during the period 1959-1969, and second, to analyze current political trends in the People's Republic following the Ninth Party Congress of last April.

The Economy in Review

While the first decade of Communist rule produced, on balance, a substantial record of achievement in the development of the mainland economy, the second decade has been beset with enormous economic difficulties from the very start. In 1958, Mao Tse-tung, dissatisfied with the progress of the economy during the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), had launched the "Great Leap Forward" program, intended to "transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country" virtually overnight. The already ambitious output targets previously set were scrapped in favor of higher goals which then were successively raised even higher, projecting rates of development that were unprecedented in China or anywhere else. To speed industrialization, the regime initiated a reckless drive to mobilize millions of rural villagers throughout China, using local resources, to build small backyard factories for the production of pig iron, steel, and other commodities. Most startling of all, within the brief span of a few months, in the fall of 1958, China's almost 750,000 collective farms were amalgamated into some 26,000 much larger communes in a move propagandized as a giant advance towards full communism but primarily designed to enhance the regime's ability to mobilize rural manpower and resources for state-directed projects.

Catastrophe soon followed. Agricultural failures and serious economic dislocations caused by the excesses and irrationalities of the Great Leap and commune movements, further aggravated by the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technical aid in 1960 and by natural calamities in 1959 and 1960, produced an economic crisis of major proportions in China during 1960-62. Food rations sank to subsistence levels for the nation as a whole, and there was outright starvation in some areas.

In order to salvage the situation, the regime found itself compelled, in the latter half of 1960, virtually to dismantle the grandiose Great Leap and communes programs. To camouflage this retreat, the leadership put forward a new slogan: "Agriculture is the foundation and industry the leading factor in the economy"—which meant in practice that priority was to be shifted to agriculture and more attention paid to light and consumer goods industries (especially those serving agriculture), with a corresponding slowdown in capital construction for heavy industry. By 1962, overall industrial production had declined to the 1957 level.[2]

[1] See, *e.g.*, Howard L. Boorman, "China and the Global Revolution"; C. F. Fitzgerald, "Order, Power and Modernization"; and Benjamin Schwartz, "Totalitarian Consolidation and the Chinese Model"—all in *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1960.

[2] For an excellent analysis of the Chinese economy in this period, see Choh-ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958-63," in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), *China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1960, pp. 147-62.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The commune system was simultaneously abandoned in fact, if not in name. By 1962, the "production teams," generally consisting of 20-30 households and constituting the lowest level of the three-layer commune structure, had again been made the owners of the means of production and the basic accounting units in the commune, thus reverting in effect to the pre-1958 system of elementary agricultural cooperatives. To solve the desperate food situation, the regime was also obliged to make important concessions to the peasantry, principally the so-called "three freedoms and one guarantee." [3] In various provinces, public land was allocated or divided among individual peasant households, and the latter were allowed to "go it alone" (engage in private farming)—a cardinal sin in the collective economy. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, then Secretary-General of the party, is said to have justified this retreat from the principle of collectivization with the remark: "So long as it raises output, going it alone is permissible. White or black, so long as the cats catch mice, they are good cats." [4]

From 1963 on, thanks largely to the more pragmatic measures successfully advocated by the moderate elements in the leadership, grain production increased, and the food shortage eased. Capital construction in the crucial chemical-fertilizer and petroleum industries went up. By the end of 1965, China's economy had at last recovered lost ground and, in some sectors, even scored notable gains over pre-Leap levels.[5] Peking announced the beginning of the third Five-year Plan in January 1966 but failed to make public any specific production targets. This reticence probably reflected sharp disagreement within the leadership over the goals and methods of the plan, with Mao and the militants apparently demanding a return to the Great Leap approach and the moderates urging a continuation of the pragmatic policies that had put the economy back on an even keel.

Since 1966, the disorder and violence accompanying the GPCR have once again given rise to serious economic difficulties. Industrial production in 1967—hard hit by transport tie-ups, coal shortages, and labor strikes and unrest—dropped some 15 percent below 1966, and it is estimated that industrial output in 1968 only approximated or slightly exceeded the level of 1967.[6] In agriculture, a bumper harvest in 1967 thanks to excellent weather served to brighten an otherwise gloomy economic picture; [7] but in 1968 agricultural output again dropped off as a result of less favorable weather conditions, fertilizer shortages, and the deteriorating morale of the cadres in rural areas.[8]

Meanwhile, Communist China's foreign trade is estimated to have declined from US $4.3 billion in 1966 (the peak year) to US $3.8 billion in 1967, and US $3.6 billion in 1968.[9] It is interesting to note in this connection that whereas the Soviet Union was Communist China's biggest trading partner during the period 1950-59 (the USSR, in 1959, supplied 47.4 percent of China's total imports and took 49.5 percent of her total exports), the direction of Chinese trade changed markedly after 1960 because of the Sino-Soviet conflict, with Japan, Hong Kong, West Germany, Singapore, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and Italy becoming China's most important trading partners in recent years.

Political Developments

With the harmful consequences of the Great Leap and communes adventures becoming increasingly evident, the first real challenge to Mao's leadership

[3] The "three freedoms" were the freedom to cultivate private plots, the freedom to trade in rural markets, and the freedom to engage in subsidiary enterprises. The "one guarantee" referred to the production quotas underwritten by individual peasant households, with rewards for overfulfillment of quotas.

[4] See "Struggle in China's Countryside Between the Two Roads," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Nov. 23, 1967.

[5] Overall industrial output in 1965 was perhaps 50 percent above the 1957 level, with greater increases in specific sectors. *E.g.*, estimated steel output reached 10 million tons (or as much as 15 million tons, according to the US Bureau of Mines), doubling (or trebling) the 1957 output of 5.35 million tons; and estimated electric power output reached 35 million kilowatt-hours, an increase of 74 percent over the 1957 figure of 19 billion kilowatt-hours. In agriculture, however, total 1965 grain output, estimated at 200 million tons, exceeded the 1957 figure of 185 million tons by a relatively narrow margin. For these and other production statistics, see Edwin F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution," and Ta-chung Liu, "The Tempo of Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1965," both in US Congress Joint Economic Committee Report, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 71, 85, and 93-95.

[6] "China's Economy in 1968," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. VII, No. 9, May 3, 1969.

[7] See John R. Wenmohs, "Agriculture in Mainland China—1967: Cultural Revolution Versus Favorable Weather," *ibid.*, Vol. V, No. 21, December 15, 1967.

[8] Grain production for 1968 is estimated at 182 million tons, as compared with 190 million tons in 1967. Output of "economic" crops—cotton, oilseeds, sugar, tobacco, etc.—is also believed to have fallen below 1967 levels. See "China's Economy in 1968," *loc. cit.*

[9] "China's Foreign Trade in 1968," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, No. 13, July 1, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was already taking shape as the 1949-59 decade neared its close. A preliminary inkling of this came in December 1958 when Mao suddenly relinquished the chairmanship of the republic in favor of Liu Shao-ch'i (though remaining as head of the party). Although this was variously interpreted at the time, Red Guard posters displayed in Peking during the GPCR quoted Mao as stating that he had been forced out as chief of state in 1958 by Liu and other opposition leaders, who treated him like a "dead parent at a funeral" and subsequently failed to consult him on policy matters.[10] Whether or not Mao's reported claim is true cannot be determined with certainty; nevertheless, it is clear that his political authority and control over government policy began declining in 1959.

The rising opposition to Mao was confirmed at the August 1959 Plenum of the CCP Central Committee at Lushan, when a wide range of Maoist policies came under vigorous attack by P'eng Teh-huai, then Minister of Defense; Huang Ko-cheng, Army Chief of Staff; and a number of other military and party leaders.[11] Although P'eng and his "anti-party clique" went down to final defeat and disgrace after a tumultuous session, Mao's prestige and self-esteem were badly scarred in the confrontation. Moreover, the increasingly severe aftereffects of the Great Leap and communes programs proved P'eng's indictment at the Lushan Plenum to have been largely correct, with the probable result that not a few of those who sided with Mao and condemned P'eng in 1959 subsequently came to feel that they had done an injustice to P'eng.

According to later charges by the Maoists, a desire to vindicate P'eng and discredit Mao inspired the writing of a historical play, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui," which was performed throughout China during 1961-62. Written by Wu Han, a Deputy Mayor of Peking and a well-known playwright and historian, the play related the story of a righteous Ming Dynasty minister who returned land to the peasants and brought oppressive and corrupted officials to justice, only to be cashiered for his efforts through court intrigue.[12] There now seems to be little doubt that this play was in fact a veiled indictment of P'eng's 1959 dismissal and hence an attack on Mao's leadership. At any rate, it was a critique of Wu Han's play, reportedly written at Mao's instigation and published in a Shanghai newspaper in November 1965,[13] that proved to be the opening shot in the GPCR.

The cleverly-concealed attacks on Maoist leadership written by Wu Han and other dissident intellectuals,[14] coupled with the fact that they could be published without hindrance by the official censors, clearly attested to the decline of Mao's prestige and of his grip on the party and state apparatus. Whether it was because of opposition pressure within the leadership, of preoccupation with the widening Sino-Soviet rift, or of his unwillingness to preside over the liquidation of his utopian programs—or, more probably, because of a combination of all these factors—Mao abstained to a considerable degree, after 1959, from active participation in the day-to-day formulation and implementation of domestic policy. Although his formal approval of major policy decisions was apparently sought by his colleagues, it seems clear that he had temporarily lost a large measure of control over the decision-making process.

As soon as the national economy showed signs of recovery, however, Mao attempted to make the party once again responsive to his will. During a party conference in Peitaiho in August 1962 and again at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee the following month, he demanded the rescission or restriction of the "revisionist" measures that had been taken to salvage the disasters of the three preceding years and the launching of a new campaign to revive ideological enthusiasm and restore discipline among party cadres at all levels. This time, however, Mao's intervention was only partially successful. For while the Plenum went along with his demand for an intensified campaign of "socialist education," most of the remedial measures that had contributed significant-

[10] See Tokyo dispatches in *The New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1967.

[11] A considerable amount of generally credible new information concerning the Lushan showdown has come to light in the course of the GPCR. P'eng Teh-huai's "Letter of Opinion," in which he set forth his criticisms of Maoist policies, and other relevant materials are translated in *Current Background* (Hong Kong: hereafter cited as *CB*), No. 851, April 28, 1968. Chinese Communist official sources have also published the formal party resolution that repudiated P'eng in 1959, and other informative materials (see *Peking Review*, No. 34, Aug. 18, 1967).

[12] Wu Han, *Hai Jui Pa Kuan* (The Dismissal of Hai Jui), Peking, Peking Ch'u-pan-she, 1961.

[13] Yao Wen-yuan, "A Criticism of the New Historical Play, 'The Dismissal of Hai Jui,'" *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), Nov. 10, 1965; reprinted in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Nov. 30, 1965.

[14] On the anti-Maoist writings of Wu Han and others, see Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6 (November-December), 1966, p. 4.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly to China's economic recovery were left intact. Thus, it would appear that some of Mao's former loyal supporters in the central leadership, such as Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and P'eng Chen (a Politburo member and First Secretary of the Peking Party Committee), as well as many provincial party chiefs who had supported his radical policies in the 1950's, were now no longer inclined to follow his lead uncritically.

The implementation of the intensified socialist education campaign, which began in May 1963 and dragged on into 1965, itself provided fresh evidence of the growing fissures behind the central leadership's outer facade of unity. There were abrupt and bewildering shifts in the emphasis, targets, and objectives of the campaign as first Mao and his supporters, then Liu and Teng (the party's "organization men"), and finally the Maoists again, apparently gained the upper hand in issuing successive, conflicting instructions or directives in the name of the Central Committee. Althought it was Mao who had the final word in this protracted, seesaw battle, the last of the Central Committee directives on the socialist education campaign—issued in January 1965 and believed to have been chiefly Mao's handiwork—seemed to reflect his conviction that the existing party organization could no longer be relied upon to act as a faithful executor of his will. The directive sounded a new and startling note in referring to "persons in authority within the party taking the capitalist road"—a phrase that was to become a *leitmotif* of the much larger struggle that began unfolding in 1966—the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.[15]

The GPCR, without question, has been the most important development of the last decade in the politics of Communist China. The causes, evolution, and impact of this unprecented upheaval have been explored in detail by many specialists on Chinese Communist affairs in this journal and elsewhere,[16] and they therefore need not be reviewed here. Suffice it to note that the serious conflicts which developed within the CCP leadership in 1965 over a broad range of domestic issues (particularly, the socialist education campaign, rectification in the field of art and literature, and the strategy of economic development) as well as over foreign policy (especially the war in Vietnam and Sino-Soviet relations), and which immediately precipitated the GPCR, were essentially a continuation of earlier dissensions among the leaders, whose area of consensus had steadily narrowed over the years. In a fundamental sense, then, the GPCR represented a final, extreme effort by Mao to ferret out the opposition to his program and recapture control of the future direction of the Chinese revolution.

Foreign Relations

The Sino-Soviet conflict has clearly been the most crucial foreign policy issue facing the Chinese leaders in the last decade—as well as one of the most portentous developments in the international politics of the 1960's. When Communist China emerged on the world scene in 1949, the CCP leaders adopted a policy of "leaning to one side" in world affairs and formed an alliance with the Soviet Union—a relationship which they believed would enable China not only to obtain Soviet material and technical assistance for her domestic economic and military construction but also to extend her international influence. Even before the first decade drew to a close, however, Peking found its hopes in the former area dashed by Moscow's unwillingness to extend further aid to China's economic development and to assist her in developing nuclear weapons, and in the international sphere by Soviet failure to back China more positively in the 1958 Quemoy crisis and the 1959 border conflict with India, as well as by Khrushchev's efforts to develop a "peaceful coexistence" dialogue with the United States.

In 1960, Peking's increasingly vociferous demands for Communist militancy against the West finally erupted into open polemics with Moscow.

[15] For a succinct account of the conflicting central directives on the socialist education campaign between May 1963 and January 1965, see Charles Neuhauser, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960's: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, No. 32, October-December 1967, pp. 11-13. A detailed study of the campaign may be found in Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Campaign of 1962-1966*, Berkeley, University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1968.

[16] In addition to the articles by Mr. Gelman and Mr. Neuhauser cited in footnotes 14 and 15, a partial listing of articles on the Cultural Revolution is as follows: Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," *The China Quarterly*, No. 29, January-March 1967; Richard D. Baum, "Ideology Redivivus," and Franz Michael, "The Struggle for Power," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May-June) 1967; and Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," *ibid.*, No. 2 (March-April) 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From then on, Chinese policy moved rapidly toward an open political and ideological break with the Soviet Union, finally consummated by Chinese charges of the "capitalist degeneration" of the Soviet system and denunciations of Khrushchev as a traitor to the cause of Communist world revolution. The Sino-Soviet conflict was certainly a key factor in reinforcing Peking's highly militant international posture during the first half of the 1960's, which saw the Chinese Communists attempt to assume the leading role in pressing the cause of anti-imperialism and wars of "national liberation" both in colonial areas and among the emergent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

China's effort to forge a new anti-imperialist alliance among the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia did, indeed, produce results for a time. By 1965, Peking had established cordial relations with a number of sympathetic—though non-Communist—Afro-Asian states, such as Sukarno's Indonesia, Nkrumah's Ghana, Sekou Touré's Guinea, Ben Bella's Algeria, Nasser's Egypt, Ayub Khan's Pakistan, Sihanouk's Cambodia, and Ne Win's Burma. Meanwhile, the CCP had also secured the backing and allegiance of most, if not all, the Asian Communist Parties—including the North Korean, North Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Japanese—in its competition with Moscow for leadership of the international Communist movement. The image of Communist China's power was also enhanced considerably in the Third World with the successful detonation, in October 1964, of China's first atomic device, making her the first non-Western nuclear power. China's international influence was thus at its peak in early 1965.

However, the Chinese Communist leaders dogmatic concept of the anti-imperialist solidarity of the underdeveloped nations often blinded them to the national interests of the countries and governments they sought to influence. Thus, for example, Premier Chou En-lai found on his African tour in 1964 that Peking's denunciations of the United Nations and of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty fell on unreceptive ears; and in 1965, when the Chinese attempted to turn the projected Second Bandung Conference into an anti-American and anti-Soviet demonstration, many non-Communist Afro-Asian delegations refused to go along. Peking's professions of friendship for the national regimes of Third World countries were belied, moreover, by a strategy of fomenting local Communist subversion against some of the very governments it was seeking to line up in the united front against imperialism. The bankruptcy of China's Third World policies was sharply underscored by the political demise of some of Peking's best friends—leaders like Ben Bella in Algeria, Sukarno in Indonesia,[17] and Nkrumah in Ghana. From 1965 onward, China's relations with a number of Afro-Asian countries, as well as with Cuba, deteriorated sharply.[18]

China's militant anti-imperialist policies in the Third World and her challenge to Soviet hegemony in the international Communist movement were not decided without debate in her leadership councils. Premier Chou's accusation in December 1964 that some misguided comrades had advocated a capitulationist line of "three reconciliations and one reduction" (*i.e.*, reconciliation with reactionaries at home and with revisionists and imperialists abroad; and reduction of assistance to foreign revolutionaries) strongly suggested that the militant foreign policy line was not supported by every segment of the leadership.[19]

The escalation of the war in Vietnam after February 1965 appears to have markedly intensified the debate in Peking. A careful analyst of Chinese foreign policy has cited evidence for the conclusion that some military leaders, led by the then Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing (since purged), pressed for a reconciliation with Moscow in order to bolster China's national defense, coupled with more aggressive policy to forestall an American victory in Vietnam; and that a civilian faction within the leadership, consisting of Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen and others, likewise urged a rapprochement with Moscow, primarily with a view to regaining Soviet assistance in China's domestic economic development.[20] According to the same analyst, however, the faction led by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai won out in the debate, re-

[17] The importance of the Communist debacle of September 1965 in Indonesia cannot be overstated. The abortive Communist attempt to stage a *coup d'état* resulted in the virtual destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party and the overthrow of Sukarno, under whose protection the Communists had seemed on the verge of a complete takeover. Sukarno's replacement by an anti-Communist military regime effectively terminated the so-called "Peking-Djakarta axis."

[18] For a general assessment of Peking's foreign policy goals and performance, see Richard Lowenthal, "Communist China's Foreign Policy," in Tang Tsou (ed.), *China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 1-18.

[19] Chou En-lai's "Report on Government Work" (delivered to the 1st session of the 3rd National People's Congress on Dec. 21-22, 1964), *People's Handbook 1965*, Peking, Ta Kung Pao She, 1965, p. 12.

[20] Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-68.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

jecting both the demand for a hard line in Vietnam because it would greatly increase the risk of war with the US, and the demand for reconciliation with Moscow because Mao regarded the Soviets and Soviet revisionism as an even greater enemy than the Americans. Subsequently, in the spring of 1966, Peking turned down a proposal advanced by the Japanese Communist Party, with the approval of North Korea and North Vietnam, urging Chinese participation with the USSR in a united Communist front on Vietnam. The CCP's intransigent posture embittered Hanoi and strained Peking's relations with North Korea and the JCP.

During the GPCR, Peking's international position suffered further. By the end of 1967, almost all of China's ambassadors and key diplomatic officials abroad (except her ambassador in Cairo) had been recalled to undergo ideological "rectification," and Chinese Communist embassies everywhere were being operated by low-level officials. Not only that, but with a new group of militants temporarily running the Foreign Ministry in Peking, the Chinese government showed itself unwilling or unable to abide by the accepted norms of international diplomacy (including those assuring protection for diplomats), which were denounced as a relic of bourgeois institutions.[21] In July and August of 1967, when the GPCR reached its peak of violence and disorder, Red Guard mobs sacked and burned the British Embassy in Peking and harassed the embassies and diplomats of many other countries, while Chinese diplomatic personnel rioted in a number of foreign capitals.

Since mid-1968, Peking has moved to restore some semblance of order in its foreign relations. Particularly after the close of the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, Communist China sent 17 ambassadors back to their posts abroad and resumed more normal diplomatic relations with a few selected European countries (France, Rumania and Sweden, in addition to Albania) and more than a dozen Afro-Asian countries. Despite these efforts, Peking's diplomacy remains far from restabilized, with little or no indication that the revamped leadership installed by the Ninth Party Congress has agreed upon any new, long-range foreign policy.[22]

Rise of the Military

The political turmoil and breakdown of public order brought on by the GPCR had as their end result the rise of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to an unprecented position of political ascendancy in Communist China. Today, not only is the PLA the real locus of power in an overwhelming majority of the 29 revolutionary committees which are now the ruling political-administrative organs in all the provinces of the People's Republic; but it also has primary responsibility for implementing the regime's policies in factory, school and commune. The rise of the military to their present political preeminence did not, however, begin only with the GPCR. The assumption of political functions by the PLA and the process of gradual militarization of the system were already well under way.

The process can, in fact, be traced back to the replacement of P'eng Teh-huai by Lin Piao as Minister of Defense in September 1959. In his first public statement as head of the military establishment, Lin pledged the "unconditional loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the party and to Comrade Mao,"[23] and from 1960 onward he carried out an intensive campaign of political indoctrination in the PLA, centering on the study and application of the thought of Mao.[24] Mao evidently adjudged the army's campaign much more effective than those which had been carried out in the non-military sectors of society in the first half of the 1960's, such as the socialist education campaign and the ideological rectification campaign in arts and literature. Accordingly, the PLA was held up before the nation as the paradigm of the correct "Communist work style," and individual soldiers said to have distinguished themselves by their selflessness and ideological dedication, such as Lei Feng and Wang Chieh, were made models for emulation campaigns.

Further evidence that Lin Piao and the PLA were now the repositories of Mao's highest confidence was provided by the latter's call in December 1963 for the whole country to "learn from the

[21] See Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," in *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968, pp. 72-96.

[22] Ch'en Yi was not relected to the CCP Politburo by the Ninth Congress and appears to have relinquished his role as Foreign Minister. Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien has recently been performing Ch'en's former diplomatic duties.

[23] Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Sept. 31, 1959.

[24] See "The Resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units" (Oct. 20, 1960), in J. Chester Cheng, (ed.), *PLA Kung-tso Tung-hsun: The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1966, p. 64.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PLA," with all political, economic and social organizations directed to study and emulate the army's methods of organization, operation, and ideological training. That this call was an indirect rebuke to the party for having not done its job properly is unmistakable in retrospect. Even more important, from 1964 on, steps were taken to establish a network of "political work departments," clearly modelled after the PLA's political commissar system, in party and government organizations. These departments were staffed primarily by political cadres transferred from the PLA, and PLA veterans also took over many other positions in government, party and industry normally held by civilians,[25] while civilian cadres in the economy were sent to PLA schools for training.

It is tempting to view the present political prominence of the PLA simply as the end result of the developments just discussed; yet to do so would be to ignore the special and largely unforeseen circumstances that came into being with the unfolding of the GPCR. Although Lin Piao and the PLA played a substantial role in helping Mao launch the GPCR in the summer of 1966,[26] extensive PLA intervention in the GPCR was evidently not planned from the outset. In fact, it appears that many of the PLA's commanding officers were opposed to army involvement in what they considered to be an intraparty dispute and initially adopted a hands-off policy. Thus, when the Red Guards, following the 11th Plenum, launched their assaults on "capitalist-leaning powerholders" in the regional, provincial and local party structures, the PLA units on the spot stayed on the sidelines.

However, the intrigues, incompetence, factional infighting, and almost unlimited license of the Red Guard and "rebel" organizations soon disrupted economic production and public order, while little headway was made in the struggle to wrest control from the provincial power structures. It was only after the failure of Mao's grand strategy of placing major reliance on the spontaneous forces of the "revolutionary masses" that he turned to the PLA in January 1967 and directed it to intervene on the side of the "leftist" revolutionaries, thus opening the way for the army to become the dominant force not only in the GPCR but in post-GPCR Chinese politics.[27] There is little reason to believe that this outcome—so contrary to Mao's own dictum that the party must direct the gun—was anticipated by Mao or is desired by him today.

China's New Leadership

The Ninth Congress of the CCP, which met from April 1 to 24 this year and elected a new leadership, was supposed to symbolize the "victorious close" of the GPCR and mark the beginning of a "new" political era. However, the distribution of power that underlies the post-Congress political order remains essentially the same as that which came into being during the past two years: that is to say, it is one in which the military-regional forces, generally articulating conservative viewpoints and opposed to measures that threaten local stability, occupy a predominant position.

In the 25-man Politburo (21 full members and 4 alternates) elected last April, representatives of military-regional forces overshadow those of other political groups (see accompanying table).[28] More specifically, 13 of the 25—Lin Piao, Yeh Chun, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-cheng, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-shien, Chiu Hui-tso, Hung Yung-sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, Li Teh-sheng, and Wang Tung-hsing—actually wear PLA uniform.[29] Four of these—Hsu, Ch'en, Huang and

[25] It was disclosed in 1965 that some 200,000 ex-PLA officers and men were working in the "political departments" and other branches of government trade and finance institutions. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 18, 1965.

[26] It was *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, the organ of the PLA, that set the pace in the attacks on Mao's leading intellectual critics and their supporters within the party hierarchy (such as P'eng Chen and Lu Ting-yi) in the spring of 1966; and without the backing of Lin Piao and the PLA, Mao certainly could not have defeated and demoted such powerful party figures as Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing at the 11th CC Plenum in August 1966. The PLA was also instrumental in organizing and providing transport and logistical support for the hordes of Red Guards who journeyed to Peking in 1966.

[27] "Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left" (Jan. 23, 1967), translated in *CB*, No. 852, p. 49. This directive nullified the PLA's previous "non-intervention" policy and ordered army units to support the leftists by force, if necessary.

[28] This feature is even more conspicuous in the make-up of the full Central Committee. Out of the 279 (170 full and 109 alternate) members, 46 percent or 127 (76 full and 51 alternate) members are from PLA ranks. Another 127 are representatives of the provincial Revolutionary Committees, but of these, 71 are PLA men concurrently holding army and committee posts.

[29] The appearance of Hsieh and Wang in PLA uniform is somewhat surprising since they had not previously been identified publicly as holding army positions. One source suggests that they may hold top positions in the PLA's security apparatus (see Ting Wang, "Issues Revealed in the Documentary Film of the Ninth CCP Congress," *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), June 22-23, 1969).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Li Teh-sheng—are army district commanders and concurrently chairmen of provincial Revolutionary Committees.

Mao, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and K'ang Sheng constitute the hard core of the leftist elements in the new Politburo, while the usually more moderate civilian officials of the State Council are represented only by Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien. Two patriarchal figures of the regime, Chu Teh, 83, and Tung Pi-wu, 82, are also included in the membership but are not likely to participate actively in the decision-making process because of their advanced age.

In terms of political orientation, the new Politburo represents a balance of power between radical and conservative forces, with the scale slightly tipped in favor of the conservatives (most of the military members must be regarded as falling in the conservative camp). While it is true that on the Politburo's five-man Standing Committee, which presumably is the supreme policy-making body, the radicals outnumber the conservatives by three to two, it seems unlikely that this body will formulate policies contrary to the will of the majority of the Politburo. It is probably equally true that the Politburo would find it impossible

COMPOSITION OF THE CCP POLITBURO

(As elected by the Ninth Party Congress)

Members	Basic Position(s)
Mao Tse-tung*†	Chairman of the CCP
Lin Piao*†	Vice-Chairman of the CCP; Vice-Premier; Minister of Defense
Yeh Chun (wife of Lin Piao)	Director, Staff Office of the Military Affairs Committee (MAC)
Yeh Chien-ying†	Vice-Chairman of the MAC
Liu Po-cheng†	Vice-Chairman of the MAC
Chiang Ch'ing (wife of Mao)	1st Deputy Director, Cultural Revolution Group (CRG)
Chu Teh†	Chairman, National People's Congress
Hsu Shih-yu	Commander, Nanking Military Region; Chairman of the Kiangsu Revolutionary Committee (RC)
Ch'en Po-ta*†	Director, CRG
Ch'en Hsi-lien	Commander, Shenyang Military Region; Chairman, Lioaning RC
Li Hsien-nien†	Vice-Premier; Minister of Finance
Li Tso-peng	1st Political Commissar of the Navy
Wu Fa-hsien	Commander of the Air Force
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Deputy-Director, CRG; Chairman of the Shanghai RC
Chiu Hui-tso	Deputy-Chief of Staff and Director, General Rear Service Department, PLA
Chou En-lai*†	Premier
Yao Wen-yuan	Member of the CRG; Vice-Chairman of the Shanghai RC
K'ang Sheng*†	Adviser to the CRG
Huang Yung-sheng	Chief of Staff, PLA; Chairman of the Kwangtung RC
Tung Pi-wu†	Vice-Chairman of the Republic
Hsieh Fu-chih†	Vice-Premier; Minister of Public Security; Commander of Public Security Forces; Member, MAC Standing Committee
Alternate Members	
Chi Teng-kuei	Vice-Chairman of the Honan RC
Li Hsueh-feng†	Chairman of the Hopei RC
Li Teh-sheng	Commander, Anhwei Military District; Chairman, Anhwei RC
Wang Tung-hsing	Director, Staff Office of the CC; Vice-Minister of Public Security; Member, MAC Standing Committee (?)

* Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo
† Members of the preceding Politburo
NOTE: Except for Mao and Lin Piao, all names are listed in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order (*i.e.*, in order of the number of brush strokes in the Chinese ideograph for the surname).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to carry out policies inimical to the interests of a large number of Central Committee members, particularly those military-regional members who occupy key positions in the administrative apparatus counted upon to implement central directives. It is important to note, in this connection, that the dissension within the top leadership during the last few years not only has brought about a marked expansion of the arena of political conflict, but has also resulted in easier and wider access from below to political influence.[30] Consequently, those situated in the secondary and lower levels of the leadership hierarchy are now in a position to participate to a greater degree in the decision-making process and the resolution of conflicts.

Recent Political Trends

When Mao addressed the Ninth Party Congress at its opening session on April 1, he reportedly urged the Congress to become "a congress of unity and a congress of victory."[31] However, the unity and victory that the Congress was called upon to forge seem to have proven elusive, for two months later Mao issued another appeal in the form of a major editorial pronouncement.[32] This "latest directive" of the party Chairman was apparently made necessary by a resurgence of violent disorders in various parts of the country, where ultra-leftist "rebel" factions launched new attacks on the provincial Revolutionary Committees, provoking the constituted authorities to respond to the attacks with severe countermeasures.[33]

One of the main reasons for the resurgence of disorders has been the widespread dissatisfaction among the young "rebels" over the campaign to rehabilitate many of the party cadres who were ousted from office during the GPCR. This process had already been going on in the provinces for some time, but it was elevated to the status of an official policy by Lin Piao's Political Report to the Ninth Party Congress.[34] The central leadership has thus recognized that the administrative ability and experience of the former cadres are vitally needed in order to reestablish viable governing institutions throughout the nation. The reinstatement of large numbers of cadres, however, will inevitably entail a further weakening of the position of the "rebel" organizations in the Revolutionary Committees.

Judging from the harsh tone of another major editorial published on Army Day (August 1),[35] and from many recent provincial radio broadcasts attacking "anarchy," "factionalism," and "splittism" and appealing to the public to observe "revolutionary discipline," Mao's pleas for national unity and for a measure of compromise between radicals and conservatives in the interest of such unity have not as yet quieted political unrest in the country.

Moreover, dissension does not seem to be confined to the lower levels of the political structure. The slow progress that is being made in reconstructing the shattered party apparatus strongly suggests that there are divergences of view within the top leadership as well. While Mao and his radical supporters in the Politburo are anxious to see the party organization rebuilt with their own followers in key positions, the military have displayed no enthusiasm for party reconstruction.[36]

[30] The latter is evidenced by the unusually large representation of mass organizations (other than the Red Guards) in the newly-elected Central Committee: 32 full members and 23 alternates, and possibly most of the 24 members whose background is not known. It would be a mistake to view all these people as mere window-dressing without any political weight. In the course of the GPCR, the political role of social groups, particularly the workers, increased substantially. In fact, in late 1966 and early 1967, the provincial party authorities and the Maoists actively sought and competed for the support of various mass organizations, and since 1968 some regional military authorities and newly-established Revolutionary Committees have reportedly organized so-called "Workers' Provost Corps" to help maintain order and subdue the radical Maoist rebels. The bargaining power of the mass organizations has thus been enhanced, and it may be assumed that many, if not most, of the mass-organization representatives in the Central Committee play important roles in local politics, even though they are not well-known national political figures.

[31] "Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP" (April 14, 1969), *Peking Review*, No. 18, April 30, 1969, p. 42.

[32] Joint editorial, "Hold Aloft the Banner of Unity of the Ninth Party Congress to Strive for Still Greater Victory," published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, *Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, June 9, 1969.

[33] In Chekiang province, outbreaks of violent factional fighting in April and May led the *Chekiang Jih-pao* (May 8) to call for stringent measures to curb "class enemies" (actually, extreme pro-Maoist "rebel" groups) who were "sabotaging" party policies. For other examples of attacks on the resurgent activities of "ultra-leftists," see Hunan Provincial Radio broadcast of May 27 and *Nan-fang Jih-Pao* (Canton) editorial of June 2, 1969 (broadcast by Radio Canton the same day).

[34] See text of Lin's report in *Peking Review*, No. 18, April 30, 1969, pp. 16-35.

[35] Joint editorial, "The People's Army is Invincible," published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, *Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, Aug. 1, 1969.

[36] This impression stems from the fact that the recent major pronouncements of the regime have paid surprisingly little attention to matters involving the party. For example, Lin Piao's 24,000-word Political Report to the Ninth Congress devoted only a few thousand words to party affairs, and the joint Army Day editorial mentioned party reconstruction only in passing, including it in a list of tasks to be fulfilled by the PLA.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The almost total absence of concrete policy proposals in Lin Piao's Congress report further strengthens the impression of a lack of consensus within the top leadership on China's future course. This uncertainty is as evident in the economic as it is in the political sphere. Denunciations of "revisionist" measures such as the earlier-mentioned system of "three freedoms and one guarantee" in agriculture and bonus incentives for workers in industry have been rare in recent months, and earlier moves toward launching a new leap forward in the economy along the lines of 1958-59 have apparently been abandoned, most likely because of opposition from the conservative elements in the leadership. The lack of consensus on economic policy is bound to impede the formulation and execution of a long-range policy of economic development. Those immediately in charge of operating economic units have been functioning during the past two or three years largely on the basis of stop-gap measures. It may perhaps be true, as Allen Whiting suggests, that in China's highly atomized, agricultural economy, local management can keep minimum needs in balance and maintain a reasonable level of productive activity for an indefinite period, barring natural calamities.[37] Still, without overall national planning and direction, China's economic growth is likely to be much slower, and the regime will find it ever harder to meet the needs of the mushrooming population.

Looking Ahead

For the next few years the attention of the Chinese Communist leadership seems likely to be focussed more on internal problems and the building of "socialism in China." Reconstruction of the party machinery, reinvigoration of the economy and the restoration of production to pre-GPCR levels, the re-instilling of discipline in the youth who have enjoyed too much freedom in the past few years, and the reimposition of tight social controls—these are likely to be the national priorities of the leadership for some time to come. It is quite probable that this will mean a curtailment of aid to foreign revolutionaries and possibly some reduction of defense spending in order to channel more resources into economic development at home, no matter how stridently the national propaganda media may trumpet Mao's and/or Lin's militant international line. Despite the current tensions on the Sino-Soviet borders, China's military leaders are too well aware of the vulnerability of China's ground and air power—not to mention her own nuclear weapons centers—to sanction a policy that would risk war with the Soviet Union or the United States.

While a Sino-Soviet reconciliation is almost certainly out of the question as long as Mao remains on the scene, the future relationships between the two major Communist powers and between China and the United States will become much more fluid after Mao is gone. Much, of course, will depend on Soviet and American policies and on future developments in the general international situation. Some purged Chinese military leaders such as P'eng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing once argued for the maintenance of close ties with Moscow in order to obtain Soviet aid in advanced weapons development and bolster China's defense position vis-à-vis the United States, while other members of the leadership advocated a reduction of tensions with both Moscow and Washington in order to give China a much-needed breathing spell for solving her economic problems at home. Policy alternatives such as these are virtually certain to be put forward again, even though their advocates may now be in disgrace or discreetly silent.

That the new post-GPCR leadership has already been engaged in debate on the future course of Chinese communism was suggested by a lengthy theoretical discussion of Mao's doctrine of "uninterrupted revolution" which appeared in *Jen-min Jih-pao* on July 5, 1969. Purportedly written by a member of a PLA Rear Service unit, the article referred back significantly to the Sixth Central Committee Plenum of December 1958 (which toned down the Great Leap and communes programs and approved Mao's "retirement" as chief of state) and went on to warn against leftist errors, emphasizing that revolution must proceed in orderly stages. The article also invoked the hallowed authority of Lenin in support of the doctrine that "socialist revolution could first win victory in one country," thus implicitly taking issue with a statement on "uninterrupted revolution" which Lin Piao attributed to Mao in his Ninth Congress report.

All this suggests that Chinese policy today is in a state of flux, and that changes are certainly within the realm of possibility—at least after Mao's death, if not before.

[37] Allen S. Whiting, "China's Ninth Party Congress—'A Unity of Opposites,'" Part 3, *The Mainichi Daily News* (Tokyo), June 3, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution

By Richard M. Pfeffer

China's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" is too complex and too diffuse a configuration of phenomena to be "explained" within the confines of any single perspective. It has been described, derisively, as "really three things in one: an enigmatic multiple power struggle, wrapped in a crusade, and superimposed on a scattering of more or less spontaneous, more or less politicized student riots, strikes, peasant uprisings, mutinies, and palace coups." [1] Quite clearly, the Cultural Revolution, unlike Pallas Athena, did not spring full-blown from anyone's brow. While Mao appears to have fathered it, various groupings within the elite, the masses, and the middle levels of power have, for their own reasons, contributed to its development. Individual interpretations of its motive forces, focusing on one or more of its aspects and levels of relevant "facts," vary widely.[2]

We are not yet, and perhaps never shall be, at a stage where we can systematically appreciate all the facets of so momentous a complex of events as the Cultural Revolution. But if it is too early to set down refined theoretical frameworks for understanding the CR as a whole, we can at least begin to formulate tentative approaches toward understanding each of its levels of reality and the nature of the relationships among certain of those levels. This article focuses on what Mao Tse-tung has been attempting to accomplish through the CR. The assumptions behind this focus are twofold: 1) Mao's intentions are significant in shaping the

[1] W.A.C. Adie, "China's 'Second Liberation' in Perspective," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Chicago), February 1969, p. 14.

Mr. Pfeffer is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, Md.) and editor of No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy, *New York, Harper & Row, 1968. The present article is a condensed version of an essay that will be published in 1970 by the Free Press, New York, in a book edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya.*

[2] See, *e.g.*, Benjamin Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1968, pp. 1-17; Franz Schurmann, "What's Happening in China?," *The New York Review of Books*, Oct. 20, 1966, pp. 18-25; and Richard D. Baum, "Ideology Redivivus," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1967, pp. 1-11. Baum's excellent analysis, which in part argues a "functional nexus between revisionism and modernization," suggests at least that Mao's concern over the deterioration of revolutionary values and spirit in the CCP is well founded. Much of my argument is in line with Baum's analysis, but Baum, like most American social scientists today, appears to assume the "rationality" of modernization and the "revivalist" irrationality of Mao's Cultural Revolution (see also footnote 11).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

events of the CR; and 2) Mao's "intentions" are, in some sense, knowable.

If the assumption that Mao planned the CR in advance and deftly manipulated it to his own taste requires a near-deification of the man, the contrary assumption that Mao simply played events by ear and in fact exercised little influence over their development trivializes one of the great men of the 20th century. The reality doubtless lies somewhere in between. Mao probably had no detailed plan for developing the CR; but, on the basis of his ideology, his personality, his experience as a revolutionary, and the actual course of events as seen in retrospect, it seems fair to conclude that Mao had a vision of what he sought to accomplish and an intuitive conception of the means appropriate to those ends. Moreover, although Mao's power to determine events is limited, the CR has reminded the world of the immense power of ideology and of a supreme leader who, to a large degree, can shape ideology, through propaganda, to fit his needs.

Undoubtedly Mao provoked the CR for a variety of reasons: he sought to achieve multiple goals, some minimal, others maximal. The minimal goals might be said to include the purge of particular individuals, the shake-up of the bureaucracy (in the manner of past but less intense campaigns), and even the temporary breakup of the party machine.[3] The maximal goals seem to have included the training of a successor generation in revolution by allowing and encouraging youth to wage "revolution from below" (*i.e.*, without the disciplined control from above characteristic of past intraparty rectification movements); the creation of a new morality and "superstructure" in China; and, more specifically, the reinstatement in practice of the revolutionary ideals of equality and mass participation, and the transformation of the nature of the Communist Party.

This article concerns itself almost exclusively with Mao's maximal goals, in large part because the dimensions of the CR and Mao's role in it seem hardly intelligible in terms of his more minimal goals.

Dimensions of the CR

Viewed from Mao's perspective, the CR may be taken as the latest and most striking manifestation of the historical dialectic involving leader, party, and masses that is at the heart of Maoism and the Chinese Communist Revolution. It represents part of the continuing search for a Chinese way—more particularly, a Maoist way—to carry on that revolution.

Few analysts to date have begun to take the CR seriously as a revolution.[4] Yet it seems appropriate to understand it as such. For while it is true that the CR is not a comprehensive socio-political revolution in the sense of the earlier Communist Revolution in China, it clearly goes beyond the limits of any lesser category of socio-political change. Through the CR Mao has sought to transform a whole culture and its central legitimating institution. If he has not attempted, in the classical mode of great revolutions, to eliminate physically the members of a ruling class, he appears at least to have tried to prevent members of the post-1949 elite from becoming entrenched to the point where they take on the characteristics of such a class. If he has not attempted a fundamental change in the economic relations of Chinese society, he has tried to an unprecedented degree to delegitimize, on the level of ideals, the individual pursuit of material gain. If, in short, the CR has not embodied several of the core elements of the major social revolutions in history, the reason is simply that the CR is the progeny of such a revolution, and its function is not to repeat the earlier revolution but to revitalize it.

Franz Schurmann, placing the CR in the historical perspective of a continuing Chinese revolution, writes:[5] ". . . for decades now, elite upon elite has been dragged into the mire of discreditation. . . .

[3] Regarding the last, see Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," *Asian Survey*, June 1968, pp. 465-88. The present author disagrees with Neuhauser's view that "the party as such has not been under attack . . . in the . . . Cultural Revolution" —that it is not the party as such and its "central legitimizing role as the 'vanguard of the proletariat' and the font of political authority in China," but rather the "party machine, the organizational command structure," which has come under Maoist attack. While I accept the validity of Neuhauser's analytic distinction between "party" and "party machine," I argue in this paper that Mao has attacked the party as such, not to destroy it, but to transform it. It is precisely the party's exclusive legitimizing role that has been brought into question.

[4] One notable exception is William Hinton, who appears to have become a straightforward Maoist. He writes in his most recent article: "The world has never witnessed anything to approach, not to mention equal, this mass mobilization . . . as hundreds of millions entered the arena of political action" ("Hinton Re-examines 'Fanshen'," *Progressive Labor*, February 1969, p. 107).

[5] "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Ideology and Organization," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, Vol. I, Book 2, p. 551.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today the new elite of the party is sharing their fate." In this sense, the CR is a testament to the fact that social revolutions which are not permanent revolutions tend to eliminate one mode of inequality—*e.g.*, the inequality of traditional societies—only to establish another mode of inequality. The events in China suggest that Mao, the visionary, is no longer satisfied with such a substitution.

The CR was directed against Communist China's "New Class," to use Djilas' term. Its first-stated aim, "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road," [6] can be meaningfully understood only in this sense. In Mao's view, the growth of such an "increasingly privileged and powerful social stratum in command of . . . [China's] politico-economic apparatus" [7]—paralleling developments in other socialist countries—posed the threat of death to the Chinese Revolution.[8]

Inextricably related to the growth of this stratum has been a decline in the Chinese popular spirit of revolutionary solidarity and sacrifice. To quote two sympathetic yet perceptive American observers of recent Chinese Communist development,

> **. . . life has become "privatized," especially among the youth, who tend increasingly to concentrate on their careers and to neglect social responsibilities; admiration for the material achievements and the supposedly freer ways of the affluent capitalist societies has grown; an abyss has opened up between the style of life and modes of thought of the leading stratum on the one hand and the still poor, toiling masses on the other.**[9]

Mao and his supporters have increasingly come to believe that these trends, if unrestrained, will sooner or later result in the "restoration of capitalism."

Revolution Against History

But viewed in this light, the CR also seems to be a revolution against history—that is, against what appears to be the inevitable development of a privileged stratum in the process of economic development, or, even more boldly, against modernization itself.[10] Never in history has there been a revolution that has continued to place the same high ideal and practical value on egalitarianism and mass participation once the mobilization and destructive phases of the revolution were completed. As every major social revolution became institutionalized, egalitarianism and mass participation have been substantially sacrificed in favor of other goals such as national power or modernization. It is this historical pattern—again repeating itself in post-1949 China—that Mao has sought to combat through the CR.

It is not clear whether Mao still embraces modernization as a major goal of the Chinese Revolution. If he does, then—in the words of the observers quoted above—"it makes no sense to talk about completely preventing the growth of a privileged stratum" since "that is part of the necessary price of economic development," but "it [still] does make sense to talk about limiting the power of this stratum, keeping its privileges to the necessary minimum, and preventing it from solidifying its position and transforming its vested interests into [the equivalent of] inheritable property rights." [11] If this, indeed, has been one of Mao's aims in the CR, his decision to make allies of the very young—particularly those below college age who are neither dominated by traditional mores nor tainted by careerism—is readily understandable. For one of the difficulties of preventing the development of a new ruling class is that many members of the very groups that have the greatest interest in preventing it too frequently "still live under the influence of old moral and religious ideas which sanction and sanctify the privileges of the few and confer legitimacy on their rule." [12] This problem has been compounded in China since 1949 by the elitist and careerist element in the Communist Party. The thinking of Mao and his allies is probably well summarized by Huberman and Sweezy when they point out that the initiative in preventing

[6] "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Peking Review*, Aug. 12, 1966, p. 6.

[7] Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, "The Cultural Revolution in China," *Monthly Review* (New York), January 1967, as reprinted by the Radical Education Project, p. 11.

[8] The use of the death imagery is suggested by Robert J. Lifton's *Revolutionary Immortality*, New York, Random House, 1968.

[9] Huberman and Sweezy, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

[10] Insofar as the CR appears to be a revolution against modernization, it is no wonder that many American social scientists have tended to deride it. In the United States today, modernization has come to be worshipped as a kind of new Hegelianism combining the "is" and the "ought" in history. Despite reservations, American social scientists generally tend to treat it as both inevitable and good. Even so perceptive an observer as Robert Lifton concludes that Mao, in trying to confront some of the problems connected with modernization, is out of touch with reality and guilty of "psychism" (Lifton, *op. cit.*). Also see Baum, *loc. cit.*

[11] Huberman and Sweezy, *op. cit.*, p. 13 (italics deleted).

[12] *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the emergence of a new ruling class therefore devolved upon

those, both in the leadership and in the rank and file, who made the revolution and remain uncorrupted by the temptations of actual or potential privilege. It is up to them to lead the struggle and to enlist as much support as possible from the ranks of the underprivileged and the uncorrupted. If those who made the revolution fail in this task, or if they do not understand its necessity . . . then they will have put their country firmly on what the Chinese [*i.e.*, the Maoists] call the capitalist road, and their successors who never had their revolutionary experience and understanding will almost certainly not be able, and in all probability will not want, to divert it from that road.[13]

In the 1950's and 1960's, the Chinese party leadership, as it turned to the task of reconstruction and economic development, undertook a series of campaigns aimed in part at maintaining the revolutionary elan. The CR, viewed in this perspective, might be understood as a bigger and more ambitious campaign to protect certain revolutionary goals while continuing the drive toward modernization. In this interpretation, the Maoists are seen as continuing to embrace the goals of modernization but hoping, through the CR, to minimize the negative social implications of the modernization process. Thus, according to Huberman and Sweezy:

Mao and his colleagues are realists enough to know that it will be a long . . . time before China can hope to wipe out substantial inequalities. The target [of the CR] is the privileged ones who are misusing their power to promote special and private interests. . . .The method of dealing with them is not terror [selectively] wielded by a secret police . . . but the mobilization of [certain of] the unprivileged and particularly the youth who have not yet been exposed to the temptations of privilege and power. The [Maoist] . . . leadership evidently believes that if the privileged stratum can be contained and controlled and the young . . . won for the Revolution . . ., then the country can be kept from taking the capitalist road for at least one more generation while economic development brings closer the day when general abundance will make possible the real elimination of inequality and privilege.[14]

But if the CR, in one sense, was just a bigger and better campaign against the regularized abuses of the new privileged stratum, it was also more than that. Besides being an attack on those who abused their privileged positions, it was at the same time an attack on the legitimacy of the institutions and organizations from which privilege in Communist China arose. And it also appears to have entailed the relegation of modernization as a national goal to a lower priority. Seen in this broader context, the CR seems to have been an extremely radical attempt to establish what might be called counter-institutions capable both of limiting the drift towards hierarchy and privilege and of reasserting the revolutionary goals of egalitarianism and mass participation. The three central counter-institutions—none of which requires a high degree of disciplined organization, and all of which are therefore relatively free at least of the inflexibilities toward which organizations are prone—are: 1) the supreme leader; 2) the Thought of Mao Tse-tung; and 3) "the masses" as participants (the role of the masses being legitimized, in part, in much the same way as peasant rebellions were legitimized in China's traditional political system by the concept of the passing of the mandate of heaven).[15]

Leader, Party and Masses

The Chinese Communist political system since the mid-1930's has been characterized by a dialectical process involving leader, masses, and organization, a process that can be personified partially in the historical relation between Mao and Liu. In that relationship Mao functioned primarily as the radical initiator, the leader who set general directions, stimulated the release of mass energies, and worked to prevent the ossification of institutions. Liu, on the other hand, functioned more in the role of coordinator and consolidator of gains, the relatively conservative "organization man," the implementer on the ground.[16] Generally speaking, the mutuality and tension between the two roles has been healthy for the ongoing revolution.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp.13-14.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. See also Carl Riskin, "The Chinese Economy in 1967," in *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1968, p. 60.

[15] Ray Wylie ("Revolution Within a Revolution," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1969, p. 32) sees the role of the masses in the CR as setting a possible pattern for the future: "The Maoist press has declared that there will probably be more Cultural Revolutions in the future. That is, the people have in Mao Tse-tung's thought the theoretical basis—and in the present Cultural Revolution the historical precedent—by which to justify an attack on any future regime that loses its revolutionary elan and begins to drift toward despotism . . . Above all, it is an endeavour . . . to impart to them the ideal of a 'new China' and the idea that it is 'right to rebel' if a future regime betrays that ideal." In this perspective, Mao Tse-tung becomes Chinese communism's own John Locke.

[16] The perspective of Mao as radical initiator and Liu as consolidator was suggested to the author by Professor Tang Tsou's "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *The China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1969, pp. 63-91. I am grateful to Professor Tsou for having allowed me to read the manuscript prior to its publication.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mao, the great leader, has been consistently ambivalent about large-scale bureaucratic organizations. In part, this may simply reflect his personal and historical awareness, as a 20th-century Chinese, of China's two major pre-Communist examples of such organizations. Born in 1893, at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, Mao grew up while the traditional Chinese bureaucracy disintegrated. He also saw at first hand the efforts of the Kuomintang to build its own bureaucracy in Republican China, and he observed its rapid corruption. Thus, Ezra F. Vogel is probably right in observing that "Chinese Maoists are preoccupied with a vision from their past—the vision of the moral degeneration of a bureaucracy which is out of touch with the people, the core problem which led to the decline and fall of the Kuomintang".[17] However, this interpretation, by itself, fails to explain why Mao (and the Maoists) should be so much more preoccupied than other elements in China's leadership with the problematic nature of bureaucracy as an instrument for achieving goals—especially revolutionary goals.[18]

To understand Mao's particular ambivalence toward bureaucratic organization, it is also necessary to recognize the relevance of Mao's special experience in Yenan during the revolutionary war —an experience which some observers have seen as responsible for the so-called "Yenan syndrome" or, more derisively, for Mao's attachment to a "primitive political system." During the Yenan days of 1935-45, as John W. Lewis has pointed out, Mao functioned in the role of distant, charismatic leader of the highly decentralized guerrilla war.[19] In that role, he emphasized the positive function of the masses[20] and the critical importance of relatively unlimited struggle in maintaining a revolutionary environment; and he was habitually suspicious of elitist bureaucratic organization as the primary medium for waging revolution.

By contrast, Lewis argues, Liu Shao-ch'i operated in those days as chief political commissar (today's "party bureaucrat"), "fashioning a strong party-army wherein only limited forms of struggle were tolerated".[21] He ritualized these limited forms of struggle in tightly organized local party units, concentrated on the elitist organization of the party, and after the establishment of Communist rule in 1949 played a leading role in building the centralizing party bureaucracy. The result was that, by 1956, China's Yenan-type, flexible, decentralized revolutionary warfare organization had been effectively replaced:

> **Guided and dominated by party structure, that [Maoist] system had made the initial transition to an elite system according priority to the goals of modernization and the requisite recruitment from scientific and technical sectors of the society. The party apparatus was at its zenith, and the term "thought of Mao" [since resurrected and enshrined in the CR] was dropped from the 1956 party constitution. Charisma, now routinized, had shifted from Mao to the party, and with Leninism supplanting "the thought of Mao Tse-tung," the Chairman had subsumed his image under the party and lent it his authority.[22]**

Having basically eliminated, neutralized, and/or delegitimized all hostile competing power elites, the CCP itself became what Professor Tang Tsou has aptly termed "the establishment *par excellence*."[23] The party allied itself with leaders in all segments of Chinese life to form a privileged stratum which kept "the levers of power in various fields in their hands and [lived] fairly comfortably amidst the general poverty of China even during the years of agricultural crisis. . . . The party organization's sensitivity to the material interests of the various social groups and its ability to work with the privileged groups" enabled this stratum to operate quite effectively in modernizing China, but it also built up repressed dissatisfaction among the Maoists and among some dominated or underprivileged groups.[24]

Thus, the Chinese political system before the

[17] "The Structure of Conflict: China in 1967," in *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 102. Vogel's analysis is deeply informed and frequently brilliant, but it tends to ignore the significance of Mao's maximal goals, mentioning Mao's "major objectives" almost in passing, and treating the CR simply as a great and sophisticated Maoist-type purge. Power is the name of the game, and the relevance of ultimate values, if assumed, is obscured.

[18] Chalmers Johnson ("China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective," *Asian Survey*, January 1968, pp. 3-4) touches on problems of bureaucratic ossification and goal displacement in China. His description of the inefficiencies of bureaucracies, said to be particularly serious in Communist countries, drives another nail into the coffin in which theories of totalitarianism are destined to be buried.

[19] John W. Lewis, "Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution," in Ho and Tsou, *op. cit.* The following discussion of the roles of Mao and Liu in Yenan is based on Lewis' stimulating piece, but in stressing the different experiences of the two men, I do not mean to imply that other factors may not be equally important in explaining their divergent orientations towards revolution.

[20] For a discussion of Mao's "populism" and "his 'mystical faith' . . . in the rural masses," see Lifton, *op. cit.* pp. 83-85 and 110.

[21] Lewis, *loc. cit.*, p. 453.

[22] *Ibid*, pp. 464-65.

[23] Tsou, *loc. cit.*

[24] *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CR was dominated by a centralized, hierarchical, incredibly pervasive party-cum-privileged stratum, which has been described—again in the words of Tang Tsou—as "one of the purest forms found in human experience of a type of association in which there is a clear-cut separation between the elite and the masses".[25] In this light, the CR and, to a lesser degree, many of the earlier Maoist-type mass campaigns can be viewed as a critique of, and reaction against, this elitist type of political system.

The Mission of the Party

But with the perspective of the dialectical process between leader and party in mind, Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seems to have been less purely anti-organizational in character than has been generally assumed. The CR appears rather to have been aimed at reasserting, on a greater scale and in the face of intense resistance, the earlier balance between leader, masses, and party organization that prevailed in the 1940's. As such, it may also be said to represent Mao's attempt to reestablish the distinctive quality of the party organization—which is one key to any organization's survival and continued success.

The distinctive quality of the CCP historically has lain in the content and diffuseness of its goals and in its style. As Professor Schurmann has observed, the Chinese party, unlike organizations with narrower goals, has made its broad objective "not to produce organizational expertise but to make men into committed leaders who can command [other] men in a variety of concrete problems to be resolved." [26] The Chinese Communist movement has also been committed to achieving modernization, national power, and the ideal Communist society of the future, but increasingly after taking power the party found that it had little distinctive to offer with regard to the first two of these goals. Writes Schurmann:

The state administrative bureaucracy planned and operated the economy and seems to have acquitted itself well. The army was doing its best to provide for China's defense. . . . [And] looking at these . . . segments of the trinity of state power, one cannot but have the feeling that the role of the party was becoming increasingly unclear.[27]

The more the emphasis shifted toward modernization, professionalism, pragmatism, and the use of material incentives rather than spiritual ones, the more the party found itself deprived of a valid leadership role. It was left with its ideology, but without organizations for which the application of that ideology had any real practical value. At the risk of exaggeration, Schurmann writes that "during the period of liberalization in the early 1960's before the Tenth Plenum of September 1962, the 17 million party members had nothing to do except what they had to do otherwise in their practical roles (for example, as factory directors)." And he concludes that "to compensate for this, China's leaders decided to launch a campaign of ideological indoctrination designed to preserve the party member's leadership role in the realm of ideology, even if practically there wasn't much for him to do." [28]

But surely, given a continued concentration on goals related to modernization, such campaigns would simply establish more firmly the "trained incapacity" of party members to exercise meaningful leadership. If this is true, then only by reestablishing the primacy of the Maoist vision of the good society—a society that requires for its realization the transformation of human nature, requiring in turn a continuing cultural revolution—could the party hope to perform again a unique and significant leadership role.

The same point can be made with respect to the party's distinctive style, a critical element of which is the organizational technique known as the "mass line." As ideally conceived, this technique is a sophisticated method for encouraging participation by those at the bottom of the organization (*e.g.*,

[25] *Ibid.* This emphasis on the relatively elitist nature of the Chinese political system in the mid-1950's should not, however, obscure the complex reality of politics within that system. For an excellent and provocative article which begins to sketch out the contours of reciprocity in Chinese politics in the mid-1960's, see Michel Oksenberg, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-44.

[26] Schurmann, "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution . . ." *loc. cit.*, p. 538.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 546. See also the same author's "China's 'New Economic Policy'—Transition or Beginning," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1964, pp. 65-91, especially after p. 83.

[28] Schurmann, "The Attack of the Cultural Revolution . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 543. Schurmann's vision of the party in the early 1960's ties in nicely with the theory later set forth by Baum (see footnote 2). On the other hand, Oksenberg (in Ho and Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 494-96) diverges from Schurmann and Baum in wondering whether the attitudes and values of the Liu Shao-ch'i/Teng Hsiao-p'ing grouping might not be *less* conducive to modernization than those of the Red Guards. Several economists have also begun to raise such questions: *e.g.*, Riskin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 60-64; and Jack Gray, "The Economics of Maoism," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1969, pp. 42-51.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the peasants), for gathering information, and for translating high-level policy decisions (made partly on the basis of this information) into operational decisions on the ground. It is predicated upon a continuing process of interaction between leaders and led, the purposes of which are to stimulate initiative below, to reduce the feedback problem common to highly authoritarian or so-called "totalitarian" societies, and simultaneously, within the limits of practicability, to tutor the masses. Ideally, the mass line functions to avoid the twin extremes of "tailism"—responding primarily to the short-term demands of the masses—and "commandism" —simply ordering from above, without consideration for the desires of the masses.

With the regularization of party bureaucratic procedures and the increased emphasis on professional expertise in the early and middle 1950's, however, the elitist element in the party character tended to dominate patterns of decision-making, and participation by the masses came to be looked upon by organization men as regressive. As a consequence, instead of becoming firmly institutionalized as part of routine decision-making, mass-line techniques tended to be more and more embodied in periodic waves of mass campaigns which the organization men in turn viewed increasingly as antagonistic to party regularity. Such campaigns became *ad hoc* mechanisms for temporarily de-regularizing procedures and shaking up the bureaucracy. But in view of the hostility which the campaigns generated within the bureaucracy, the mass line tended to be employed erratically and without the organizational discipline and balance required for its successful functioning.

Leader Above Party

In the CR, Mao seems to have attempted to revive the distinctive attributes of the party described above. It can be seen that in some sense this required an assault on the party as then constituted, as a preparatory step toward re-instilling in it a sense of its sacred mission and special competence. The party, if it is to maintain its institutional integrity, cannot be concerned primarily with modernization, for it has shown no distinctive competence in this realm. Rather, the party has to concern itself primarily with the quality of life in China as measured, for example, by the standards of the Maoist ideal society. Such a concern may prompt the party to act at times as a counterbalance to the modernization process. If the likelihood of the party's success in moving counter to such forces can be regarded as less than certain, the long-run consequence of an abdication in this regard would be to assure the party's own irrelevance.

In recognizing and acting upon these facts of organizational life, Mao, in his assault on the party, ironically was acting as the great party leader. As Philip Selznick points out in his analysis of leadership, it is the function of "leadership in administration" to "define the mission of the enterprise" and to build "special values and distinctive competence into the organization." [29] He goes on to say:

> **It is in the realm of policy—including the areas where policy formation and organization-building meet—that the distinctive quality of institutional leadership is found. Ultimately, *this is the quality of statesmanship which deals with current issues, not for themselves alone, but according to their long-run implications for the role and meaning of the group.* Group leadership is far more than the capacity to mobilize personal support; it is more than the maintenance of equilibrium through the routine solution of everyday problems; it is the function of the leader statesman . . . to define the ends of group existence, to design an enterprise distinctively adapted to these ends, and to see that that design becomes a living reality.**[30]

Using Selznick's analytic distinction between "organizations" (technical instruments which are expendable, are designed to achieve relatively definite goals, and can therefore be judged on "engineering premises") and "institutions" (which are "infused with value" beyond their mere utility as a means and are therefore more resistant to change even if they are inefficient),[31] and as Franz Schurmann has pointed out, one can say that Mao has tried to de-institutionalize the party so that it can be judged by Maoist standards as an expendable instrument. Realistically, one also can say that Mao, aware that the process of institutionalization is a recurring one, has attempted to set leader above party, to elevate the Thought of Mao Tse-tung to the level of the highest moral standard,

[29] Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957, pp. 26-27.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 37 (italics added). Mao, as leader, can be seen as the receptacle of ultimate values. Dick Wilson refers to Mao as China's "conscience" in his "Where China Stands Now: An Introduction," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1969, p. 5.

[31] Elsewhere in this paper, the terms "organization" and "institution" are not used in the technical sense in which Selznick uses them. Selznick treats these terms as ideal types. In the concrete, the relationship between the organizational and institutional components in a particular unit is complex and a matter of process.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to establish the precedent of discovering vanguard elements outside the party in order to counter the natural tendencies within the party toward institutionalization.[32]

The cult of personality, which was used in the early 1950's to legitimize roles and institutions through association with a beloved and respected leader (thus, Chinese children's songs praise *Chairman* Mao), has in the 1960's been raised to new heights and used to place leader above institutions. The cult was thus forged into a weapon for assaulting the party and government.[33] Similarly, the Thought of Mao—which the 1956 party constitution relegated to second place by substituting the statement that "the CCP takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action" for the sentence in the 1945 party constitution that the CCP "guides its entire work" by the Thought of Mao Tse-tung—has increasingly been treated in the 1960's as a quasi-sacred, magical body of norms.

Mao's extreme reliance in recent years on his own personal authority and ideology reflects the seriousness of his predicament. As Tang Tsou points out, Mao has been "confronted with the very difficult problem of justifying his revolution and legitimizing his attack on the party organization," whose authority had hitherto been accepted as axiomatic.[34] Moreover, the pragmatic policies initiated by the party in the early 1960's have been highly successful. Mao therefore felt it necessary to use all his non-organizational weapons in order both to attack the still sacred aura of party authority and to "override pragmatic standards." [35] Mao's thought was elevated to a new peak higher than that occupied by the thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and therefore higher than the party or any ideology upon which the party might base a claim to legitimacy in opposition to Mao. This, notes Professor Tsou, served a definite political purpose by setting "a new standard of legitimacy and correctness with which the actions and opinions of many top leaders were to be judged." [36]

At the same time, Mao's strategy deprived his opponents of the capacity to attack him openly, forcing them in effect "to hide under the Maoist cover [and to] 'fight the Red Flag by waving the Red Flag'." [37] In other words, even when opposing Mao, the opposition found itself obliged to rely publicly for its legitimacy upon Mao's thought, thereby reinforcing his primacy. Thus, Professor Tsou rightly observes, the party organization had

The Continuing Revolution

All of our victories are victories of Mao Tse-tung thought and of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line. The practice of our socialist revolution proves that the theory, line, principles and policies of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat advanced by our great leader, Chairman Mao, constitute most important new contributions to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and have opened up a brilliant road for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration, and carrying the socialist revolution through to the end. . . . From their protracted struggles, the people of the whole country have come to realize the truth: Closely following our great leader, Chairman Mao, means victory. . . . We must carry on in a more extensive and deep-going way the mass movement for the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung thought and do an ever better job of ideological revolutionization. We must firmly grasp revolutionary mass criticism, carry out the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation conscientiously, carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution through to the end, and further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.

—From Lin Piao's speech at the mass rally celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. NCNA, Oct. 1, 1969.

[32] In the author's view, Mao is aware that his own personal authority and charisma cannot be bestowed with great effectiveness on another and has therefore sought to establish counter-institutions to protect his value concerns after his death (see below).

[33] The author's hypothesis that Mao has consciously used his personal authority, earlier institutionalized in the cult of personality, for grand political purposes is in contrast to the view that Mao is a supervain megalomaniac. While one may disagree with Mao's goals and methods, neither are, in my view, pathological. The "growing personalization of the Mao cult" (noted by Stuart Schram in his *Mao Tse-tung*, Baltimore, Penguin, 1967, revised paperback ed., p. 340) has been part of Mao's effort to play an active leadership role in the CR. By deliberately repersonalizing the cult of personality and recreating it as charisma—for example, by his numerous appearances at huge mass rallies—Mao has heightened his own capacity to evoke great emotion and to manipulate that emotion.

[34] Tsou, *loc. cit.*

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] See Vogel, *loc. cit.*, p. 106.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"to defend itself under the major premises and rules of the game laid down by Mao. All . . . organizations pledged allegiance to Mao and his thought. All . . . said that they supported the Cultural Revolution. . . ." [38] In short, the party organization was disarmed by Mao's capacity as supreme leader to manipulate political ideology.

Countervailing Institutions

The proposition that Mao sought through the CR to establish counter-institutions that would assure the realization of his vision of the Chinese revolution finds support in the new CCP constitution adopted by the Ninth Party Congress on April 14, 1969. In startling contrast to the 1956 party constitution, which lauded Marxism-Leninism without even mentioning the Thought of Mao in its preamble (general program section), the new constitution proclaims:

The Communist Party of China takes Marxism, Leninism, and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking. The thought of Mao Tse-tung *is* Marxism-Leninism of the era in which . . . socialism is advancing to worldwide victory.[39]

The document goes on to credit Mao with integrating "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution" and bringing Marxism-Leninism "to a higher and completely new stage." Thus, Mao's thought is once more enshrined in the party constitution.

By contrast, the references to the party in the new constitution are less grand than those in the preceding constitution, which called the CCP "the vanguard of the Chinese working class [and] the highest form of its class organization." The new constitution simply states that "the Communist Party of China is the political party of the proletariat." The text, it is true, later refers to the party in more eulogistic terms, but only in conjunction with Mao's leadership: "The Communist Party of China with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its leader is a great, glorious, and correct party and is the core of leadership of the Chinese people." Thus, the party as a separate entity is downgraded.

In line with the explicit emphasis on Mao's thought and leadership, the new constitution also praises Lin Piao as a most loyal and resolute defender of Mao's "revolutionary line" and, in a departure from past precedent, specifically designates him as Mao's "successor." The constitution thus takes the authority to determine the succession to the post of party chairman out of the hands of the party Central Committee, where it would normally reside, and assures Mao of a successor acceptable to him. Moreover, Articles 5 and 9, by comparison with the 1956 constitution, place heavier stress on the leadership role of the party chairman and vice-chairman relative to the rest of the party organization. In particular, Article 5 provides that if a party member disagrees with the decisions or directive of a party organization, he "has the right to *bypass the immediate leadership* and report directly to higher levels up to and including the Central Committee *and the Chairman* of the Central Committee" (italics added). Thus, the Maoist leadership is upgraded at the expense of the party hierarchy.

Finally, the constitution fully endorses the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and exhorts party members and party organizations to "consult with the masses" (Article 3) and to "constantly listen to the opinions of the masses both inside *and outside* the party and accept their supervision" (Article 5; italics added).[40]

Thus, taken as a whole, the new constitution appears to formalize Mao's effort to set up countervailing institutions above and below the party. Mao's thought, Mao's leadership—or, more generally, Maoist leadership—and the role of the masses are all upgraded, while the monopoly role of the party is downgraded.

Mao, Marx and Rousseau

Mao's experience in Yenan and since, his image of himself as leader, and his conceptions of the nature of the party and the masses all contribute towards an understanding of his goals in the CR. Beyond this, Mao's goals since the mid-1950's

[38] Tsou, *loc. cit.*

[39] This and other passages are quoted from the text as reported in English by *New China News Agency*, April 28, 1969; italics added.

[40] Just what "supervision" by "the masses" will mean in practice is unclear. The revolutionary committees which have been set up throughout China at all levels may well represent, in part, an attempt to institutionalize the role of "the masses," but the nature and permanency of these committees and their relationship to other institutions are problematical. Whatever is meant by "supervision," the vision of an active role for "the masses" will be an empty one if there is no institutional facility through which they can make their power felt.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may in some sense best be comprehended in terms of an increasingly observable rejection of Marxism-Leninism, accompanied by an increasing affirmation of Rousseauean concerns and methods.[41]

Although Mao earlier seems to have believed, with Marx, that economic development and moral progress were indissolubly and positively linked—that industrialization would produce the "Communist man"—there is little evidence that Mao today continues to embrace this convenient rationalization for withholding concern for moral progress while focusing on material progress. Like Rousseau, and buttressed by world history since Marx, in particular by the experience of having observed the processes and consequences of the institutionalization of the Chinese revolution, Mao appears to have concluded that "the arts and sciences (technico-economic progress) as they . . . developed . . . [after the Great Leap] . . . actually . . . [ran] counter to moral progress and contributed to all the corruptions of society" [42] and of the revolution.

And the parallels to Rousseau do not stop there. Mao's vision of the ideal society is very similar to that of Rousseau. Mao's good society is a kind of Christian utopia, collectivist, austere, egalitarian, and without the need for coercive institutions because it is composed of virtuous men who have internalized such values as self-sacrifice in the common good, and who directly and actively participate as a solidary mass in determining the course of politics. And like Rousseau, Mao focuses on the demand for a new society, the importance of education, and the role of the great charismatic leader who understands the needs of the masses, epitomizes the national character, and at the same time embodies their highest moral concerns. It is the leader who "liberates" the masses from their narrow particularity as individuals so that they can realize their human potential.

But there is a vital difference between Mao and Rousseau which is central to an understanding of Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution. Rousseau was a radical theorist without power. His primary goal, historically conditioned, was to eliminate the sort of immobile particularism associated with feudalism, thereby freeing man to understand the broader potentiality of his nature. Rousseau's mechanism for this miraculous transformation is the "great legislator," who arrives Messiah-like, fuses the people into a moral unity, extirpates traditional institutions which obstruct that fusion, and establishes laws and institutions to perpetuate the good society. Rousseau's whole scheme has frequently and correctly been described as an evasion of the central political problem of how the desired transformation of society is to be effected—an evasion accomplished by the invocation of a *deus ex machina*, the great legislator.

But Mao *is* the great legislator, *a radical in power*—perhaps the first in history who has substantially retained his radical purity after being in power for over a generation.[43] As such he must deal with political problems, the foremost of which is that there will be no Messiah to produce the ultimate ideal state. The cultural revolution required to "liberate" man must be accomplished through, not in evasion of, politics. The great leader must act in history. The problems of institutions cannot be avoided—neither the present problem of how to transform old institutions and men, nor the continuing problem of how to ensure the future integrity of those transformed.

In going beyond Rousseau, Mao has also gone beyond Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism in his effort to resolve institutional problems. He has sought in the CR to transform the most powerful institution in China, the Communist Party. As Benjamin Schwartz brilliantly argues, Mao has declared that the sacred moral values previously associated exclusively with the party are most purely found in himself and his thought, and that these qualities "may be shared by groups, institutions and individuals which lie *outside* of the party. Indeed, the party as such, when considered apart from . . . [the leader and his thought], may wholly degenerate. . . ." [44] It is the leader, his ideology,

[41] Marx's philosophy, especially his early work, obviously owes much to Rousseau. In this sense, Mao may be said to be rejecting elements of Marxism while selectively reaffirming the concerns of the early Marx. The following discussion of Mao and Rousseau draws to a considerable extent upon the work of Benjamin I. Schwartz, especially his brilliant "The Reign of Virtue . . . (*loc. cit.*, footnote 2) and his earlier "Modernization and the Maoist Vision—Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Goals" (*The China Quarterly*, Jan.-March 1965.)

[42] Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue. . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 9

[43] It appears that as 20th-century Americans we may be peculiarly unable to appreciate Mao as a radical in power and as a great man. We tend to view politics as "the art of the possible"—an implicitly conservative formulation. Radicals at home and abroad tend to frighten and annoy us. Moreover, while in the 19th century we had our voluntarist heroes—*e.g.*, self-made men and captains of industry—today we increasingly have come to disbelieve in the power of man's will in the face of overwhelming technological forces. Bereft of white, middle-class heroes at home, we may even resent great men abroad.

[44] Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue. . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the masses whom he can directly inspire, that offer hope of becoming a counterforce to over-institutionalization and the problems of organizational goal displacement.

Polarization of the Elite

But how and why did Mao determine to follow this strategy? In the 1950's, despite important differences of opinion within the Chinese leadership group over the priorities to be given to various revolutionary goals, there was a shared belief that these goals were compatible—a belief, in short, that by working for China's modernization and strengthening, one was simultaneously working for a Maoist-Communist China. Here again, the role of ideology, this time as a cohesive force, can hardly be overestimated. For Marxism-Leninism, the commonly accepted ideology of the leadership elite, combined a technological approach to history with a moral one. By promising simultaneous fulfillment of technological and moral goals through history, Marxism-Leninism strengthened the Chinese leadership consensus. Particularly in the early stages after 1949, the obvious tensions between professionalism ("expert") and Maoist politics ("red") did not seem unmanageable. Even the Great Leap of 1958 appears to have been conceived and implemented, in large part, on the assumption that the different revolutionary goals were not fundamentally incompatible: it was, to some degree, an attempt to harness the power of "redness" in the service of modernization, an attempt to accelerate economic development through mass mobilization and ideological exhortation, with politics in control.

But the failure of the Great Leap in the immediate economic and organizational sense (there were severe food shortages and breakdowns in organizational control) and the recriminations that followed that failure in 1959-61, including Marshal P'eng Te-huai's attack on Mao's leadership at the August 1959 Lushan Plenum, tended to polarize China's political elite into two groupings. One diffuse grouping, headed—we can say in retrospect—by Liu Shao'ch'i, P'eng Chen, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others, concentrated their attention primarily on organization-building, regularity and modernization. These men, the "organization men," were in operational control of China after 1959 and built up vested interests in the party and state organizations. In general, it was their view that economic development directed by the party and government bureaucracies would ultimately produce the desired Communist society. The other grouping, headed by Mao, was more radical and increasingly lost faith in bureaucratic procedures and in the Marxist notion that economic development would lead to the good society. As the two groups tended to polarize, the struggle between them became more and more a struggle for power—for the power to determine the course of China's development.

In the early 1960's, with the organization men in control of party, government, and economy and pursuing pragmatic policies, Mao moved rapidly to maximize his influence in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) through a series of internal campaigns to reindoctrinate the army with Maoist goals and techniques. Mao's decision to make the PLA the opening wedge in what he probably envisaged even then as a long-range and vitally needed campaign was natural. In many ways the PLA was the easiest of the three basic organizational hierarchies of China—army, party, and government—to politicize in Maoist modes of thought and action. In the context of the break with the Soviet Union and China's increasing desire to find a "Chinese path" of socialist development, and given the fact that of the three hierarchies the PLA had the least need to "produce" from day to day, Mao seemed best able to establish his model in the army. Despite some opposition from professionally-oriented officers, Mao succeeded in the early 1960's in fashioning the PLA into his most reliable organizational support.

In the years just prior to the launching of the Cultural Revolution, the prestige and power of the PLA's top and second-echelon officers increased rapidly under the tutelage of Mao and Lin Piao, at the expense primarily of the party and secondarily of the government. The PLA became the embodiment of Maoist virtue, thereby subtly undermining the party's prestige. PLA leaders assumed important political roles in the government and economy. And as the battle between Mao and the leaders of the Peking party organization became more intense in late 1965, the PLA's official organ, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (Liberation Army Daily) became for a time the most authoritative voice among the mass media, superseding even the party's own *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily).

On the other hand, too much should not be made of Maoist control of the army. While the PLA has probably been the most loyal organizational support of the Maoists, the events of the CR have made clear that its support has been substantially limited. If Mao hoped in the early 1960's to fashion the PLA into a truly revolutionary force, the prospects

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for success seemed dim by 1966. The key question has always been: *PLA support to do what?* The upgrading of the PLA to the role of Mao's staunchest ally appears to have been feasible precisely because Maoist demands for its support remained relatively restricted. Until late January of 1967, the PLA was significant primarily as a proclaimed model and as a reserve force which all sides were probably pleased to see remain on the sidelines—in part because of uncertainty as to what action it might take. In short, its role in support of Mao did not directly involve the use of its coercive powers. Nor was Mao's most vocal supporter, Defense Minister Lin Piao, called upon to test on any national scale the solidity and unity of this support.

Red Guards and the PLA

As the CR evolved out of elite polarization and certain mass dissatisfactions, Mao came to rely basically on two groups—the Red Guards (and Revolutionary Rebels) and the PLA. In retrospect, it can be said that these two groups functioned—ironically enough—in relatively specialized ways: the Maoist Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel movement constituted the force for seizing power from below, while the PLA substantially embodied the tendency to impose order from above.[45]

As the CR intensified in 1966-67, reaching its peak perhaps in August 1967,[46] it went through alternating cycles of attack and retrenchment—*i.e.*, of revolution from below and control from above. The attack phases were not fully controllable by the Maoist faction, not only because their intensity and duration depended in large part on the degree of resistance encountered, but also because, by the very nature of the CR, the capacity to exercise internal operational control over highly decentralized Red Guard activities was limited. Moreover, even where that capacity may have existed, its exercise often would not have been legitimated by the primary goals of the CR itself. Within the parameters prescribed by the exigencies of the power balance in China and the need to avoid excessive disruption of agricultural and industrial production and distribution, the Maoist central Cultural Revolution Group found it difficult both organizationally and on ideological grounds to impose internal control from above on a revolution they were trying, to stimulate from below. As for external controls, the usual instruments of such control—the party and the government—were themselves the prime targets of attack by the Maoist revolutionaries, leaving only the PLA as a potential restraining force.

In the first phase of the CR, from its inception up to January 1967, the PLA played a relatively minor role. In fact, most of the events of this phase took place outside and independently of any well-structured national organization. The shift from institutionalized procedures to mass meetings in Peking between revolutionary youth and the supreme leader was more than simply symbolic. The shift was central to the meaning of the CR as an assault on hierarchically structured control mechanisms. In this centrality lie both the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the CR.

When the CR shifted in 1966 from attacks on relatively defenseless members of the bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, and tourists to an assault on leading party personnel at all levels throughout China, it encountered expectable resistance. Red Guard units were disorganized and inexperienced. Organizational power, experience in political infighting, and vested interests were all on the side of the entrenched party apparatus. Even Mao's attempt to legitimize the onslaught and to delegitimize resistance to it could not compensate for these realities. Moreover, in the nature of the situation, the proper targets for attack frequently were unclear. The directives from the central Cultural Revolution Group in Peking—lacking as they did the organizational apparatus required to translate their vaguely stated and even contradictory goals into practical action—were subject at least to honest misinterpretation. As a result, the Red Guard units

[45] The Red Guard and Rebel groups were by no means all responsive to Mao's desires. According to John Gittings ("The Prospects of the Cultural Revolution in 1969," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1969, p. 24), "the real rebels were the 'have nots' of China—the unemployed students, contract laborers, unskilled workers, and others who looked on rebellion as the way to remedy their lot." But even many of these "rebels" were more concerned with the material improvement of their lot than with Maoist values: see Evelyn Anderson, "Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1968 pp. 12-21. In addition, other conservative groups were set up by "local establishment figures" in self-defense: see Allen S. Whiting, "Mao's Troubled Ark," *Life*, February 21, 1969, pp. 62 f. Naturally, all groups, whatever their motives, called themselves "Maoists."

[46] It is arguable whether the violence and dislocation of the CR reached their peak in August 1967 or at certain times in 1968, but August 1967 still appears to have been the major turning point. After that, as Ezra Vogel notes (*loc. cit.*, p. 118), "there was a serious attempt to rebuild local political structures," and the subsequent struggles "should be viewed in the context of rebuilding the organizations." Gittings also observes ("The Prospects. . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 24-27) that struggles in 1968 generally involved a jockeying for power in "the whole process of political consolidation and restoration of order." It became necessary at times for the radicals to demonstrate their strength in order to keep from being frozen out in the division and restructuring of power.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—moved by enthusiasm and/or self-interest—often acted erratically, indiscriminately, and too intensely. Once again, Mao could not have the best of both worlds: he could not, on the one hand, encourage spontaneity and broad-gauged attacks from below on bureaucratic organizations and traditional institutions in the hope that this would teach youth the meaning of revolution by encouraging them to wage revolution, and, on the other hand, expect to be able to exercise definitive control even over his own forces in the struggle. As Mao's ideology was severed from organization, ideology manipulated by the leader inspired attacks that led to confusion and chaos.

Mao's Dilemma

In January 1967, the turmoil caused both by the Maoist drive to "seize power from below" through the Red Guard (student) and Revolutionary Rebel (adult worker) movements and by the subsequent inability of the radical Maoist factions to unify and stabilize the situation made it necessary to call upon the PLA to intervene in support of the left and restore order. But as the military, during February, stepped into the virtual organizational vacuum that had been created throughout the country, it became clear that PLA loyalty to Mao did not mean comprehensive and unified support for his radical goals. In fact, as might have been expected of a military organization trained to keep order—or, for that matter, of almost any large, hierarchical, national organization—the PLA intervened, in terms of practical effect, more on the side of order than of the revolutionary Left. And the more it expanded its governing activities, the greater its stake became in maintaining production and order.

Thus, despite his extensive earlier efforts to radicalize the PLA, Mao found himself confronted, in the final analysis, by a contradiction inherent in the thrust of the Cultural Revolution. The spearhead of the CR was the youth movement and its "assault" from below on the establishment. But when that assault led to excessive disruption or faced defeat, it became necessary, temporarily at least, to impose order from above through the only organization that remained relatively effective—the PLA. Insofar as the latter retained its integrity as a hierarchically organized and still relatively centralized and disciplined organization, it was capable of imposing order on a national scale in response to Maoist demands from Peking, but as such it was likely to favor order rather than revolution, and its very use interfered with the goal of revolution from below. On the other hand, insofar as the hierarchical military structure tended to become decentralized and disunited—as actually happened during the summer of 1967—the PLA inevitably became less responsive to Maoist demands and more likely to be controlled by regional or provincial military leaders who had their own local interests and organizations to protect and were generally antagonistic towards the disruptive activities of the revolutionary youth.

Mao, in short, was faced by a paradox. He needed an organization to wage permanent revolution, but found that organizations tend, at some point in the process of institutionalization, to become counterrevolutionary. There appears to be no single organizational form appropriate to permanent revolution. Hence, the tenuous "division of labor" in the CR between the Red Guards and the PLA; but in that division, final power lay with the PLA.

The CR in Perspective

The major exploits of Mao's life, and the Cultural Revolution in particular, are events which outside observers (and perhaps many Chinese as well) have had great difficulty in appreciating. The sheer intensity of emotions that has marked these events, combined with the not infrequent use of coercive and violent methods and the masses of people involved, has tended to arouse anxieties and antagonisms in much of the world outside China. Generally speaking, revolutions tend to appear less costly and awesome the farther they recede into the past, becoming abstractions in the process; revolutions in the present tend to repel or disturb us.[47] How much more is this the case when the sort of revolution at issue seems incomprehensible, even in terms of our past understanding of revolutions? We were not prepared by that understanding to appreciate Mao's Cultural Revolution. In terms of classical revolutions, the CR seems "artificial," or even superfluous, and therefore obviously excessive and romantic.

Yet, many observers sense that something of historic significance has happened in China. Even if we do not pretend to understand its implications,

[47] Of course, the frequently hidden costs of maintaining the status quo can also be awesome.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we sense that a great leader has fused explosive idealism and intense power in uneasy union and, in the process, has released tremendous energies. In a meaningful sense, the CR has been a struggle waged by the Maoists both to reopen in the most comprehensive manner the issue of China's goals and to determine the issue in favor of their own objectives. The central question for Maoists, in the author's view, is the nature of the society (quality of life) that should be the "end" of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Mao reopened the issue because it became increasingly clear to him that the dominant means employed to institutionalize the Chinese Revolution, while conducive to achieving certain of the Revolution's values, simultaneously appeared to preclude the realization of other values more deeply held by him and others. To a much greater degree than in the Great Leap, the core issue in the CR has been structured dramatically in terms of a choice of priorities—a choice, in short, between "modernization" and the Maoist vision of the good society.

Viewed in this light, the CR should not be dismissed simply as an aberration, as just another succession crisis characteristic of "totalitarian systems," or even as a kind of transition crisis peculiar to a certain stage of a society's development—it appears to be much more than a developmental watershed. In the final analysis, the CR seems to epitomize the tension between reality and ideals (in this case, Maoist ideals). It involves conflicts between societal values, social change, group and individual attitudes and interests, and social organizations and institutions. As such, it may have meaning for the world.

China's Cultural Revolution, in this sense, is part of a worldwide pattern of movement-type challenges to established authority and to related bureaucratic structures, challenges based fundamentally on the stated ideals of the very social systems whose authority structures are under assault. This worldwide pattern transcends stages of development and particular cultures, and it increasingly articulates a worldwide consciousness and sharing of certain values, particularly among the young. While one may point out that the challenge in China differed from analogous movements elsewhere (*e.g.*, in France, Mexico, and the United States) in that it was initiated from above and developed in the context of a power struggle within the elite, the fact remains that the Chinese movement also forged a life of its own: it gained believers, developed with considerable spontaneity, proved exceedingly difficult to control, and sought to realize—too often by methods difficult for most Western minds to accept—a vision of a more humane existence.

China's Cultural Revolution is also part of a worldwide historical tradition having its own vision of how men should relate to one another and to their society—namely, the tradition supported by theorists and practitioners of anarchism and permanent revolution. As Michel Oksenberg observes:

> **Mao's policy may . . . be seen as an effort to secure the commitment particularly of the younger generation to the building of a more just society, a commitment that arises from participation in the revolutionary act of defying authority. Mao would rather delay China's industrialization than have its industrialization serve the purposes of an entrenched bureaucratic elite. In this respect, Mao continues to be true to his revolutionary heritage. At the same time, Mao shares with many the belief that bureaucracy and industrialization do not necessarily lead to an improved quality of life. To the extent that Mao's desire is to insure that industrialization serves the interests of his society, he is dealing with the central . . . problem of our age. Seen in this light, Mao cannot be discussed in terms of "success" or "failure." To call his system "primitive" is to do him injustice, for in many ways we are reduced to value judgments. And we can be sure that the faith in voluntarism, egalitarianism, and permanent revolution which captured a long line of revolutionaries before Mao, and which [has] . . . gripped Mao in his life, will continue to attract political figures who come after him.**[48]

In the opinion of this author, the problem of permanent revolution is not, as is often argued, only of interest to political theorists and intellectual historians. Nor is the concept of permanent revolution merely a romantic ideal of abnormal personalities ("romantic revolutionaries"). Rather, to an increasing extent throughout the world and—ironically—in advanced industrial societies particularly, permanent revolution is a fact. The motor for permanent revolution in advanced industrial societies is technology. But the problems presented are more universal: how to create flexible institutions which are responsive to popular interests, encourage direct mass participation, and are capable of controlling development on the basis of values meaningfully determined by the people.

The challenge of creating participatory institutions to deal with these problems is, in the author's view, at the core of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Only time will tell what Mao has been able to achieve in facing this challenge and what those achievements may mean in the concrete for China and for the world.

[48] Oksenberg, in Ho and Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 493-94.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Role of the Military

By Stephen A. Sims

With the Chinese Communist Party badly disrupted and demoralized as a consequence of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has emerged—at least for the time being—as the dominant organized force in the politics of the Chinese People's Republic. This fact was dramatically underscored by the proceedings of the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, which saw China's top-ranking military leader, Lin Piao, deliver the main address of the session—the Political Report of the CCP Central Committee—and which later formally adopted a new party constitution specifically designating Lin as Mao Tse-tung's "successor."

While certain ambiguities remain as to the exact distribution of power, the enhanced position of the military was clearly evident in the new composition of the leading party organs announced by the Congress. According to a *New York Times* report, "at least" 58 of the 170 full members of the new Central Committee are "important military men." [1] Other sources give even higher estimates. The Politburo includes, besides Lin Piao (who is also Vice-Chairman of the party and Minister of Defense) and the veteran Marshal Chu Teh, eight other military figures in its total membership of 21. These are Generals Yeh Chien-ying and Liu Po-cheng; Hsu Shih-yu, commander of the Nanking Military Region; Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Shenyang Military Region; Li Tso-peng, first political commissar of the navy and member of the National Defense Council; Wu Fa-hsien, air force commander; Chiu Hui-tso, PLA General Rear Services commander; and Huang Yung-sheng, army Chief of Staff. (Of incidental interest, three of these men—Hsu, Chen and Huang—came under Red Guard attack during the GPCR.)

The numerical strength of the military in the Politburo is not, however, reflected in its Standing Committee, on which Mao and Lin are joined by Ch'en Po-ta, Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng, three civilians. Certain limitations on the power position of the miltary also seem to be suggested by two other aspects of the Congress proceedings. First, while Lin Piao gave the major political address at the Congress, it was not accepted without change, indicating that his power is far from absolute. Second, the new composition of the Central Committee and Politburo was announced in a list headed by Mao and Lin but thereafter arranged in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order (the number of brush strokes in the Chinese ideograph for last names) and not in order of rank, the usual practice in the past, clearly implying that the distribution of power is an unresolved issue. The problem of civilian-military rivalry is compounded by the trend toward factionalism within the upper echelons of the

[1] *The New York Times*, April 26, 1969.

Mr. Sims is an American student of Chinese Communist affairs now working on his doctorate at the University of California.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

army itself; one observer has recently suggested that a state of equilibrium has been created in the military between groups whose loyalties and influence are based on long-standing field-army ties developed during the Communists' rise to power—and hence that Mao and Lin would be unable to count on the support of certain officer groups in a showdown struggle for power.[2] Thus, while the overall influence of the army has increased, it should not be assumed that Lin Piao's position within the military is entirely assured, nor should the potential for further reshuffling be discounted.

Whatever the distribution of power at the top level of the political leadership, the army clearly holds the reins in the provinces. Available evidence indicates that some 19 of the 29 Revolutionary Committees—created in 1967 to replace the old party committees as the ruling authorities at the provincial and municipal level—are headed by PLA commanders or PLA political commissars. In addition, the military has strong representation in the state administrative structure. According to sources cited by Mr. Parris Chang (in an earlier article in this journal), a number of high-level military officers have been appointed to the State Council, and some 33 government ministries are now headed by men transferred from the PLA.[3]

Obviously, the trend toward the assumption of civilian leadership roles by army officers and cadres is limited by the PLA's need to maintain its operational ability. Whatever further changes the governing structure undergoes, the bulk of positions within it can be expected to be filled by party and state cadres. Nevertheless, with military men occupying the key positions, the PLA could exercise an influence disproportionate to its size. The ability of army cadres to hold such strategic posts would depend in large measure upon the skills they possess, since the requirements for the effective governing of Mainland China are great in terms of administrative and technical know-how. In general, armies have not established successful records in attempting to govern developing nations. However, few armies can match the variety of experience possessed by the Chinese PLA.

The present article is intended as a brief analysis of the military's capacity to provide leadership in the post-GPCR regime. The assessment will be in terms of two questions. First, what tasks have actually been performed by the army in Chinese society, and consequently what types of expertise and competence have been acquired by military personnel? Second, what other manpower resources could be tapped by the PLA in staffing the government structure, and how reliable would such personnel be in terms of ideological outlook and loyalty to the regime?

Functions of the PLA

The PLA has become a relatively modern army of approximately 2.5 million men. The Korean conflict of 1950-53 led to a reorganization of the Chinese army along Soviet lines—including the creation or expansion of many technical functions—and Soviet equipment and advisors made possible rapid strides toward modernization. Organizationally, a system of ranks was established, and regular conscription was initiated. While titles and insignia of rank were abolished in 1965, the modern technical and administrative organization has remained, including engineer, signal, technical-service and armor headquarters in the ground forces, a general Institute of Military Medical Sciences and even a PLA Military Museum. The air force has also undergone substantial modernization, developing from extremely modest beginnings into a force of 2,500 aircraft by 1965. The detonation of several nuclear devices and experimentation with nuclear-armed missiles—areas that obviously involve military participation—indicate that the Chinese Communists have reached sophisticated levels of scientific knowledge in these fields as well. While the technical diversity demanded by these military or military-related functions may not rival that developed in the US or Soviet military establishments, it has nonetheless been sufficient to equip the PLA's leadership cadres with a wide range of administrative and technical skills.[4]

Moreover, the PLA is perhaps unique among the world's armies in the extent of the role it has played in the Chinese economy. First, it has participated on a significant scale in agricultural production. In 1963 the PLA delivered almost 1,000 million catties of rice to the state (1 catty = 1.333

[2] W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *China Quarterly* (London), January-March, 1969.

[3] Parris Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1969, f.n. 37.

[4] S. B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967, pp. 219-27 and Appendix B.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lbs.), reportedly achieving a 15-percent increase in its total grain production and a 20-percent increase in its meat production over the previous year.[5] In addition, demobilized military personnel have been used to carry out large-scale land reclamation projects, with much of the reclaimed acreage turned into state farms. According to the official New China News Agency:

Most of the state farms were set up from 1954 to 1958 by demobilized armymen of the Chinese PLA, who drained numerous marshes, hacked out roads, and build thriving settlements in former desolate areas.[6]

The report added that farms established on former wasteland between the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, in Heilungkiang Province, aggregated about 1,500 square miles in total area.

Army units have also been active in water conservation and flood control projects. In the Peking area, for example, PLA units in 1963 were said to have repaired over 450,000 meters of canals, dug new irrigation canals, and built 38 pumping stations.[7] A report from Canton dated February 8, 1964, claimed that 30 PLA companies in the area had performed a total of over 30,000 man-days of labor on 28 water conservation projects since the beginning of the year.[8]

Among other economic activities, the PLA has done considerable work in the spheres of industrial construction and mining, though it has had less direct experience in industrial production and management. An example of economic initiative on the part of the army has been the development of Sinkiang Province, which constitutes about one-third of Mainland China's land area and is entirely under military administration. To spearhead development, the army established the Sinkiang Military District Production and Construction Army Corps, divided into three components to oversee agriculture, industry and mining. The industrial section reportedly constructed a number of factories, and the mining section directed projects for the development of natural resources such as petroleum, coal and uranium.[9]

On a national scale, the military has performed an important function in the area of railroad construction. The PLA Railway Corps has gained a great deal of experience in the planning and engineering aspects of railroad building, including the design and construction of railway bridge and tunnels, and the laying of track. Related duties have included maintenance work and the operation of repair facilities for rolling stock.[10]

In overall terms, the economic work of the military reached its peak in the Great Leap period. According to Chinese sources, the army contributed respectively 59, 44, and 46 million man-days of labor to the economy in the years 1958-60. While these figures were no doubt inflated, it is clear that a marked decline has taken place since—*e.g.*, a figure of 8.5 million army man-days of economic labor was announced for 1963.[11] The decrease in time spent directly on production tasks has allowed the PLA to broaden the scope of its other activities.

The creation, training and support of militia units, a task assumed by army units in many areas, has served both to broaden the military's base of support and indirectly to aid production. Efforts to build up the militia have been carried on both in agricultural communes and in industrial enterprises; to cite one example, at a Canton shipyard a militia unit was established that functioned as an industrial shock force, concentrating on the crucial tasks necessary to meet production deadlines.[12] The PLA has also used its militia-building activities as a channel for political indoctrination, a reflection of its increasing role in the politicization of Chinese society since 1960.

In the latter role, the army has carried on a vigor-

[5] New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, Feb. 6, 1964; reprinted in *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 3158, Feb. 11, 1964, p. 18.

[6] NCNA, Peking, Nov. 5, 1963; in *SCMP*, No. 3098, Nov. 12, 1963, p. 22. Demobilized military personnel are discussed in this text both as a contributing source to PLA experience and as a potential source of PLA support. To help clarify the discussion, it ought to be noted that some demobilized military personnel assigned to civilian tasks have remained affiliated with the PLA on a reserve or detached basis. Included in this category are the cadres who helped to implement land reform, those assigned to agricultural cooperatives, and those transferred to economic and administrative positions under the "Learn from the PLA" campaign (see further in the text). However, most demobilized servicemen pass from under formal army control. A great number are transferred directly to work in the civilian economy, but they then come under control of the state administration. See John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 186-87.

[7] NCNA, Peking, Feb. 6, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3168, Feb. 28, 1964, p. 9.

[8] NCNA, Peking, Feb. 8, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3165, Feb. 25, 1964, p. 8.

[9] Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[10] Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

[11] All figures cited in Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[12] *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Canton), Sept. 24, 1964: in *SCMP*, No. 3342, Nov. 32, 1964, p. 4.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ous program of political education through a wide range of cultural activities. The PLA Art Institute, founded by Lin Piao in 1960, marked the beginning of the army's expanded role on the cultural front. The first class of the Institute, numbering about 100, was graduated in 1965; in the same year two generals were appointed as Vice-Ministers of Culture.[13] Meantime PLA cadres undertook the formation of singing, dancing and drama groups throughout the nation. In 1963 it was reported that military personnel had established over 1,000 art groups[14] and had produced some 1,000 stage plays.[15] The army also set up the "August 1st Film Studio," which has since developed into a major producer of revolutionary films.

All of these activities lent validity to the image of the PLA as a revolutionary model for Chinese society, a concept officially articulated in the "Learn from the PLA" campaign inaugurated in 1964. The slogans of the campaign proclaimed that the army was worthy of emulation by Chinese society at large because it had successfully applied the "four firsts" and "three-eight" working style, thereby achieving the Maoist goal of being both ideologically correct and professionally competent.[16] In practical terms, the campaign served to endorse the direct transfer of military cadres to positions in the administrative and economic structure in order to provide civilians with firsthand experience of the PLA "style of work." (Actually, such transfers had already begun in 1963, well before the "official" announcement of the campaign in February 1964, suggesting that a trial period was undertaken to avoid the incautious excesses of the Great Leap Forward.) Some civilian cadres were also sent to PLA training schools.

The launching of the "Learn from the PLA" campaign was followed up by the creation of "military-type" political-work departments for economic affairs, attached at the top level to the CCP Central Committee and extending down through the state administrative apparatus to all basic-level economic units. Separate networks were established for Finance and Trade, Industry and Transportation, and Agriculture and Forestry. The composition of these departments included PLA, CCP and administrative cadres at all levels. Several high-ranking posts were filled by military men, including the deputy directors of the departments for Agriculture and Forestry and for Finance and Trade. At lower levels, while the PLA cadres were not in a majority, their numbers were nevertheless significant. In Heilungkiang Province, 32 percent of the positions of political instructor and political teacher in basic-level economic units were held by demobilized PLA cadres. In Honan the combined figure for demobilized PLA and administrative cadres was 40 percent.[17]

The "Learn from the PLA" campaign foresaw the extension of the military's influence—for the first time on any real scale—in the area of industrial production. If the transfer of army cadres had not been interrupted by the GPCR, a large group of military cadres experienced in the industrial sector of the economy might have been created. As it is, however, the industrial sector is the area in which the PLA most lacks experience, and it would be forced to rely heavily on CCP or state cadres in any attempt to keep the reins of economic control in its own hands.

Potential Sources of Manpower

The example of demobilized PLA personnel participating in the political work departments illustrates an extremely important area of potential strength for the military. While there are clearly limits to the number of in-service cadres the PLA could supply as direct replacements for party and administrative personnel, the large number of former military men already employed in the economy might be used to overcome this lack. According to one estimate, 7 million persons were demobilized from the army between 1950 and 1958,[18] and many more must since have been mustered out of service. While the ideological level and productivity of these ex-soldiers must remain an object of speculation, they would appear to constitute an important

[13] Chalmers Johnson, "Lin Piao's Army and Its Role in Chinese Society," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), July 15, 1966.
[14] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 22, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3154, Feb. 5, 1964, p. 7.
[15] *Ta Kung Pao* (Peking), Feb. 12, 1964; in *SCMP*, No. 3171, March 4, 1964, p. 9.
[16] The "four firsts" were: men before weapons, political work before other work, ideological work in political work before routine work, and dealing with current ideological questions before questions taken from books. The "three-eight" working style refers to a three-phase quote from Mao which contains eight characters meaning: keep a trim political orientation, work hard and live plainly, be flexible in strategy and tactics. See *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 23, 1964; in *SCMP*, 3162.
[17] *Ta Kung Pao*, June 16, 1965; in *SCMP*, No. 3495, July 13, 1965, p. 6.
[18] Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potential source of trained, basic-level leadership.

More recent figures attest to the continuing number of ex-army personnel entering the economy in a variety of jobs. In Hupei, for example, 8,000 ex-PLA personnel were transferred to the rosters of the Finance and Trade Department between 1963 and 1965.[19] In Liaoning the comparable figure was 4,400, raising to 10,000 the total of demobilized military personnel working in finance and trade in the province.[20] While neither of the above reports revealed the proportion of ex-military to other workers, a separate report from Anhwei province mentioned a total of 30,000 Finance and Trade Department personnel.[21] The totals for Hupei and Liaoning could not have been much greater than for Anhwei, indicating that demobilized military personnel probably constituted nearly one-third of all Finance and Trade workers in those provinces. Many reports of a more local nature buttress the evidence that demobilized PLA personnel have assumed leadership positions at the basic level of the economy. For example, a report from Fu-hsing *shih* (city) stated that between 1963 and 1965 180 retired PLA personnel had been transferred to the municipal Finance and Trade Department, most of them in leadership posts.[22]

Numerous reports in the Chinese press have featured the achievements of demobilized military personnel in their respective economic units. In the monotonous style of mainland propaganda, these items have portrayed most such workers as models of heroic dedication and revolutionary zeal. But window dressing aside, the frequency of such reports seems to suggest a commendable level of performance among many of the ex-soldiery. While most news stories concern individuals or small groups, one report out of Hunan stated that 3,000 former PLA personnel had been cited for outstanding contributions in 26 *hsien* (counties) of the province during 1963 and 1964.[23]

Obviously, a PLA-dominated regime could not expect to run China's industry if it had to rely solely on the army cadres transferred to basic-level industrial enterprises. In filling the key positions requiring high-level administrators with experience in economic affairs, the PLA would have to find reliable supporters outside its own ranks. In this connection, it is important to remember that many of China's higher-level party and governmental personnel share the military background of the pre-1949 years. To cite an example, six of the eight Ministers of Machine Building serving in 1966 possessed considerable military experience. Two had been Lieutenant Generals, another had served under Chu Teh in 1927, and a fourth had been Mao's private secretary prior to the Long March. While past military experience does not in itself guarantee sympathy toward an army-dominated regime, the military background of many Chinese Communist leaders with economic and industrial experience does provide further potential upon which the PLA might well choose to draw.

In simple terms of quantity, then, the number of ex-military personnel in the economy seems to provide the potential for overcoming military shortages with respect to experience and skilled manpower. What remains in serious question, however, is the ideological solidarity not only of this large group but of the active military establishment as well. Ever since the creation of a professional army following the Korean War, there has been a growing conflict within the PLA over the fundamental issue of professionalization *vs.* politicization. At the same time that it approved the modernization of the PLA and the establishment of a professional officer corps, Mao's ruling elite took pains to reaffirm the validity of the Chinese Communist Party's guerrilla experience and to insist on the principle and practice of political control over the army. Conflicts arose between the party and the army and within the army itself over a gamut of issues related to defense, organization, training, weaponry, and other aspects of the attempt to build the PLA into a modern army. The party and its supporters within the army, ever faithful to the Maoist guerrilla doctrine, seemed to emerge triumphant over the "professionals," but the issue was by no means resolved. A steady turnover of high-level military leaders took place in the 1950's due to their opposition to the guerrilla strategy and orientation, including Lo Jung-huan, dismissed as head of the General Political Department in 1956; Su Yu, Chief of Staff, and Liu Po-ch'eng, head of the PLA Training Department, removed in 1958; and P'eng Teh-huai, Minister of Defense, sacked along with a number of colleagues in 1959. While "professional-

[19] *Ta Kung Pao*, July 31, 1965: in *Joint Publication Research Service* (US Department of Commerce) No. 31904, p. 21.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] NCNA (Hofei), Oct. 30, 1965; in *SCMP*. No. 3582, Nov. 22, 1965, p. 18.
[22] JPRS, *loc cit.* (footnote 19), p. 22.
[23] NCNA (Changsha), July 31, 1965; in *SCMP*, No. 3511, Aug. 5, 1965, p. 8.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism" was not the only issue involved (especially in the case of P'eng, who tangled with the leadership over economic policy), it was a continuous, festering sore in military-political relations.

While there is no way to tell how many PLA cadres of this period held "professional" views, it can be assumed that the number of officers who harbored such sentiments was not seriously reduced by the purge and reconstitution of PLA party branches carried out by Lin Piao in 1960. The army's secret *Work Bulletin* (copies of which have been smuggled out of the country) stated that only 1,200 CCP members and 940 provisional members were dropped from the party during this campaign.[24] Since veteran cadres are much less amenable to indoctrination than younger recruits, Lin Piao's "army-building" campaigns of the 1960's could not have won over many of the "professionally" oriented cadres that remained in the PLA. The purge of PLA Chief of Staff Lo Juich'ing late in 1965 invites speculation that the issue of "professionalism" is still far from resolved. The reason for Lo's dismissal is not certain, but it is altogether possible that he spearheaded renewed opposition to the guerrilla strategy after the US bombing escalation in Vietnam.

The facade of army unity and loyalty to Maoist ideology was badly shaken by the GPCR. In particular, the creation of a Cultural Revolution Team of the Whole Army, reported in January 1967, suggested that the problem of dissension within the army remained critical.[25] A wide range of army leaders besides Lo were either purged or subjected to Red Guard attack.[26] A number of other reports out of China have cited instances where PLA units gave their support to anti-Maoist groups, and an incident in which Maoist emissaries were temporarily kidnapped without PLA opposition has been well publicized. The sources of such reports, often Red Guard newspapers or so-called "large-character posters," must be viewed with some caution. However, one conclusion is certain: the PLA is not a unified body under the full control of Lin Piao. Beyond a consensus on the need to re-establish order, the orientation and loyalty of various PLA forces must remain in doubt.

[24] J. Chester Cheng, Ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966, p. 595.
[25] *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong: Cathay Press), No. 646, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 1.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 5. Among those attacked was 80-year-old Marshal Chu Teh; however, he still remains a member of the CCP Politburo.

Conclusion

To sum up, it seems clear that the PLA is now the dominant force in Chinese politics and might yet displace the party as the ruling elite in Communist China. The PLA possesses certain assets for this role in terms of organization and experience, but it also has liabilities which could limit the effectiveness of a military-dominated regime.

Administratively and technically, the PLA has the advantages inherent in any relatively modern army. Its size and increasing complexity have required the development of specialized skills among its cadres, who are also used to functioning as members of a large bureaucratic organization. The wide range of non-military activities which the army has undertaken has created cadres experienced in many tasks integral to the governing of a nation. On the basis of past performance and the largely peasant origin of military cadres, they are most qualified to assume leadership positions in agriculture and agriculturally-related organizations. Their least experience is in the operation of the industrial sector, so it is clear that party and state cadres or other civilian personnel would still be called upon to fill many of the key posts in industry under a PLA-dominated regime. In this respect, the potential role of demobilized army personnel assumes great significance.

If large numbers of demobilized army personnel were used in rebuilding the machinery of control, the influence of the military could be significantly supplemented. However, the possibility that such a development would increase the political power of the military would be offset, at least in part, by the differences of ideological outlook within the demobilized contingent. The clash between the Maoist view, which emphasizes the primacy of politics, and the "professional" view, which strives for modern operational efficiency, has not been resolved within the PLA itself, let alone among demobilized army personnel. A large force of former military men brought into the governing structure could include many persons with "professional" viewpoints and would enlarge the potential for conflict.

In the long term, it would seem likely that "professionalism" will overtake "politicalism" in the army and that the PLA will create a powerful impetus toward a more secular, technically-specialized society. A modern military force must master an increasingly complex set of scientific and technical requirements if it is to be able to defend the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation against enemies possessing highly advanced military technologies. The pressures to emphasize training over politics, for example, cannot be avoided if China is to continue to modernize its armed forces. It is significant to note, by way of further illustration, the relatively insulated position enjoyed by the Chinese nuclear-weapons program amid the turbulence of 1966-68.

While an era of military rule might prove beneficial to China, it would also pose its own built-in dangers. If the army were to succeed in maintaining a dominant power position in the post-GPCR political structure, its leaders would be in a position to command a greater portion of the nation's resources. The CCP organization, which has served to limit military appropriations in the past, would no longer be able to enforce its will. A problem would be posed by the temptation which faces all military leaders in positions of power to opt for a larger share of the national product than is actually required for defense purposes. Whatever the military's past or potential contribution to China's social stability and economic productivity, an increase in the military utilization of scarce resources could not help but be detrimental to further economic development. In this respect, PLA power might work more harm than good.

All of the foregoing is of course conjectural. From today's vantage point, the only certainty is that the political position and influence of the Chinese military have been significantly enhanced as a direct consequence of the GPCR. Whether the military leadership—or elements within it—will exploit Mao's present reliance on the army to play for higher political stakes is an open question. But if a struggle for power does develop, one conceivable outcome would represent the ultimate irony: the force used by Mao in pursuit of ideological victory might well prove to be the historical instrument of his defeat.

Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle

By Maury Lisann

Moscow's behavior at the height of China's Cultural Revolution has had a significance that extends far beyond the context of Sino-Soviet relations. Looking back on Soviet policy toward China in 1965-66, one can discern the genesis of the Brezhnev Doctrine that was applied so remorselessly to Czechoslovakia in 1968—the first indications that the present regime would resort even to military force in its effort to reassert Soviet hegemony over its putative allies. To be sure, military occupation of so small and defenseless a country as Czechoslovakia is hardly of the same order as a full-fledged invasion of the Chinese colossus, and the reasons that would prod the Soviet leaders into undertaking the latter would have to be correspondingly more grave and compelling. Nevertheless—as the account that follows will show—

Mr. Lisann is a doctoral candidate in international relations at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military intervention against Maoist China was from the outset one of the policy alternatives weighed by the Brezhnev leadership. Given the inaccessibility of Soviet archives, the evidence is necessarily inconclusive, but it seems important and persuasive enough to warrant serious scrutiny.

Another reason for considering the recent events in Communist China from the vantage point of—and as a reaction to—Soviet initiatives is that it helps us to gain a more comprehensive picture of the events themselves. The problems facing Mao Tse-tung in 1965-66, the massive purges, and the seemingly self-destructive unleashing of Red Guard violence cannot be traced solely to internal political and ideological compulsions; they are also intimately connected with Moscow's attempts to influence the policies of the Peking regime.

China differs from other Communist countries not only in the unparalleled intensity of its distaste for Soviet policies and ideology, but—more importantly—in the size and nature of its potential military threat to the USSR. China was therefore the most urgent problem that faced Brezhnev, Kosygin, and their associates after they had ousted Khrushchev in October 1964, just two days before the first Chinese nuclear test. To assess the reaction of the CCP to Khrushchev's removal, they received Chou En-lai in Moscow—and found that little had changed. The Soviets described the talks merely as "frank" and "comradely"—which would indicate that the disagreements betwen the two powers had not abated—and Peking later reported that the new Soviet leaders had described their policy toward China as being no different from that of Khrushchev.[1] The Chinese, on their part, published a 12-point indictment of Khrushchev's policies declaring that these policies would have to be changed before there could be a genuine reconciliation between the two great Communist powers.[2]

There can hardly be any doubt that subsequent Soviet policy toward Peking, although it showed signs of a good deal of improvisation, was basically consistent. And, in the view of this observer, the years of confrontation with China led logically to Moscow's claim in 1968 that the Soviet Union, by means of its armed forces, would be the final arbiter of the destinies of the other Communist states.

In broad outline, the events of the past few years might be reconstructed as follows: In 1965 Moscow manipulated the issues raised by the war in Vietnam in an effort to encourage internal Chinese opposition to Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy. This exacerbated the split in China's top leadership and eventually led to Mao's purges and the Cultural Revolution. In 1966, the Soviets seemed on the verge of urging actual rebellion on Mao's faltering opponents, though to have done so might have entailed committing their own troops to the support of a rival regime in the provinces. Mao, however, forestalled any notion of Soviet military intervention by unleashing the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution, that is, by calling out the Red Guards *en masse* in August 1966 to cut the communications of his opponents in the regional party apparatuses and thereby preclude the peaceful entry of Soviet troops at the ostensible "invitation" of his adversaries.

Of course, the basic split within the Chinese Communist Party was not the result of Soviet intrigue. It had been gradually developing for years, mainly over internal issues, and was inherent in the history of the CCP and the specific conditions of China; Moscow simply sought to take advantage of it. But the pacing and initial form of the Cultural Revolution up to about February 1967 probably owed more to Moscow than to Peking. In the end, the Soviet Union failed to achieve its objectives and was virtually shut off from exercising any influence in China. But, ironically, the chaos created by the Cultural Revolution apparently slowed down China's development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and thereby lessened the urgency in Moscow of finding a solution to the "China Problem," although it may be doubted that the Soviet leaders had the wisdom to foresee this result when they set out upon their piecemeal policy of intervention.

The Foreign Policy Debate

US bombing of North Vietnam, initiated in February 1965, was a catalytic agent in relations between the Soviet Union and China. To Moscow, at least until the introduction of US ground forces in July, the bombing seemed to justify more vigorous Soviet involvement in Vietnamese affairs and also appeared to be a sign that the US was impatient to

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 14, 1964; *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking) and *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), Nov. 11, 1965; *Peking Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 46, Nov. 12, 1965, p. 12.

[2] "Why Khrushchev Fell," *Hung Ch'i*, Nos. 21/22, Nov. 21, 1964; English text in William Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967, pp. 387-92.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negotiate an end to the conflict. Moscow had already begun to propose such negotiations and continued to do so after the bombing commenced.[3]

In Peking, the bombing came as a shock, at least to those still believing in the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung, who in January had publicly predicted that there would be no large-scale US intervention in Vietnam.[4] The debate over how to respond to the US action gave rise to sharp differences among the top leaders in Peking. On one side was a group led by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who foresaw a military confrontation with the US and hence the need for China to build up a modern army and air defense system. This, in turn, implied a need for Soviet aid and nuclear deterrence against the US. Minister of Defense Lin Piao believed, on the other hand, that that there was little likelihood of war with the US, particularly if Mao's guerrilla tactics were employed in Vietnam, and he was further convinced that withdrawal into the interior and the same guerrilla tactics would be the correct strategy in the unlikely event of an American invasion of China.[5]

Two other parties to the debate, Chief of State Liu Shao-ch'i and party General-Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing, supported Moscow's calls for unity of action in Vietnam and became conspicuously uncritical of the Soviet Union in general.[6] Whether they shared Lo's views on the danger of US attack or found them a convenient pretext for advocating better relations with the Soviet Union, the practical effect was the same.

P'eng Chen, Teng Hsiao-p'ing's deputy and party boss of Peking, played an ambiguous role in this dispute. Initially, he appeared to be in full agreement with Lin Piao. P'eng had long been known for his extreme anti-Soviet inclinations and, like Lin, felt that there was more to fear from the Soviet Union than from the US. (His deputy, Teng T'o, had earlier gone so far as to suggest that Chinese-American friendship might be desirable.[7]) P'eng Chen's speech in Jakarta in late May 1965 and a subsequent major article by him in June were particularly anti-Soviet in tone. Portions of them so resembled Lin Piao's famous article of September 2, 1965, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," that one might suspect that P'eng had a hand in writing it.[8] Nevertheless, soon after Mao began—toward the end of 1965—to make earnest preparations for his purges and the Cultural Revolution, P'eng Chen was struggling for his own survival.

After the US intervened on a large scale in Vietnam, Moscow's first task was to negotiate an agreement for the transport of Soviet aid across China. With some difficulty, and with the aid of Hanoi's mediation, this was accomplished on March 30, 1965.[9] There followed two notes to China, on April 3 and April 17, incorporating a proposal that widened the split in Peking still further. In retrospect, it seems that this may have been Moscow's main purpose. The Soviet Union requested military bases and transit rights in China, ostensibly to aid Vietnam but incidentally establishing a more or less permanent military presence in China. Among other things, the Soviets requested the use of two airfields in Southwest China, the right to station 500 men on them, an air corridor or air transit rights, permission to send 4,000 men in a body through China, and possibly the use of a port in South China.[10]

[3] "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on United Action," *Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Chi*, Nov. 11, 1965; *Peking Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 46, Nov. 12, 1965, p. 15; Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle*, New York, Pegasus, 1967, pp. 31-32, 46-70

[4] Edgar Snow, "Interview with Mao," *The New Republic* (New York), Feb. 27, 1965, p. 22.

[5] For a lengthy analysis of this "debate," see Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-1966," and Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis*, Vol. 2: *China's Policy in Asia and America's Alternatives*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 23-71 and 237-68.

[6] As examples, one can cite Teng's speech to the Rumanian Party Congress, July 20, 1965, (*Peking Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 31, July 30, 1965, pp. 8-10); Liu's advocacy of unity with *all* socialist countries in a speech which infuriated the visiting Albanian Prime Minister, April 28, 1966, (*Peking Review*, Vol. IX, No. 20, May 6, 1966, pp. 8-12); Teng's quotation of one of Mao's old slogans to the same effect (*Peking Review*, Vol. IX, No. 31, May 13, 1966, pp. 16-19); and, as late as July 1966, Liu's omission of an attack on the Soviet Union in the Chinese response to the first US air raid on the Hanoi area (*Peking Review*, July 29, 1966, pp. 9-10). For comment, see Ra'anan in Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65.

[7] Teng wrote: "We can be sure that there has been a close association between the Chinese and Americans as early as the fifth century. This long tradition of Chinese-American friendship is an important historical fact." (*Yen-shan Yeh-hua*, Vol. 2, p. 3, as quoted in Merle Goldman, "The Unique Blooming and Contending of 1961-1962," *China Quarterly* [London], No. 37, January-March 1969, p. 81.)

[8] *Peking Review*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 24-25, June 11, 18, 1965; *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, No. 36, Sept. 3, 1965.

[9] *New York Times*, April 8, 1965; *Washington Post*, Dec. 23, 1965.

[10] The details were leaked piecemeal by the Chinese and confirmed much later by the Soviets. See statement by Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Association, quoted on *Tokyo Domestic Television* 1000 GMT, July 15, 1965; Edward Crankshaw in *The Observer* (London), Nov. 14, 1965; Observer's Rountable, *Radio Moscow*, Domestic Service, 1300 GMT, Feb. 12, 1967; *Moscow Radio Peace and Progress*, in English, 1430 GMT, April 16, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Acceptance of this proposal would in effect have signified the ascendancy of the views of Lo, Liu, and Teng over those of Mao, as elaborated by Lin Piao. The Soviet leaders probably did not expect immediate acceptance, particularly as it was made before they knew that the United States would remain firmly committed to the war in Vietnam. Refraining from virtually all public polemics with China, Moscow settled back to await the outcome of the debate in Peking, probably hoping that the Soviet offer would embolden Mao's opponents and set the stage for a shift of political power in China.

A well-informed American writer on Sino-Soviet relations recently described the hasty construction of airfields begun in South China in late 1964 as well as the civil defense and military preparations undertaken in the cities of southern and coastal China during the summer and fall of 1965.[11] He interpreted the Soviet request for bases as an offer to cooperate with the Chinese in providing air cover over North Vietnam. While it may be doubted that the Soviet Union intended to go that far, and while the extent of coordination between the Soviet request and Lo's military policy is unknown, the risk of Soviet involvement in a Chinese-US confrontation was great enough to indicate the importance that Moscow attached to encouraging the controversy in Peking.

The Soviet proposal and the Maoists' immediate opposition to it provided Lo with an opportunity to deliver a vicious, if veiled, attack on Mao and Lin. In an article published in *Hung Ch'i* shortly after receipt of the Soviet proposal, Lo obliquely compared Mao and Lin to Chamberlain and Daladier, recalling that the two European statesmen, underestimating the fascist menace, had rejected a Soviet offer of a prewar alliance—with disastrous consequences. Mao and Lin were presumably well aware that the key issue in those negotiations was the British-French refusal to pressure Poland and Rumania to grant transit rights to Soviet armed forces. The article was lavish in its praise of the Soviet army and did not criticize the USSR except when naming the now-deposed Khrushchev.[12]

Lo Jui-ch'ing's anti-Maoist, pro-Soviet sentiments stood out especially prominently because Peking's central party newspaper simultaneously published an editorial which contradicted his arguments almost point for point, had no praise for the Soviet armed forces, and specifically criticized the "successors to Khrushchev."[13] It is hardly surprising that, at the end of November, Lo was the first of Mao's prominent opponents to drop from sight.

While the debate for and against unity of action gathered momentum in Peking, Moscow carefully declined to reply to the polemical attacks that continued to pour out of China.[14] As late as November 1965, when Mao was already planning his purges, Soviet Politburo member Dmitri Poliansky, in a speech on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, described the Soviet attitude toward China as being one of watchful waiting, "everything possible on our part" having been done.[15]

On November 11, 1965, the Chinese press announced that Moscow had failed in its effort to convert Peking to a policy of united action, revealing for the first time much of the Soviet maneuvering during the year just past.[16] In other words, Mao let it be known that the foreign policy debate had ended and that his faction had prevailed. That this was so understood in Moscow was indicated by the fact that the Soviets broke a year-long suspension of polemics by publishing a summary of the article in *Pravda* under an appropriate headline.[17] Moscow acknowledged the failure of its efforts more explicitly in a long editorial at the end of November.[18]

Enemies on All Sides

Having disposed of Lo Jui-ch'ing in late 1965, Mao appointed P'eng Chen head of a five-man group to organize the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps Mao still trusted P'eng at that time, but it seems more likely that he wanted to give him an opportu-

[11] Allen Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War With China," *Look* (New York), April 29, 1969, pp. 76-79.

[12] Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against US Imperialism Through to the End!," *Hung Ch'i*, May 10, 1965.

[13] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 9, 1965; *Peking Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 20, May 14, 1965, pp. 15-22.

[14] A minor exception was a brief retort, published in *Pravda* (June 7, 1965), to Peng Chen's virulent anti-Soviet speech in Jakarta in late May.

[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1965.

[16] "Refutation of the New Leaders . . .," *loc. cit.*, (footnote 3).

[17] "Anti-Soviet Article in the Chinese Press," *Pravda*, Nov. 16, 1965.

[18] "The International Duty of Communists of All Countries," *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nity to incriminate himself, for when P'eng produced an "Outline Report" on February 12, 1966, Mao alleged that it was an attempt to sabotage the Cultural Revolution.[19] According to the testimony of a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party, the last straw for Mao was a draft of a joint CCP-JCP communique mentioning united Sino-Soviet action to help Vietnam. The draft was nominally the responsibility of P'eng Chen, but Teng and Chou En-lai also seem to have had a hand in it.[20] In an interview with the Japanese on March 28, 1966, at a resort near Canton, Mao reportedly shouted at Teng and the others, "You weak-kneed people in Peking!" The same day he ordered the purge of P'eng Chen and his subordinates in the Peking Party Committee, as well as a thorough housecleaning of the party Propaganda Department.[21] P'eng's last public appearance was on March 29, and he was formally removed from his posts on May 16.[22]

In the course of his interview with the Japanese, Mao reportedly declared further that a US-Chinese war was almost inevitable, in which event the Soviet Union, using the Sino-Soviet defense pact as a pretext, would occupy China. Mao told the Japanese that if this happened he would bring the People's Liberation Army south of the Yangtze and confront the Soviet Army along that line.[23] Although Mao, like his opponents, was now positing a US-Chinese war, he made it clear that he regarded the Soviet Union as the main enemy and the US as a secondary danger.

According to Peking, Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia had begun to harass the Chinese border in late 1965. The first Chinese protest was sent on December 25.[24] Brezhnev and Malinovsky then went to Mongolia to sign a new and stronger military alliance with that country on January 17, 1966, and Soviet troop strength there was increased. On April 1, another incident took place on the Mongolian border, with the Chinese claiming that the Soviets were making intelligence preparations for a troop-crossing (in a protest note nearly three months later, Peking accused Moscow of seeking to launch armed aggression on some pretext from April 27 onwards).[25] On April 19, the Chinese issued a set of regulations calling for strict surveillance of all activities aboard foreign vessels navigating the border rivers.[26] The Chinese may have recalled that the Soviet Union had made effective surprise moves on these rivers in occupying northern Manchuria in 1945.[27]

Another clear sign of the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations in the summer of 1966 was the restriction of their reciprocal diplomatic representation to the level of chargé d'affaires. This occurred sometime

[19] "Circular of the CC of the CCP, May 16, 1966," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 16, 1967.

[20] It should not necessarily be inferred from this that P'eng Chen turned pro-Soviet in a last-gasp struggle to save himself. The JCP pressed for the wording offensive to Mao and subsequently broke with the CCP, in part over the question of "unity of action" with the CPSU. The question of whether P'eng Chen turned toward the USSR at the last moment is beyond the scope of this article; the available evidence is complex and contradictory.

[21] Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," *China Quarterly*, No. 35, July-September, 1968, pp. 59-60.

[22] "Circular . . .," *loc cit.* (footnote 19).

[23] Ito and Shibata, *loc. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

[24] *Radio Peking*, in Mongolian, 1200 GMT, June 20, 1966.

[25] *Ibid.* According to available sources, the Soviet Union apparently never acknowledged receipt of these Chinese notes.

[26] *New China News Agency*, Domestic Service, 0101 GMT, April 19, 1966.

[27] *History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union*, 1941-1945, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1963, pp. 576, 579.

A SOVIET COMMENT

Gun is mounted on China's famous "little red handbook," *Quotations from Mao*.

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 8, March 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between May and August, before there was any public indication of the worsening of relations and before any disruptive actions had been taken against the Soviet Embassy in Peking.[28] Whether this curtailment of diplomatic relations was initiated by the Soviets or by the Chinese, and on what pretext, has not been determined. It seems likely, however, that Mao feared that the continued presence of a Soviet ambassador in Peking would facilitate Soviet collusion with his opponents. The ambassador was, by custom, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and thus could conduct high-level party as well as state consultations. And he may well have been in touch with Mao's rivals.[29] As will be seen, there is reason to believe that the Soviet leaders hoped to encourage men like Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to organize a sizeable and cohesive opposition to Mao within the party, and that hints were dropped that the Red Army would be available, on invitation, to protect base areas in the provinces, from which the opposition could operate.

After it became clear in November 1965 that Mao had carried the day in the foreign policy debate, the Soviet Union, on November 28, sent one more proposal to Peking for unity of action in Vietnam, probably more for the record than in any hope that it would be accepted.[30] At the same time China began feeling Soviet military pressures on its border.

In January 1966, the CPSU distributed an intraparty document justifying a tougher policy toward China.[31] This was the forerunner of a circular letter which was sent by the CPSU to other Communist parties in February and subsequently leaked to the Western press, probably deliberately.[32] The circular letter announced that the Sino-Soviet conflict had ceased to be strictly ideological in nature, and that henceforth the Soviet Union would have to treat China as an inimical big power. One purpose of both of these documents was no doubt to ensure that the CCP would reject Moscow's invitation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, due to open on March 29. In fact, the Chinese did later cite the letters as a reason for rejecting the invitation.[33] Tradition demanded that the Chinese be invited, but tactics required making sure the Chinese would decline and thus take the responsibility for not coming. The absence of a Chinese delegation at the Congress would reinforce the impression among potential supporters of Liu and Teng that Maoist obstinacy was solely responsible for the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations.

Despite the Soviet Union's tougher policy toward Peking, its approach to the internal struggle in China remained extremely cautious for the next several months, with Moscow's Chinese-language broadcasts keeping to the ideological plane and harping on well-worn themes. One reason for this may have been that Moscow was still uncertain whether the volubly anti-Soviet P'eng Chen, who was fighting hard to retain his position, would succeed in riding out the purges. The Soviets surely wanted to see him out of the way, unable to ingratiate himself at the last moment with any faction seeking Soviet support. When he was finally removed in mid-May, there was a notable change in the tenor of Soviet propaganda, which began to call attention to signs of serious disaffection within the ranks of the CCP. In June the Soviet press began describing the Cultural Revolution,[34] and in July, after the first US bombing of Hanoi, Soviet information media resumed regular attacks on China for the first time since the ouster of Khrushchev.

The calling out of the Red Guards on August 18, 1966, apparently threw Moscow off stride, because eight days passed before the Soviet press began to report it.[35] But soon thereafter, perhaps in the belief that the chaos in China might create an opportunity for Soviet intervention, *Izvestia* published an extract from a memoir stating that the success of the CCP after the Japanese war was due to the presence of Soviet troops in Manchuria in 1945-46. According to this account, the Red Army had protected Chi-

[28] The last positive reference to Soviet Ambassador Lapin's presence in Peking was on April 27. *TASS* International Service (Moscow), 0700 GMT, April 27, 1966.

[29] Subsequent Red Guard pronouncements asserted that P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lu Ting-yi, Yang Shang-kun, Marshal Ho Lung, and Yang Yung, Commander of the Peking Military Region had met with the Soviet Ambassador and laid plans for an armed *coup d'état* in Peking. See *Ching-Kang-shan* (Peking), April 18, 1967, in *Survey of China Mainland Press*, (Hong Kong), No. 3946, May 25, 1967; and *Chan Pao* (Peking), Jan. 19, 1967, in *China Topics*, YB 426, May 11, 1967.

[30] Editorial article, "On the Events in China," *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1966; *Radio Tirana*, 0900 GMT, Feb. 12, 1966.

[31] *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1966.

[32] Excerpts in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), March 23, 1966, and *New York Times*, March 24, 1966.

[33] Texts of invitation and rejection are in *Survey* (London), No. 63, April 1967, pp. 15-18.

[34] "China's Great Cultural Revolution," *Pravda*, June 26, 1966.

[35] *Pravda*, Aug. 21, 1966; "Peking in the Course of the 'Cultural Revolution'," *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nese Communist organs that were in the process of rallying popular support and establishing democratic self-government. The Soviet troops, said the memoir, had been fulfilling their international duty to the people of China.[36] As things turned out, however, the intercession of the Red Guards proved to be not at all conducive to Soviet intervention, but just the opposite.

Looking Back

Two years passed before the Soviet Union offered an official interpretation of Chinese politics from 1965 to the calling out of the Red Guards on August 18, 1966. An article published by L. Deliusin, marked for the use of lecturers and released to the press on the day Czechoslovakia was invaded (August 21, 1968), indicated that the Soviet Union had been deceived by the course of events in China and had taken a complacent view of the situation until it was too late to prevent the Maoists from consolidating their victory.[37]

Deliusin claims that the upsurge in criticism of Mao's policies in the Chinese press during 1961-62 was misinterpreted by the world Communist movement as a sign that the views of Mao himself were changing. For "world Communist movement" one might read "CPSU." It is unlikely, however, that the Soviet Union regarded 1961-62 as a time of full retreat by Mao, because at that point Khrushchev was energetically pressing his own campaign against Peking. More likely, it was the 1964-65 foreign policy debate which lulled Moscow into thinking that things were proceeding favorably in China. This is indirectly confirmed by Deliusin, who states that, until the beginning of 1966, the Maoists had felt too weak to silence their opponents. Even before the Deliusin article appeared, authoritative Soviet sources had pointed to the beginning of 1966 as the really critical time.[38]

As an example of the difficulties that Moscow had in assessing Chinese politics, Deliusin points to the fact that, up to 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen had openly attacked Soviet foreign policy while secretly struggling with Mao on internal policy. Without saying as much, he seems to be implying here that *any* struggle with Mao was to some extent regarded as an objectively pro-Soviet struggle, even if someone as objectionable as P'eng was involved. But by associating Liu and Teng with P'eng—contrary to previous Soviet practice—he casts them in a suspicious light and thus further tries to justify Soviet inaction while the Chinese political situation was taking a disastrous turn.

Deliusin also claims that Mao, during his absence from Peking, spread false rumors of his illness and approaching death in order to deceive his opponents while Lin Piao marshalled his forces. By beginning the purge against secondary figures, Mao deluded Liu and Teng into thinking that they would be spared. The party cadres also, accustomed to hypocritical Maoist campaigns, at first did not take the Red Guards seriously. Deliusin is harshest on Liu and Teng, asserting that they refrained from speaking out against Mao because they were using his authority to further their own personal interests.

Perhaps it actually was such a combination of complacency and self-interest that kept Mao's opponents from attempting to coalesce and resist until, cut off from access to the masses and the press by the Red Guards, they found that it was too late. But Deliusin also asserts that Liu and Teng had discovered that the older generation of party workers were reluctant to undermine national unity, fearing that civil war would destroy China's status as a great power. Ultimately, says Deliusin, the threat of civil war caused both Mao and his opponents to hold back. His regretful tone suggests that Moscow might have preferred to see warfare break out, in which case the chances of Soviet troops being drawn in would have been quite high. For if Liu and Teng had won over an area, the USSR might well have responded to a request for help.

Mao thus had good reason for choosing the Red Guards as the instrument of his purge. They effectively broke the links between the regional party organizations and the local population by destroying those organizations' monopoly of communications and thus forestalled the possible emergence of a regional or provincial anti-Maoist leadership which might invite, or provide a pretext for, the peaceful entry of Soviet forces into China.[39]

[36] Col. General I. Liudniknov, "The Storming of the Great Khingan," *Izvestia* (Moscow), Sept. 3, 1966.
[37] L. Deliusin, "The Internal Political Struggle in China," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (Moscow), No. 9, Sept. 1968, pp. 134-41.
[38] *E.g.*, "The Roots of the Current Events in China," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, April, 1968, pp. 102-113.

[39] In this connection, it is also worth recalling that in China the provincial party leaders were often simultaneously the chief political officers of the armed forces in their region.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It took Moscow about three months after the Red Guards had been called out to settle on a new statement of policy. During this period a number of foreign Communist leaders favored convening a new conference of the world's Communist parties for the purpose of taking strong action against the Chinese, but the Soviet press censored such proposals out of its reports. Not until Liu and Teng first came under attack at the end of November 1966 did Moscow make its new position clear. Soviet broadcasts to China promptly questioned the legitimacy of the attacks on these "two renowned activists",[40] and a long editorial in *Pravda* on November 27 announced that henceforth the Soviet Union would distinguish between "Mao and his group" and other Chinese leaders, and would do everything necessary to overcome Maoist policies. A plenum of the Soviet Central Committee was held in mid-December to formalize this new policy. The results of the meeting were not made public, but the Soviet leadership toured the country explaining the change in line to local party cadres, a process that took up most of January. On January 5, 1967, Soviet jamming of Chinese radio broadcasts was resumed for the first time since Khrushchev's ouster. That same month the Maoists began to lose control of the Red Guards, and disorders and fighting broke out in a number of Chinese cities.

Once again developments in China apparently baffled Moscow, for Soviet reporting of the Red Guard disorders was both contradictory and sporadic until, on January 16, Soviet press coverage of China ceased altogether. On January 25, the Chinese began a massive three-week siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, subjecting its personnel to abusive treatment. It has been suggested that this was done to hamper the Embassy's coordination of Soviet shipments of aid to Vietnam and to frustrate Kosygin's attempt to act as an intermediary in the Vietnam conflict during his visit to London in February.[41] It also seems possible that the Chinese regarded the changes in Soviet policy as tokens of impending intervention and for that reason decided to isolate the Soviet staff in Peking.

Three days after the mobs were withdrawn from the Soviet Embassy, Moscow issued a statement which in many respects resembled the supposedly secret circular letter it had sent to foreign Communist Parties a year earlier. This new statement, however, went further than the secret circular, implying that the Soviet Union was justified in calling on the Chinese people to overthrow their government. Indeed, it emphasized that China was calling on the Soviet people to overthrow *their* government. The statement also claimed that China's course signified a break with Marxism-Leninism,[42] but it did not quite say that China had ceased to be a socialist state. That there was disagreement on this point within the Soviet Politburo was evident as late as March 1967. In a series of election speeches, Kosygin and Brezhnev took the optimistic line that conditions in China could still be corrected without outside help, while Podgorny was deeply pessimistic about the future of socialism in China.[43] The matter was finally resolved in the summer of 1967 with a formal declaration that socialism was indeed threatened under Mao.[44] This gave Moscow considerably more freedom of maneuver.

The Radio Campaign

In the spring of 1967, the Soviet Union launched an aggressive radio campaign in an apparent effort to foment unrest in China. Radio Moscow's regular Chinese programs were more than doubled, and the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress began broadcasting in Chinese for the first time. Radio Tashkent's Uighur broadcasts were beamed at Sin-

Teacher and Pupil

The Soviets diligently taught the Chinese the art of truthful reporting, since objectivity in dealing with news is considered the holy duty of any Soviet journalist.

Komsomolskaia pravda, July 31, 1969.

[40] *Radio Moscow*, in Mandarin, 2330 GMT, Dec. 2, 1966.
[41] Harold Hinton, "China and Vietnam," in Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-21.
[42] "On the Anti-Soviet policy of Mao Tse-tung and His Group," *Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1967.
[43] *Radio Moscow*, Domestic Service, 1455 GMT, March 6, 1967; *Sovietskaia Rossia*, March 4, 1967; *Pravda*, March 10, 1967.
[44] L. Deliusin and L. Kiuzadzhian, "A Threat to Socialism in China," *Izvestia*, July 4, 1967; I. Aleksandrov, "Contrary to the Interests of the Chinese People," *Pravda*, Aug. 16, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist China?

The idea that the Soviet Union may be contemplating military measures against the Maoist regime in Communist China just as it intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 may not be as fanciful as one might think. Mr. Victor Louis, a Soviet citizen who acts—among other things—as a correspondent for the London Evening News, *has been issuing storm warnings in the Western press of a possible Soviet intervention in China, and it is most unlikely that such reports would have been filed without official Soviet sanction (see his letter and the Editor's reply in the Correspondence section).*

On September 16, Mr. Louis hinted in his London newspaper that the Soviet military might launch a preemptive attack on Lop Nor, China's nuclear weapons center. On October 8, in a story carried by the Washington Post, *he repeated his claim that "Russian nuclear installations stand aimed at the Chinese nuclear facilities." He further observed, in a reference to the troubled Sino-Soviet border, that anti-Maoist forces were gathering strength in China, especially in the border provinces, and that they might "produce a leader who would ask other socialist countries for 'fraternal help'." He added that China's vast size was "no reason for not applying" the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, according to which the "socialist countries have the right to interfere in each other's affairs if their own interests or those of others are threatened."*

kiang. It seems safe to assume that one of the objectives of these programs was to encourage the non-Chinese minorities, especially the Uighurs in Sinkiang, to revolt against Chinese rule. Extolling the Uighurs' past rebellions, Radio Tashkent hinted that Soviet assistance would be forthcoming if they rose again and recalled the advantages enjoyed by the Soviet-sponsored "East Turkestan Republic" of 1945-50, which was partly inhabited by Uighurs.[45]

For example: "The Soviet state, formed under the great Lenin's leadership, provided the national army of East Turkestan with arms and trained commanding cadres. Moreover, the Soviet Union extended all-out aid to the young East Turkestan republic . . ." [46] Later, refugees from Sinkiang were allowed to broadcast appeals for Soviet help on Radio Tashkent. When an American newspaper allegedly accused the Soviet Union of fanning a military psychosis at home and inciting nationalist elements in Sinkiang to seek independence,[47] *TASS* denied the first charge while remaining conspicuously silent about the second.[48]

Soviet incitement did not neglect the ethnic Chinese. Units of the PLA were urged to disobey,[49] and peasants and workers were exhorted to take up arms:

It is this ideal [communism] that often incites them to pick up weapons to protect themselves and their children and to resist Mao Tse-tung and his followers' . . . fascist and illegal acts.[50] . . . in the past, workers led by the underground party organization in the area had struggled against the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique. They exerted great efforts to form armed forces and to liberate Southwest China. We believe that Southwest China will demonstrate its lofty combatant spirit to preserve its revolutionary fruits. We salute the workers there with our warm respects.[51]

On July 10, 20 hours per week of Mandarin programs were switched from Radio Moscow to Radio Peace and Progress, which carried the more provocative content. On October 17, Radio Peace and Progress began broadcasting in the Cantonese and Shanghai dialects, the former for the first time since 1958 and the latter apparently for the first time ever. And on February 1, 1968, special programs addressed to the PLA were more than doubled in frequency to a rate of two hours every day. After that, the radio campaign began to settle into a routine.

The increasing violence of the Cultural Revolution from late 1966 had been accompanied by increasingly severe border incidents, but Moscow, in contrast to its propaganda exploitation of most aspects of the violence in China, chose to conceal or underplay news of border tension, releasing it in-

[45] *Radio Tashkent*, in Uighur, 1330 GMT, Jan. 28, 1967; 1430 GMT, Feb. 18, 1967; 1530 GMT, Feb. 23, 1967.

[46] *Ibid.*, 1430 GMT, May 14, 1967.
[47] *New York World Journal Tribune*, Feb. 20, 1967.
[48] *TASS*, International Service in English, 1825 GMT, Feb. 22, 1967.
[49] *Moscow Radio Peace and Progress*, in Mandarin, 1100 GMT, April 12, 1967.
[50] *Ibid.*, 1100 GMT, April 19, 1967.
[51] *Ibid.*, 1100 GMT, May 28, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly or through distinctly minor outlets. For Moscow, the disadvantages of publicity about the border situation generally outweighed the advantages. It could always be used to stir up popular passions against China, but the problem was that it would also call attention to China's territorial claims, which was all the more inopportune because there were other potential claimants to Soviet territory.

In order to distract attention from the border tension, Moscow first used a foreign commentator to advance the opinion that, no matter how bad Mao was, he had no intention of forcing a direct clash with the Soviet Union.[52] Then novelist Konstatin Simonov went to the "troubled border" and reported back that is was a routine affair. It was, Simonov wrote, merely an irritating and recurrent matter which had to be taken into account.[53] A few weeks later, Marshal Yakubovsky went to the Soviet Central Asian border with China to award the area's troops the pre-World War II designation of "Red Banner Army." In his speech, Yakubovsky recalled how the original "Special Red Banner Far East Army" had crushed the Chinese in 1929 and defended the border for 12 years thereafter, implying that a similar long-term operation was now anticipated.[54]

The Soviets refrained from reporting major border clashes until March 1969, but by then their scale had became too large for the Soviet leaders to ignore. Moreover, the approaching Ninth Party Congress in Peking and the international Communist summit conference in Moscow provided both sides with an important political context in which the fighting could be exploited.

Conclusion

The general state of Sino-Soviet relations did not change much in the year and a half following mid-1967, and the Soviet Union was content to adhere to a policy that was relatively passive compared to that of the preceding two years. On the one hand, any Soviet hopes of intervening in a civil war in China had probably been laid to rest as a result of Mao's successful Red Guard strategy. On the other hand, Moscow could draw some satisfaction from the probability that China's development of strategic weapons systems had been slowed down to some extent as a consequence of the general disruption of the Cultural Revolution.

The dimensions of Asian geography are such that China cannot effectively threaten the main centers of Soviet population and industry until it can mount its nuclear weapons on missiles of near-intercontinental range. In 1965-66, it appeared likely that China was rapidly approaching the acquisition of this capability, but the fact that China has yet to test its first intercontinental missile suggests that the effective deployment by China of strategic nuclear systems is more remote than previously thought. In 1967 the Soviet Union began deployment of an ABM system, and it was argued in the United States that such a system could be effective against Chinese attack. This argument has never been contested by the Soviet Union; indeed, an anti-Chinese ABM system is of greater relevance to the Soviet Union than to the United States. A combination of factors such as these must have contributed to the Soviet decision in 1967 to take a longer view of its relations with China.

As stated at the outset, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is a product of the same political and strategic predilections that shaped the China policy adopted by Khrushchev's successors in 1965-66. Determined to reassert their influence—if not control—over the policies of all other Communist countries, they went to the brink of military intervention in China in 1966 and crossed over it in Czechoslovakia two years later. Moscow's role in these events clearly demonstrates that neither loss of moral leadership in the international Communist movement nor possible complications in relations with the non-Communist world are likely to deter the Soviet leadership from intervening in the affairs of its allies in pursuit of its own narrowly-defined power and security interests.

---

[52] Hirotatsu Fujiwara, "Peking Farce," *Izvestia*, March 26, 1967.
[53] *Pravda*, July 19, 1967.
[54] *Radio Khabarovsk*, Domestic Service, 0900 GMT, Aug. 10, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pages from History

ALBERT FEUERWERKER, ED.: *History in Communist China.*
Cambridge, Mass., and London, MIT Press, 1968.
JAMES P. HARRISON: *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History.*
New York, Atheneum, 1969.

Reviewed by John Wilson Lewis

THESE TWO STUDIES of Communist historiography bear out what is by now a truism: that historical scholarship in Mainland China serves the interests of current politics. While Soviet historiography has made some attempts to free itself from the shackles of Stalinism, Chinese historians have, in fact, been forced to become more doctrinaire than ever. By prescribing a fixed cast of heroes, villains and social forces, and a firm chronology of historical periods, Maoism has ruled out a genuine search into China's past; the presentation of history has become abstract, spotty, and unidimensional. At its best, such writing is good fiction for children; at its worst, it is a bore.

Most of the seventeen papers in *History in Communist China* were originally prepared for a conference convened by *The China Quarterly* in September 1964, just before the onset of the Cultural Revolution and at a time when historians in China were once again testing the limits of their intellectual world. In his preface, written in 1967, Professor Feuerwerker records the dreary fate of these historians, along with their Institute of Contemporary History and their most prestigious journal, *Li-shih Yen-chiu* (Historical Studies). Since 1964 the Chinese historical profession has been virtually eliminated as an academic force; even the lamp of extreme radicalism—lit briefly during the Cultural Revolution by historians such as Kuan Feng—had, as it turned out, little oil. Although China's historians would not have been encouraged by the stern indictment of their pre-1964 scholarship in the Feuerwerker volume, they would, perhaps, have recognized the effort to take them seriously. Sadly, such an effort now would be an utter waste.

The reading of this collection of essays reminds one just how confining ideologically-determined research can be. This is depressing, since the breadth of coverage is potentially so vast and diverse. From archeology (Cheng Te-k'un) to the December 9 Movement of 1935 (John Israel), from Confucius (Joseph R. Levenson) and Chou Dynasty ideology (Donald J. Munro) to peasant wars (James P. Harrison) and foreign conquest (David M. Farquhar), the chapters in *History in Communist China* search China's new historiography in vain for an original contribution.

This is particularly true of the essay on Confucius by the late Joseph R. Levenson. Political considerations limit Confucius to a role that is free from current social associations but still essential to China's early social evolution. By consigning the Sage to a niche among the relics, Chinese historians seek to undermine his influence on living generations while erecting one more landmark in the social movement toward Maoist communism. Confucius as a museum piece becomes a safe, largely irrelevant figure imprisoned in a long-forgotten age. As Professor Levenson put it: "the 'museumified' Confucius does not speak; no longer involved in the handing down of judgments,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he is therefore not much involved in clamorous class struggle" (p. 73).

It is one thing arbitrarily to assign an individual—even Confucius—his "place" in the inevitable historical process. It is quite another to lump 2,000 years of tradition into a single stage that is called "feudalism" and likened to the Dark Ages. Under the restraints of the Maoist concept of feudalism, studies of this great span of China's history "are not allowed to exhibit any change or any advance in the social development of the Chinese people" (p. 125).

A hint of the aggravations caused by this proscription came to light in the early 1960's. Since Mao had also proclaimed that the "class struggles of the peasants—the peasant uprisings and peasant wars—alone formed the real motive force of historical development in China's feudal society" (p. 316), historians had to cope with the problem of why those struggles wrought so little change over so long a time. For Chinese nationalists, the next obvious question was even more disturbing: Why did the "Chinese people move so much more slowly than the Western peoples" in breaking the bonds of feudalism? (p. 125). Marxism-Leninism did not help solve the dilemma for the nationalist-minded scholar but instead accentuated his problem by forcing him to mesh "the Marxist theories of class struggle with the Marxist theory of historical development" (p. 194). To the extent that he might emphasize the parallel between the historical development of China and the West, it was impossible for the Marxist historian to make the prescribed point that China had been victimized by imperialist oppression without simultaneously admitting that "China's backwardness predated the foreign intrusion" (p. 301). Thus did Marxist universalism play havoc with the impulse of nationalism in modern Chinese scholarship.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese historian's response was to downgrade the Marxist themes of class struggle and the role of anonymous social

Reviewers in this Issue

JOHN WILSON LEWIS—Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University (Stanford, Calif.); author of, among others, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1963).

JOHN E. RUE—Professor of Political Science at Oakland University (Rochester, Mich.) and author of *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966).

STANLEY KARNOW—China and Southeast Asia correspondent for the *Washington Post.*

LEONARD BUSHKOFF—Instructor on the faculty of East European and Russian History at Oakland University (Rochester, Mich.) and contributor to a number of scholarly journals.

CARMELO MESA-LAGO—Acting Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh; his most recent book was *The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba* (New York, F. A. Praeger-Hoover Institution, 1968).

STANLEY ROTHMAN—Professor of Government, Smith College, (Northhampton, Mass.) and author of many articles on the subject of Marxist ideology.

VIKTOR MEIER—Swiss specialist in East European Affairs, currently representing a number of West German newspapers in Washington, DC; author of *Neuer Nationalismus in Suedosteuropa* (New Nationalism in Southeast Europe), Opladen, Germany, Verlag C. W. Leske, 1968.

GEORGE C. WYNNE—Specialist in Soviet affairs, author of several historical volumes, and formerly USIS Press Officer in Rome.

STEPHEN D. OLYNYK—Specialist in Soviet affairs and contributor to numerous scholarly journals.

GEORGE KEMENY—Under Secretary of State for Finance in Hungary prior to 1948; author of numerous articles on East European and economic affairs.

GORDON A. BENNETT—Doctoral candidate at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and co-author of a political biography of a Red Guard defector (to be published by the Oxford University Press).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces. These themes had been dominant in the period after the Communist takeover, but in the early 1960's a spate of articles heaped ridicule on the "crude application of the class viewpoint" and on the part allegedly played by foreigners in modern Chinese history. The issue in the ensuing debate seemed to center on the question of how much change had been produced by imperial officials and gentrymen—as opposed to change wrought by "the masses" or by factors external to China. For a few years, the tradition was studied to find evidence of contributions that reflected unique and vital qualities in China's national roots. Yet, what appeared to the outside world as a slight adjustment in scholarly priorities struck Mao Tse-tung as pure treason. The Chinese leader might have been willing to tolerate the nationalist urge underlying the new wave of historical writings, but he became convinced that their hidden purpose was to discredit his thought and ridicule his leadership. In the end, the Chairman could achieve an acceptable blending of Marxist universalism and Chinese nationalism only by scrapping serious historical scholarship and repudiating its practitioners.

THE SHEER MEANINGLESSNESS of the current Chinese Communist approach to history is also brought out in the second book under review, *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions*, by James P. Harrison. The author, whose article on the same subject appears in the Feuerwerker volume, is not concerned with rebellions as such but with the rewriting of their history by Communist scholars. He examines in exhaustive detail what these historians say about peasant uprisings, their causation, leadership, organization, ideology, and reasons for failure. His comprehensive analysis of Russian and Chinese theories as well as classical Marxist interpretations of the peasantry render the study almost encyclopedic in dimension.

As a definitive work on Communist views of rural uprisings, this book supports the conclusions that present-day Communist intellectuals have a shallow grasp of Chinese social history, and that their writings on rebellions, while serving the purposes of indoctrination, would be of little use to the practicing rebel. Historical writing in China aids Peking's revolutionary programs for transforming the previously accepted values and attitudes of the populace, but, on the basis of Harrison's findings, it is striking how little this literature has to say in depth about the agrarian revolution that supposedly underlay the Communist victory.

This is even true of Mao's later writings. While some 40 years ago his "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (March 1927) displayed a remarkable insight into the varying sources and degrees of peasant discontent, his subsequent writings became far more doctrinaire and superficial. A reading of the later Mao fails to reveal how his revolutionary organization actually worked at the village level, and why it attracted this or that segment of the rural population.

An understanding of the political significance of violence depends heavily on a prior grasp of the relationships between the rebel and the political authority he seeks to overthrow. In China, the authority that touched the peasant was highly localized and often extremely complex. For the Mao of the Hunan Report, the peasant could spark an upheaval that would overturn the "local tyrants, the evil gentry and the lawless landlords." The systematic overthrow of local authorities in many places, Mao then believed, could set in motion a national revolutionary process that would dislodge his ultimate targets, the warlords and the imperialists.

By the time of the founding of the Kiangsi Soviet a few years later, however, he had revised his view and was prepared to place far greater reliance on the army and on middle-class elements in the market towns. The experience of Chiang Kai-shek's triumph in 1927 seems to have taught Mao that base-area party organizations and armed force, not a peasant movement as such, would be required to bring down his adversaries. He would continue to talk about the "motive force" of peasant rebellions in Chinese history, but his own strategy took the army and middle class—the "forces of counter-revolution"—much more into account. Mao thus came to appreciate both the strengths and weaknesses of the social order he opposed and, in the context of that order, redefined his code of operation.

Peking's current interpreters of mass revolution, however, must wrench Mao's Hunan, Kiangsi, and Yenan views from their relevant historical contexts and homogenize them into a single "theory." If the Communist cadres had followed the contradictory prescriptions set forth in his selected writings, their revolution would surely have failed. The orthodox Maoist theory of peasant rebellion floats freely above real life, unencumbered by considerations of space and time. Bound by this theory, Chinese historiography can no longer probe the central problems related to China's social conflict and historical development.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leaders, Friends, and Adversaries

STUART SCHRAM: *Mao Tse-tung.*
New York, Simon & Schuster, 1966.
KAI-YU HSU: *Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence.*
New York, Doubleday & Co., 1968.
LYMAN B. VAN SLYKE: *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in China's Communist History.*
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967.

Reviewed by John E. Rue

COMMUNIST CHINA'S leaders are growing old. Still, from within the imperial courtyards of Peking, the ancient Northern Capital, they attempt to channel and direct the life and thought of the Chinese people. Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and the other aging revolutionaries, having devoted their whole adult lives to creating a Communist party and army capable of capturing power and remaking Chinese society, have now set out to destroy those elements in the party and state that may slow down or reverse the flow of revolutionary change. No longer do they seek merely to transform Chinese culture by uniting it with the Western Marxist vision of the good society. Using the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung as their guide, they are determined to root out the remnants of the ancient Chinese tradition of civility and to create so strong and relentless a proletarian consciousness in the Chinese people that the momentum of their revolution will never cease. While the final outcome of their effort is not yet known, studies of their revolutionary experience and thought—such as the three works under review—can help to illuminate their recent course.

STUART SCHRAM'S *Mao Tse-tung* is the most perceptive and dispassionate full-length biography of the "great helmsman" available. The author examines the whole of Mao's political career, beginning with the stories of his childhood in Hsiangt'an and ending with the massive eruption of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

According to Schram's account, while Mao was still a youth in school, be became an anti-Western nationalist dedicated to the revival of China's traditional role at the center of world civilization. Like the bandit heroes of his favorite novel, *Shui Hu Chuan*, he was willing to take to the mountaintops to fight against an unjust social order, even before the salvos of the Russian October Revolution directed the attention of Chinese intellectuals toward Bolshevik organization and Marxist theories. In his first published article on physical education (April 1917), he argued that disciplined physical strength and courage were among the chief prerequisites of the military heroism that was necessary to achieve national salvation. During the May 4th movement of 1919, Mao expressed his confidence in the capacity of the Chinese people, once aroused, to cast off the shackles of foreign domination and rid themselves of corrupt and incompetent rulers. His faith in the revolutionary mission of the Chinese people has rarely wavered since.

Thus, when Mao took part in organizing the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, he was already an ardent nationalist and dedicated revolutionary. But although he had read some of the basic Marxist literature, he did not yet know how to express his ideas in Marxist terminology.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Schram's judgment, it was not until 1935, when Mao became chairman of the CCP, that he "was at last assimilating the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and learning to cast his policies in the proper ideological shapes" (p. 177). From that year until the proclamation of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949, Mao had to struggle on two fronts—against the Kuomintang on one side and against Moscow on the other. In relations with the former, he was continuously engaged in maneuvers aimed at strengthening the position of the CCP in preparation for the final split with Chiang. His relations with Moscow were more complex, for the Communists of both countries had genuine feelings of solidarity. But the Soviets strove to achieve goals that were entirely unacceptable to Mao. First, they demanded that nothing the Chinese Communists did to promote revolution in China should in any way straitjacket Soviet diplomacy in other areas of the world. More broadly, they sought virtually complete control and guidance of the Communist movement in China so that their own ends would not be compromised. These issues contributed to the persistent tension between Moscow and Yenan before 1949, and they have been central to the dispute between the two parties that has erupted in the last decade.

To make his policies more acceptable to his would-be mentors in Moscow, Mao had to state them in Marxist terms. But to achieve the broadest possible appeal in China, he had to explain his policies in Chinese to Chinese—in a "new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eyes and to the ears of the Chinese common people" (p. 203). According to Schram, in the resultant "Sinification of Marxism," Mao contributed little to Marxist theory but he did make communism familiar and acceptable to his countrymen. His greatness does not lie in philosophic originality, but in the strategy and tactics that he devised for the anti-Japanese war and for the civil war with the Kuomintang that followed.

By making a revolution in his own way, Mao also affirmed his independence from Moscow. In the aftermath of his victory, he led the CCP through its first "rectification movement," removing those Chinese Communist leaders who had been the ideological exponents of Stalinism and had been subservient to Soviet direction.

WHILE MAO'S STRATEGY was successful in achieving military victory on the mainland, his role as leader and mastermind of the New China has been another matter. Since 1949, Mao has been unable to devise a way to build a wealthy and powerful Chinese state, either by relying on Soviet aid and the Soviet model of development, or by creating a distinctively Chinese strategy of political organization and industrial growth. Both the Great Leap Forward and the commune experiment proved disastrous. Having failed to develop new policies that would work reasonably well, the Maoists have reached back into their own history, revived some of the techniques devised to unite party, army, and people in the period of revolutionary guerrilla war, and attempted to apply these techniques to the problems of generating rapid industrial growth and transforming the Chinese people into fully conscious proletarian revolutionaries.

In this effort, Mao has vehemently insisted that the "subjective can create the objective"; that mass action, political zeal, and dedicated men can overcome bureaucratic inertia, lack of technical competence, and a smaller stock of modern weapons and machines than their real and imagined enemies. The Chinese describe this attitude, with approval, as revolutionary romanticism.

Mao has also been increasingly concerned with the problem of establishing the long-term validity of his thought and practice not only for China but for revolutionary movements throughout the world. Mao firmly believes that his experience and the policies he developed to guide and direct China's revolutionary struggle can be used as a model for national liberation movements everywhere. He also believes that, given the balance of forces in the world today and the refusal of the Soviet Union to lead a violent revolutionary struggle, the goal of world revolution depends on the newly aroused revolutionary masses in the colonies and former colonies of Asia, Africa, and South America. If guerrilla forces will only master and apply the Chinese revolutionary model, they will prove by their victories that imperialism is a "paper tiger."

Like his Confucian forebears, Mao still sees the Chinese revolutionary model as something at once distinctively Chinese and at the same time universal. Mao and his followers are still nationalists. No theory or practice can be truly universal unless it is also Chinese. Thus Mao's followers can claim that Mao's thought and practice are "entirely Marxist" and also "entirely Chinese." The implication of this claim, Schram notes, is that Maoists are "more Marxist *because* they are Chinese" (p. 293.) Once upon a time China was the acme of high culture and the model of political stability for

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much of the world; under Mao's leadership, China is now creating the pattern for the revolutionary transformation of the entire world.

Should the coming of the world revolution be long delayed, it is of utmost importance to Mao that China not lose its revolutionary impetus. His concern in this respect is precisely what led to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As Mr. Schram suggests, the "Sinification of Marxism" had proved too successful. Mao's mixture of Marxist and Chinese elements resulted in a resurgence of national pride, but it also contributed to a revival of ancient bureaucratic ways that slowed down progress. As a consequence, the emphasis of Maoist thinking switched after 1966 from the aim of making Marxism Chinese to the aim of making Chinese culture "proletarian." The Maoist method of historical analysis gave way to the ritualistic repetition of a few of Mao's conclusions, chanted endlessly by his newest corps of revolutionaries, the Red Guards. The little red book, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, which became the talisman of the Red Guards, exalted the subjective over the objective, the capacity of the human will to overcome all social and natural obstacles, and the necessity for relentless strugggle against US imperialism and Soviet revisionism.[1] "Relentless struggle" ensued, for sure, but it was an internal struggle that created havoc in China. Now the Red Guards have been curbed and the GPCR seems to have lost its momentum, but Mao has shown no signs of abandoning his revolutionary philosophy.

Chairman Mao has already succeeded in transforming China once during his lifetime. It is perhaps unrealistic of him to expect that the policies of his middle years can once again transform the political consciousness of the great majority of the Chinese people. In Schram's opinion, Mao wishes "to go down in history as the man who not only laid the foundations of a new order in his country, but set its course for all time" (p. 325). He will settle for nothing less; so of course he cannot be satisfied. Yet if Mao should die tomorrow, the Chinese political scene will still be dominated by men who have followed him for several decades. Many of the problems they must deal with flow from his policies. It is very unlikely that his achievements will be repudiated or lose their significance.

[1] See *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*. Edited and with an introductory essay by Stuart R. Schram. Foreword by A. Doak Barnett. New York, Praeger, 1968.

MAO TSE-TUNG DID NOT make the Chinese revolution all by himself. Nor was he necessarily the first to have all the thoughts that have been attributed to him. But few major books or monographs have been devoted to expounding the contributions that other leaders have made to the successes and failures of the Chinese Communist Party. Chou En-lai is one such leader, and Professor Kai-yu Hsu's biography, *Chou En lai: China's Gray Eminence*, tells a part of his story. Chou became a member of the CCP shortly after it was founded, was elected to the Politburo at the Fifth Party Congress in 1927, and has been a member of that body ever since. While many of the older party leaders lost their positions in the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chou managed to become and remain a member of the small group which directed that upheaval.

Hsu paints two portraits: first, Chou En-lai as a talented administrator capable of clarifying alternatives before decisions are made, implementing policies creatively while maintaining a sure sense of the limits of his discretionary power; second, Chou with an extraordinary flair for diplomacy. In disputes within the party leadership, he has always been able to choose the winning side in sufficient time to maintain his position in the Politburo. Foreign diplomats have usually respected Chou, if not what he stood for. He has charm, ability, an understanding of the limits of diplomatic maneuver, and a realization of modern China's ultimate dependence on military force for its political power.

Indeed, Chou En-lai has played a major role in the development of the Chinese Communist armies. A leader of the Whampoa military faction in the days of the first united front with the Kuomintang, he led a fair number of the officers who graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy into the Communist Party, took part in the Nanch'ang uprising, and then directed the Military Affairs section of the Central Committee of the CCP in the crucial years from 1928 to 1935. He did not come over to the Maoist faction until the Ts'unyi conference that took place during the Long March. From that time since, he has been an advocate and organizer of policies everyone identifies as Maoist.

Professor Hsu's book covers the early years of Chou's life very thoroughly. The chapters on the organization of the CCP in Europe and on the Whampoa Academy are especially good. Hsu asserts that Chou's Shao-shan Report of September 1930 showed a truly Olympian grasp of the Chinese revolutionary situation and that many of the things Chou said then survive in Mao's works on *New*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy and *People's Democratic Dictatorship.*

Unfortunately, Hsu's book offers little on Chou's activities from 1949 to the present, the years in which he has organized the huge apparatus of the Chinese People's Republic and directed and sustained much of its diplomacy. While this period is beyond the scope of the study, the reader is left with a gap in assessing the author's judgment that Chou is the only remaining man among China's leaders "who can lead and understand China's youth and intelligentsia." Mr. Hsu also expresses the belief that when the present "Maoist hard line begins to be a strain on Peking and endangers Red China's continued build-up, the CCP will again turn to Chou to effect the kind of compromise for which he has already become famous" (p. xvii). Time alone will tell whether this judgment is correct.

THE CONCEPT AND STRATEGY of the united front plays a crucial role in the history of the CCP. According to Mao, "the united front, armed struggle, and party-building are three fundamental problems of our party in the Chinese revolution." Professor Van Slyke's study, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History*, focusses on both the theoretical development of the front concept and its utilization in practical politics. As particular events led Mao to generalize his ideas on the united front, these generalizations became a part of his intellectual outlook and influenced the ways in which he chose to handle the problem of sorting out enemies and friends in later episodes of the Chinese revolutionary struggle.

Initially the united front was merely an organizational tactic. The first front took shape as a collaborative effort within the Kuomintang, linking the Communists with the emerging national bourgeoisie in a struggle against warlords of the "feudal type" and against foreign imperialists. When the CCP later began to push the class struggle of the peasantry and urban laboring forces too far, a split with the Kuomintang became inevitable. The CCP, however, was not prepared for the bloody purge of Communists and their sympathizers that accompanied and followed the KMT decision to expel the CCP and end its alliance with Soviet Russia in 1927.

In the following years, the Comintern ordered the formation of a "united front from below"—a long-term struggle to win the masses away from rival parties and unions. These tactics soon proved futile, for the CCP could not protect the workers it led out on strike. Students could not be reached easily. And it proved almost impossible to organize soldiers against their officers in the KMT and warlord armies.

In spite of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the declaration of war against Japan by the Chinese Provisional Soviet Government, the CCP remained committed to the destruction of the KMT regime as a necessary prerequisite to active war against Japanese imperialism. Officially this attitude did not change until the 7th Comintern Congress in August 1935, which proclaimed the policy of international front tactics to fight fascism. The crucial turning point toward the formation of the CCP's second united front with the KMT was the famed Sian incident in 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was forcibly detained by the nationalist military leader Chang Hsueh-liang and enjoined to suspend the civil war and ally with the Communists to organize armed resistance against Japan. After Chiang Kai-shek's release the first steps were taken toward the CCP-KMT coalition that was to endure uneasily throughout World War II.

Meantime the Communists began to develop an elaborate theory of united front strategy and an equally elaborate apparatus, the united front department, to carry out this strategy. From the time he returned from Moscow in late 1937 until early 1940, Wang Ming, Mao's old political rival, directed the united front department. In these years Mao worked out his own theory of the way in which the united front should operate to further the aim of eventual victory over the KMT. After Mao succeeded in removing Wang Ming from the united front department, Maoist theory became the dominant line. Fundamentally, Mao's policy was to unite with as many persons and groups as could be organized under Communist leadership, and to convert as many as possible to the immediate and long-range goals of the CCP. His aim was to isolate the enemy, seek all possible allies, and neutralize those diehards who were willing to fight the KMT but unwilling to do so under Communist leadership. While front tactics proved difficult to implement in some areas, the CCP was nevertheless able to unite with most revolutionary individuals and groups in the course of the civil war (1946-49), and to organize their participation in the rebuilding of the Chinese economy and state after the formation of the People's Republic.

Along this political course, Mao developed the notion that the united front was a viable way to handle contradictions among the people. He came

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to view it as an organizational milieu within which the "people" could educate and reform themselves. Thus, the united front developed through tactical and strategic phases to become an integral part of Maoist ideology. While in recent years the concept has become formal, dogmatic and metaphorical, it probably cannot be abandoned by the Chinese Communists because it plays an essential part in the Maoist vision of unity with the masses. Without it the image of the CCP as the leader of the Chinese people—indeed all the world's peoples—would be destroyed.

Professor Van Slyke has produced an excellent book. It covers new ground and is written in lean and lucid prose. His thoroughgoing analysis of the united front illuminates one of the three "fundamental problems" cited by Mao; it is to be hoped that Mao's notions on party-building and revolutionary warefare will someday be examined in equal depth and perspective.

Upheaval on the Mainland

LOUIS BARCATA: *China In The Throes of the Cultural Revolution.*
New York, Hart Publishing Co., 1968.
ROBERT TRUMBULL and the staff of *Yomiuri Shimbun*: *This is Communist China.*
New York, David McKay Co., 1968.
JACK GRAY and PATRICK CAVENDISH: *Chinese Communism in Crisis.*
New York, Praeger, 1968.
ROBERT JAY LIFTON: *Revolutionary Immortality.*
New York, Random House, 1968.

Reviewed by Stanley Karnow

MAO TSE-TUNG'S tumultuous Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, calculated to purify the Chinese people "to their very souls," started slowly in the fall of 1965, accelerated in the summer of 1966, reached a peak of confusion and near-chaos during the following year, and, in zigzag fashion, has been gradually subsiding since. What prompted Mao to undertake this extraordinary campaign, how it developed through its several phases, and what its effect has been on China are questions that will preoccupy scholars far into the future, just as students of the Chinese Communist phenomenon are only beginning to piece together events of a decade ago. The four books under review are thus preliminary, tentative, and somewhat speculative attempts to describe and assess one of the most cataclysmic episodes in modern history.

In *Chinese Communism in Crisis*, Messrs. Gray and Cavendish, both lecturers at the University of Glasgow, acknowledge at the outset that "the crisis of the Cultural Revolution is too recent to be fully studied." Their stated objective is to delineate the historical background of the crisis. In sweeping style, they review the main phases of China's revolutionary development over the past 80 years.

While admittedly designed for the general reader, their book seems to suffer from an effort to squeeze too much history into too little space. Moreover, it fails to penetrate to the more profound causes of the Cultural Revolution. For example, it lacks a plausible examination of Mao's personality, experience, and charismatic impact on his country. Nor does it attempt to appraise the economic, political, and social tensions that were to erupt during

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Cultural Revolution and reveal the extent to which ideology has only camouflaged age-old conflicts in Chinese society—between the cities and the countryside, the mandarins and the peasants, officialdom and ordinary people.

The most valuable portion of *Chinese Communism in Crisis* is its documents section, which is divided into two parts. The first contains five literary texts that were given prominence at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution—among them *The Dismissal of Hai Jui* by Wu Han, and *Evening Chats at Yenshan* by Teng T'o, which Mao interpreted as veiled attacks on his leadership. The second part consists of seven doctrinal and policy texts, some of them familiar documents such as Lin Piao's *Long Live the Victory of People's War!*, others less well known yet still significant.

THE SECOND VOLUME under review, *This is Communist China*, is a compilation of reports by nine Japanese scholars and journalists who visited China in late 1966 and early 1967 as a task force for the Tokyo newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*. The reports have been assembled into a narrative by Robert Trumbull, the veteran Far East correspondent of *The New York Times*.

On the face of it, *This is Communist China* should have fulfilled its dust-jacket blurb as "a major event in foreign affairs reporting." Its Japanese authors are men with experience in China, some of them having been educated in Peking and Shanghai, and its editor, Mr. Trumbull, is a skilled writer. But like much Japanese reporting on China in recent years, the book is a disappointment. While its contributors, some of whom spoke Chinese, were permitted to travel widely on the mainland and to interview scores of people, most of their reports merely record the kind of statements available to the outside observer who reads *Hsinhua* dispatches or the *Peking Review*. Hence the book is filled with materials that are either dubious (*e.g.*, the claim of chemical workers in Shanghai—the scene of much Red Guard turmoil—to have boosted fertilizer production by 50 percent during the Cultural Revolution) or tediously unenlightening (*e.g.*, the disclosure from "Communist Chinese sources" that North Vietnam is "not isolated but has the support of the peoples of the world.")

BY CONTRAST, the book by Austrian journalist Louis Barcata, *China in the Throes of the Cultural Revolution*, is so filled with fascinating personal experiences that it raises doubts of another sort. Barcata visited Communist China for the third time in the spring of 1967, speaking no Chinese and guided for the most part by official interpreters. Yet he was, judging from his conversations with Chinese, exposed to unprecedented candor.

Arriving in Canton, for instance, Barcata soon found himself engaged in talks with Red Guards who frankly told him how much they disliked the "fat" Chinese foreign minister, Ch'en Yi, for taking pride in his French education. In Shanghai, Barcata claims to have slipped away from his interpreter to spend a long evening in private discussion with a Chinese doctor. And from time to time, he writes, he engaged in debates with other Chinese who somehow succeeded in communicating with him as they never normally do with foreign visitors.

Unlikely as such anecdotes might seem, there is no doubt that Barcata knows his subject. His observations are acute, his knowledge of China is substantial, and his descriptions are economical and pointed. Perhaps most topical in his narrative are the repeated references to tensions between Red China and the Soviet Union, and the extent to which they affected the Chinese man-in-the-street long before the two Communist neighbors clashed on the Ussuri River in March 1969.

OF ALL THE BOOKS LISTED, Robert Jay Lifton's *Revolutionary Immortality* is certainly the most stimulating in its effort to analyze the GPCR as an attempt by the aged Mao to guarantee his "living on" through the perpetuation of his revolution. A psychiatry professor at Yale, Dr. Lifton argues that Mao, having observed the decline of Communist orthodoxy in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death, has feared that China would take the same road after his own demise. Hence, the Cultural Revolution is depicted by Dr. Lifton as essentially a "demand for the renewal of Communist life," and he places special emphasis on the many signs of an effort to bring about a rebirth of revolutionary spirit. The Red Guards, for example, represented the younger generation and Mao's hopes for the future; when they were initially unleashed by Mao in August 1966, they were infused with the aim of destroying old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. The elevation of Mao to the status of a demigod was calculated to transform the hero into an immortal whose ideas would never die.

Dr. Lifton's approach is refreshing and salutary

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compared to the many tedious studies of China that have been published. One criticism might be ventured, however, and that is the author's tendency to overlook the practical aspects of Mao's "madness." However, visionary and utopian Mao may be, he has been fundamentally inspired by the conviction that a large, underdeveloped, and overpopulated land like China could only make progress through the massive endeavor of its people. Thus, pragmatic goals have prompted his emphasis on the spiritual regeneration of the Chinese masses. Nonetheless, his attempt to inspire revolutionary fervor, to make a virtue out of necessity, has plainly been an unrealistic avenue to China's salvation—as was apparent, first, in the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, and as is now apparent in the barren results of the Cultural Revolution.

Like the six blind men in the parable who described the elephant in six different ways, many analysts are now at work trying to assess the current Chinese scene and offering a wide assortment of observations. These four books are part of the first flow of a torrent of volumes on the Cultural Revolution that can be expected to pour forth in coming years. The really authoritative studies have yet to appear.

Moscow and the Malay Triangle

CHARLES B. MCLANE: *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.

ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN: *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

Reviewed by Leonard Bushkoff

ONE OF THE MORE STRIKING political incongruities of our era is the appeal that communism, an ideology developed in and for the industrial, urbanized states of Western Europe, has generated in the underdeveloped regions of the globe. Both the theoretical and historical aspects of this phenomenon have been examined at length over the past two decades, but much remains to be done in collating and synthesizing these findings, placing them in perspective, and evaluating their significance. Professor McLane's book is a major step in this direction. It is clearly an outgrowth of his earlier work, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (1958), and, like that work, is dispassionate, lucid and exact; we are all in his debt.

His two-fold objective is ambitious: first, to summarize and interpret the histories of the Communist parties of Vietnam, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, and Siam from their founding in the 1920's and 1930's to the early 1950's; second, to analyze the impact of Soviet (and occasionally Chinese Communist) attitudes and strategy on these parties. From the viewpoint of thematic organization, however, the synthesis of these two purposes is not easily achieved, and a certain clashing of gears is audible as McLane switches from one subject to another. The appending of "Conclusions" to each chapter does not fully solve the problem.

The author also had obvious difficulties in finding reliable data. McLane is understandably skeptical

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the exaggerated claims of many colonial officials regarding Communist subversion. But the international Communist press and the Soviet political journals on which he perforce relies are hardly very impressive sources, and he sometimes overinterprets their statements in attempting to establish a basis for his judgments. Nevertheless, it is refreshing to find a scholar who attacks a broad issue in a large-minded way; the result deserves careful reading both in government and academic circles.

McLane begins by seeking out the roots of Soviet doctrine on the colonial world. He finds little on the subject in Marx or even Lenin until the Second Comintern Congress in mid-1920, which enunciated policies of cautious collaboration with peasant and nationalist movements against the colonial powers. Though McLane faithfully summarizes the debates on this question, he goes too far in implying that the Comintern was truly interested in Asia at this time. Lenin's theses, though ostensibly written to apply to the entire colonial world from Casablanca to Shanghai, were really aimed at the Middle East, which he felt was ripe for a nationalist and anti-colonial revolution—primarily in Turkey and Iran, and possibly in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. With communism defeated in Berlin, Bavaria, and Hungary in 1919, and stagnating in most of Europe during 1920, a diversion which would both protect Russia's southern flank and threaten British and French interests was much to be desired; Southeast Asia, by comparison, rated little attention. A similar failure to grasp the underlying circumstances behind Comintern policy leads McLane into confusion when he tries to reconcile the well-advertised pronouncements of the Fifth Comintern Congress in mid-1924—favoring self-determination for minorities and colonial nations—with the Congress' obvious disinterest in nationalism in the Far East. Certainly these theses closely fitted the situation in Asia. But at the time the Comintern was primarily concerned with the Balkans (where a revolutionary situation seemed at hand in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Croatia), and it apparently lacked the energy and resources to sustain and support two large-scale operations simultaneously.

Only in 1925, after all opportunities in Europe and the Middle East had been exhausted, did the Soviets decide to plunge into the Oriental maelstrom. But their China venture hardly signified a basic shift toward fomenting socialist revolution in the East; rather, it was an attempt by Stalin to weaken another link (the Rapallo Treaty being the first) in the hostile chain surrounding Russia and, incidentally, to prove himself no less a revolutionary than Trotsky or Zinoviev. The result was disastrous, since Chiang Kai-shek turned against the Communists in 1927. McLane unfortunately fails to recognize that this failure permanently soured Stalin on future alliances at the grass roots with nationalist movements, and thus on any serious interest in Southeast Asia. Nor does he note that Stalin, always aware of Soviet industrial and military weakness, was deeply concerned about the danger of provoking a counterstroke from the colonial powers, especially Great Britain, by supporting revolutionaries in their colonies. Presumably Stalin recognized that in any showdown between these revolutionaries and their colonial masters, the Soviet Union, lacking significant naval or air power, or even Pacific bases—was in no position to provide military aid, and that the failure of such ventures would simply tarnish Soviet prestige (as happened decades later, for example, in the Cuba missile crisis of 1962). Not until World War II had greatly weakened the colonial order would Stalin try to expand the Communist portion of the globe's surface. Until then, the Comintern and its constituent parties were assigned a purely defensive role, serving as flank guards to help protect the Soviet fatherland.

THOUGH McLANE is not at his best in explaining the intricacies of Comintern policy in the 1920's, his survey of communism in Southeast Asia in the years 1928-1941 is a model of brevity and precision. He presents convincing evidence that Soviet interest in Southeast Asia was slight; it received little attention in Soviet academic and political publications, very few Soviet scholars or publicists were knowledgeable about the region, and even fewer Comintern agents—Ho Chi Minh was perhaps the leading one—operated in the area. The Comintern, though usually very jealous of its authority, had the American, French and British Communist Parties exercise responsibility for the Communists of the Philippines, Indochina, and Malaya, respectively. (Curiously enough, the Dutch Communists did not perform a like function in Indonesia.) Decentralization—or disinterest—went so far that the Malayan Communists in turn played a similar role *vis-à-vis* the few Communists in Burma and Siam. Even these tutors treated their pupils rather distantly. Only the Chinese Communists were really concerned about revolutionary

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movements in the area (especially in Malaya, Siam, and the Philippines, where a substantial Chinese population was not unsympathetic to communism), but they were too occupied with the problem of their own survival to exert much direct influence.

Despite, or perhaps because of, this lack of interference, communism in Southeast Asia was definitely on the rise during the 1930's. In part this was due to the effect of the great depression on commodity prices (a subject which McLane unfortunately overlooks), and to a resulting upsurge of peasant unrest and nationalism; in part it stemmed from increasing tension brought on by the Sino-Japanese war and the resulting fear of Japanese expansion. The Comintern itself joined the anti-fascist tide in 1935, but its advocacy of the Popular Front did not sit well with many Communists in Southeast Asia, who regarded as treasonous the admonition to join their colonial masters against the Japanese. In this period, as well as in the subsequent zigzag phases of Soviet prewar and wartime alliances, there was no sign in Southeast Asia of the monolithic subservience to Moscow exhibited by the European Communist parties.

Even after the war, when communism suddenly blossomed into a major contender for power as the colonial nations retreated, Moscow showed no disposition to encourage revolution in Southeast Asia. McLane does not find any evidence of a Soviet-inspired "master plan" for conquest of the area, nor indeed much evidence that the Soviets were seriously concerned about developments there until about 1947. And even then Moscow urged moderation, arguing that the primary task was to sap the strength of the imperialist powers in order to bolster the Soviet position in Europe. Moscow made it clear that if this task was being accomplished effectively by local nationalists, they might well receive Soviet support despite the objections of local Communists. As long as Stalin still hoped for major gains in Western Europe by peaceful means, a full-blooded revolutionary push in Asia would have been a major embarrassment, possibly leading to American naval and air intervention(at a time, it should be noted, when the Soviets still lacked atomic weapons). Hence, Moscow frowned at any talk of overthrowing the Sukarnos, Aung Sans, and other rising nationalists. This advice was ignored in China (where, to quote Stalin, "the Chinese comrades agreed [in Moscow] with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted quite otherwise"); for a while it was heeded elsewhere—but not for long.

A series of Communist "insurrections" (McLane shows clearly how much the term needs qualification) erupted during the year 1948—first in Burma in March, then in Malaya in June, and next in Indonesia in September. The Huk uprising in the Philippines in January 1950 came as a postscript. McLane views these outbursts as ill-timed and ill-conceived reactions to the Cold War (which was then reaching full force in Europe) and to the Communist victory in China. None of the uprisings was successful in the long run, and the parties involved lost seriously in prestige, cohesiveness, and manpower. Revolution prospered only in Vietnam, where the unified and disciplined Communist leadership had succeeded far better than elsewhere in identifying itself with nationalism.

These failures, plus the concern stirred in Moscow by the vigorous American response to the invasion of South Korea—affecting the US military and diplomatic posture both in Europe and Asia—prompted a new Soviet strategy for Southeast Asia in 1951-1952; sympathetic treatment of neutralist governments now became the rule, traditional diplomatic procedures the means, and the strengthening of "third force" states the end of Soviet policies.

Here Prof. McLane's interpretations owe much to Marshall Shulman's challenging study, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (1963). Like Shulman, he implies that, despite frequent rhetorical extravagances, Stalin was pursuing essentially flexible, pragmatic, non-ideological policies during 1950-1952—the broad themes of which have been largely continued by his successors.

McLane reaches other conclusions that may startle those who take for granted the Soviet Union's eagerness, drive, and ability to advance the Marxist cause in other countries. Moscow not only paid little attention to communism in Southeast Asia, but consistently showed little insight in its grasp of the political situation there. Success came to the Chinese Communists only after they disregarded Soviet wishes, which may explain why the Vietnamese Communists also chose to act on their own initiative.

There can be no doubt that McLane's book is a work of the first importance. It is not perfect: the narrative is sometimes distended by qualifications, arguments are not always followed through to their ultimate conclusions, and discussions of Marxist doctrine are sometimes rather labored. But there is also a firm grasp of issues—an ability to define problems and seek answers—that is the hallmark of true scholary effort.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIS UNFORTUNATELY cannot be said of Arnold Brackman's *Southeast Asia's Second Front.* The author, a well-known correspondent with long experience in the region, describes political events in the Malay triangle—Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore, and the Philippines—from the late 1950's to the Indonesian *coup* of September 1965. His thesis is familiar, vigorously stated, and distressingly simplified: that the Communists (whose unity and unquenchable desire for expansion he takes for granted) are hell-bent for domination of the Malay archipelago, thus hoping to outflank the American naval and air barrier off the Chinese mainland. This drive, together with the opposition it engenders from pro-Western or truly neutralist elements in the archipelago—especially in Malaysia and the Philippines—constitutes Southeast Asia's second front, the conflict in Vietnam being the first. Brackman provides the usual scholarly paraphernalia of footnotes and citations, but the book nevertheless seems hasty and rather disorganized, with key issues of strategy, tactics, motivation, doctrine and attitudes submerged under a tide of facts and assumptions. Sukarno is dismissed with a few curt phrases about self-seeking and adventurism without any real attempt to analyze his policy. Moreover, the virtual destruction of the Communist Party of Indonesia since late 1965 and the drastic changes in Indonesian foreign policy since that date have struck at the very foundations of Brackman's thesis: as journalism, his book has been overtaken by events; as history, it lacks the restraint and analytical bent necessary for lucid exposition.

The Cuban Revolution

RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ: *Cuba, the Making of a Revolution.*
Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1968.
EDWARD BOORSTEIN: *The Economic Transformation of Cuba.*
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1968.
D. BRUCE JACKSON: *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism in Latin America.*
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

Reviewed by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

THESE THREE BOOKS, of differing quality, are respectively the work of an historian, an economist, and a US foreign service officer. The first deals with the underlying causes of Castro's revolution, the second with its economic programs, and the third with attempts to export it to other Latin American countries.

Professor Ruiz sets himself the task of determining why Cuba experienced a successful social revolution in 1959 despite the fact that the country had come to enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Western Hemisphere. Using Crane Brinton's analysis of the causes of revolution,[1] Ruiz attempts to prove that all the requisite prerevolutionary conditions existed in Cuba prior to 1959: Cuban society was caught up in a rising tide of demand for change; class conflicts and discontent infused the middle strata of society; the economy depended heavily on sugar production and hence suffered from acute fluctuations due to cycles and seasons; incumbent power elites were politically inept and incapable of handling economic prob-

[1] Crane Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1938.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lems; institutions such as the *municipios*, the Church, the labor unions, the political parties, and the army were either weak and disorganized, lacking influence over the masses, or controlled by the state; the intelligentsia was a bitter, alienated and disenchanted minority; finally, there was no strong set of nationalistic values which could act as a buffer against exogenous influences.

In Ruiz's view, the frustration felt by nationalists in Cuba was closely tied to historic resentment over US influence and interference in Cuban affairs, dating back to the War of Independence in 1895-98 and the revolution of 1933. He sees this attitude as the key factor explaining the socialist (ergo anti-capitalist) and anti-American character of Castro's revolution.

Unfortunately, Ruiz's sketch of prerevolutionary Cuba becomes blurred as he attempts to fill in the details. His analysis is based on incomplete, unbalanced, and often secondhand information, and his treatment of the Cuban scene sometimes verges on caricature. For example, the typical citizen is depicted as speaking a mongrel tongue, "Spanglish," and playing games inspired by American comic-strip heroes such as Little Orphan Annie—while at the same time reading anti-American propaganda and bitterly criticizing US imperialism. In an attempt to prove Cuba's imitativeness, Ruiz asserts that both the division of the island into six provinces and the 1940 Political Constitution were patterned after the American model. Actually, the system of provinces was inherited from Spain, and Cuba is a unitary, not a federal, republic. The 1940 Constitution, considered one of the most progressive of its time, was a mosaic of hundreds of rules and rights copied from magna cartas all over the world—including the fundamental laws of the British parliamentary system, the Soviet Constitution of 1936, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the Spanish *Fuero del Trabajo*, as well as the US Constitution.

Ruiz's casual handling of statistics is another matter for concern. He states that prerevolutionary data did not reveal growing equality in the distribution of income in Cuba, but he does not clearly specify his sources. The only pertinent figures available, to the reviewer's knowledge, were published by the ILO and refer to the percentage of national income paid out in wages (as opposed to the percentage represented by dividends, rent, interest, etc.). These figures suggest that the proportion of income accruing to the Cuban working force rose steadily from 1948 to 1958, reaching a level by the latter year that was the fourth highest in the Western Hemisphere.[2]

According to Ruiz, the establishment of the US sugar quota system in 1934 "would never permit the Cuban sugar industry to return to pre-depression levels of production." This does not accord with the facts. The highest output reached in Cuba during the sugar boom was 5.2 million tons in 1925, and the yearly average in the 1920's was 4.2 million tons. It is true that output dramatically declined to an average of 2.9 million tons during the depression years of the 1930's; but it regained previous levels in the 1940's, increased to an average of 5.4 million tons in the 1950's, and attained a record total of 7 million tons in 1952.[3] Errors like these raise doubts about other statements of fact, figures, and citations in the book, which are not documented in footnotes. (Ruiz does, however, provide a comprehensive and useful bibliography.)

Among other weaknesses, the author's discussion of events becomes confused because he does not always proceed chronologically. The book also lacks balance in that certain subjects are discussed in detail while others of equal or greater significance get brief treatment. For example, the author devotes much more attention to the inception and development of the Cuban socialist party than to the Auténtico party's administration, conveying the wrong impression of their respective significance and achievements. Whereas the socialists were unable to develop a strong party base and exerted their limited influence mainly through the trade unions, the Auténticos organized a populist party that won state power from 1944 to 1952 and promoted many progressive institutions.

MR. BOORSTEIN'S BOOK is based on his experience as an economic advisor to the Castro regime for three and a half years. It provides a fresh outlook on the difficulties faced in organizing and implementing a socialist economy.

The three introductory chapters of the book briefly describe the prerevolutionary economy, the transformation to socialism, and the Castroites' initial efforts to introduce economic controls. The core of the study comprises Chapters 4 through 6, in which Boorstein recounts his experience of working with

[2] International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics*, Geneva: issues from 1947 to 1960.
[3] *Anuario Azucarero de Cuba*, Havana: issues from 1937 to 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Cubans in the fields of foreign trade, planning, and sugar policy. In Boorstein's opinion, the revolutionaries developed a guerrilla mentality in economics, due to their lack of experience and contempt for administrative tasks. They were audacious and self-confident to the point of overoptimism. The immediate effects of their unorthodox approach were free-wheeling expenditures, a lack of control and coordination, and large increases in consumption and imports. At the same time, their overoptimism resulted in upward-biased projections of production, reflecting the planners' unrealistic ambition to achieve soaring rates of industrial output and GNP growth. The strong urge of the revolutionaries to curtail sugar dependency in order to promote rapid industrialization and diversification in agricultural production led to a decline in sugar output, the most important source of foreign exchange. The reduction of exports and the increase in imports induced a growing trade imbalance and national debt.

In the face of these failures, the Cuban pendulum swung to the other extreme: excessive controls. Czechoslovak advisors tried to apply to Cuba's economy the system of central planning used in the industrialized socialist countries, without realizing that the lack of adequate statistics and trained cadres would undermine that system from the outset. Technical offices were rapidly staffed with inexperienced personnel, and the measure of achievement for these brand-new bureaucrats became the quantity of data produced rather than their accuracy. Hence, the long-range plan (1962-65) and the annual plans of 1962 and 1963 set unrealistic targets that could not be achieved. Finally, the Cubans decided to try a middle-of-the-road approach, discarding overall planning and dreams of rapid industrialization in favor of programming only the most important sectors of the economy, such as sugar.

Boorstein was among various foreign advisors who supported renewed stress on sugar production in Cuba. This policy had its rationale in the theory of comparative advantages (*i.e.*, it is cheaper to produce sugar cane in Cuba than sugar beet in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany, while the reverse is true with respect to machinery)—an old theory now embellished with the ideal of a fair, mutually advantageous division of labor within the socialist camp. Specialization was supposed to result in a net profit—through cost reductions—for all members of the bloc, not just for the most industrialized countries. Boorstein makes no mention of the complaints aired by developing East European nations to the effect that this policy would restrict them to the role of raw-material suppliers and impede their balanced development. The Rumanians, as we know, have refused outright to cooperate in the system. While Castro's options are more limited, he has shown signs of irritation over bloc trade arrangements—witness his complaint that "there are tendencies [among 'several socialist countries'] toward maintaining practices of trade with the underdeveloped world which are the same practices . . . [employed by] the developed, bourgeois capitalist world.[4]

Ironically, Boorstein's book exhibits two of the same shortcomings he ascribes to the Cubans: he relies on insufficient and inaccurate statistics, and as a result he displays excessive optimism in forecasting the future. For example, his two tables on Cuban's foreign trade provide scanty information restricted to the years up to 1962, although in 1966—well before Boorstein's publication date—the Cuban journal *Comercio Exterior* provided the finest and most complete collection of statistics available on the subject, specifically updating and correcting some of the figures used by Boorstein. On the basis of the earlier data, Boorstein estimates that Cuba's external deficit amounted to $1.1 billion in 1965, half of it resulting from debt payments. According to *Comercio Exterior*, however, the cumulative deficit in the balance of trade alone was $1.2 billion in 1965, without taking debt payments into account. Finally, Boorstein asserts that by 1963 (when he left Cuba), the organization of the economy and the foreign trade situation were improving, and he forecasts that by the end of the 1960's an increased output of sugar and other primary products will have solved the balance-of-payments problem. Actually, the deficit in the trade balance was worse in 1963 than in any previous year, and by 1966 it had reached a record figure of $344 million. Sugar output reached six-million-ton levels in 1965 and 1967, but was quite low in 1966, 1968 and 1969. Output in the latter year was 4.7 million tons, 48 percent short of the planned target.[5]

While an author may be forgiven for errors in prognostication, it seems clear in this case that Mr. Boorstein made too little effort to augment his on-the-spot experience with later research.

[4] *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Aug. 25, 1968, p. 2.
[5] Fidel Castro in *Granma Weekly Review*, June 1, 1969, p. 3; and *Economic Intelligence Report: Cuba*, May 31, 1969, pp. 1-3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

D. BRUCE JACKSON'S STUDY analyzes Cuba's relations with the USSR and the Communist parties of Latin America in the period 1964-67, when the controversy over revolutionary strategy came to a head.

Despite the frictions created between the USSR and Cuba by the missile crisis of 1962, Castro gave evidence of supporting the Moscow line during 1964 and 1965. Jackson attributes this to Soviet pressures on Havana for more "orthodox" policies, together with the uncertainty created by the change of Soviet leadership after the overthrow of Khrushchev. At a conference of Latin American Communist parties held in Havana in November 1964, Castro and the Soviet-oriented parties reached a compromise agreement limiting guerrilla activity to Venezuela and five other Latin American countries, while relying on the sort of non-violent struggle that Moscow favored in the remaining 14 countries. Meantime Cuba had also yielded to Soviet demands by abandoning her ambitious policy of industrialization in favor of renewed emphasis on sugar production, and by stressing economic incentives over moralistic revolutionary appeals to the masses. Castro's deference to Moscow seemed to reach a high point with the departure from Cuba, in April of 1965, of Che Guevara—the leading exponent of rapid industrialization, export of the revolution, and reliance on moral inspiration of the masses.

There was general surprise, then, when in 1966 Castro suddenly shifted to a new bellicose stance in favor of revolutionary struggle. In Jackson's view, the main motive behind this switch was Castro's awareness that his image as an independent revolutionary leader was in the process of rapid deterioration in Latin America. Undoubtedly a specific factor in his decision was the Venezuelan Communist Party's abandonment of armed struggle following guerrilla defeats in the fall of 1965. Castro's new line, inaugurated at the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in early 1966, was affirmed in a conference resolution that armed struggle was the only answer to underdevelopment and colonialism. This was a serious blow to Moscow's policy of coexistence and an embarrassment to the pro-Soviet Communist parties. A split between guerrilla-oriented and Moscow-oriented Communists took place in Venezuela, and the quarrel soon spread all over Latin America. The Castroite line was given a theoretical basis by Régis Debray, the French professor and revolutionary, who elaborated the theme that guerrilla leaders should take over both military and political command from the estabilshed party leaders. The example of Cuba itself, where Castro had imposed his will on the party apparatus with Soviet acceptance, constituted a good precedent.

In an interesting final chapter, Mr. Jackson sums up his own explanations for the different phases of Castro's policy. While he identifies important domestic and foreign factors that have affected Cuba's course, he also feels that Castro's subjective attitudes have undergone a crucial process of change. The Cuban premier has placed the goal of exporting the revolution above domestic prosperity because he believes that his own survival depends upon maintaining his charismatic appeal both inside and outside of Cuba. The rewards of constructing "socialism on one island"—the task assigned to Cuba by the USSR—not only appeared remote and pallid, but offered nothing to Castro's foreign constituency. In Jackson's view, Castro's fear that a US-USSR rapprochement would leave Cuba unprotected was another factor leading him to promote guerrilla warfare in Latin America.

The book concludes by predicting an indefinite continuation of the Soviet-Cuban controversy over revolutionary strategy in Latin America. While this forecast may prove correct, it seems to place excessive reliance on a single variable—international politics. Since Mr. Jackson has assigned some importance to domestic influences on past Cuban policy, it seems strange that his future projections ignore internal variables, such as the deterioration of the Cuban economy and the expanding cracks in political consensus. In giving priority to exporting revolution over consolidating socialism in his own country, Castro has paid a high price. The question remains whether domestic difficulties will force him to come to terms with Moscow or whether he will continue to pursue his foreign ambitions no matter what the cost on the home front.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marx Transformed?

SHLOMO AVINERI: *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.*
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Z. A. JORDAN: *The Evolution of Dialetical Materialism.*
New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1967.

Reviewed by Stanley Rothman

EVER SINCE THE PUBLICATION in English of the early writings of Marx, a serious re-evaluation of his thinking has been underway. The two books under review are part of this examination. Both authors agree that Marx's early writings must be given greater emphasis, and both agree that the "mechanistic materialism" attributed to Marx by Lenin—and accepted as gospel by several generations of Soviet and Western commentators—is off the mark. Both also argue that Engels was in part responsible for the later misinterpretations of Marx's thought, and both try to establish what Marx really meant.

Avineri's work is a conscious attempt to create a totally new image of Marx—a Marx far more cautious and empirical than has generally been assumed. In the author's view, Marx was not an economic determinist in the strict definition, he did not believe in the use of "terror," and he did not maintain that the condition of the working class would grow progressively worse under capitalism. In fact, Avineri argues, the whole structure of Marx's thought is quite compatible with a pragmatic, evolutionary, and eclectic approach to socialism. His arguments amount to the construction of a new Marx out of bits and pieces spliced together from every conceivable source, including an essay written shortly before Marx's graduation from the Trier Gymnasium.

Jordan's study is narrower in focus, concentrating on Marx's more theoretical works. His systematic analysis leads him to admit at least changes in emphasis as Marx grew older. He also sees more contradictions and tensions in Marx's thought than does Avineri and is much more aware of some of the ambiguities which characterize it. As a result, his book is more diffuse, and his conclusions are not nearly so clear-cut.

While Avineri's interpretation is better on one or two points, Jordan's book is on the whole the superior of the two. One may well agree that the early writings are of key importance for an understanding of Marx, but this is not the same as assuming that there were no later changes in his outlook. Further, one simply cannot give equal weight to purely polemical esays, letters, or newspaper articles and *The German Ideology;* nor can one derive a new Marx from snippets culled from here and there, when other snippets can just as easily prove the opposite.

In the reviewer's opinion, however, both authors ultimately err on the same key point. They maintain—albeit with very different arguments—that Marx was not a materialist, that he was in fact a "humanist" and a "naturalist," and that Engels was responsible for what has become known as "dialectical materialism." Avineri attempts to prove that Engels was a "mechanistic materialist" in the tradition of Hobbes, whereas Marx was the true Hegelian.

Jordan, on the other hand, argues that Engels was the true Hegelian, but that just as Hegel saw a fundamental substratum that was "spirit," Engels could not divest himself of the belief that ulti-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mately the basic components of the universe consist of matter in motion. Contrary to Avineri, Jordan differentiates Engels' position from traditional materialism insofar as he was anti-reductionist and believed in the possibility of "emergence." Thus Jordan admits that Engels did not believe in the wisdom or even the possibility of replacing the social analysis of social forces by discussions of "matter in motion." Although Engels was clearly convinced that new systems were constantly being created by new combinations of the basic components of the universe, he was equally convinced that these new systems had to be analyzed in terms appropriate to them.

Jordan, in the reviewer's opinion, comes closer to the truth than Avineri, but not too much closer. Both Marx and Engels were "dialectical materialists." Both regarded themselves as having stood Hegel right side up, and both differentiated their materialism from traditional materialism. Had Marx written directly on the subject in his later years, he probably would have developed it with considerably more sophistication and subtlety, but the weight of evidence strongly indicates his essential agreement with Engels. Marx himself said in the preface to the second German edition of *Das Kapital*:

> **My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life processes of the human brain, *i.e.*, the process of thinking, is the demiurgos of the real world. . . . With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.**

Engels may have coined the term dialectical materialism, but it was a reasonable description of Marx's own view.

Jordan argues that Marx could not have been a materialist because, except for his early writings, he did not engage in metaphysical speculation, and materialism is a metaphysical doctrine. I agree. The point is that Marx did not agree with this definition of materialism. In *The Holy Family* he explicitly argued that materialism and naturalism are the same thing, and that they represent, not metaphysics, but the correct world view.[1] Further, despite Jordan's argument to the contrary, Marx also stated, quite explictly, that his view of history was dependent upon his "materialism." [2]

A number of additional criticisms could be leveled against both books, especially Mr. Avineri's. Marx did use the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" or its equivalent more than three times, and not only in "private communications," and so did Engels.[3] Marx did believe in the use of terror when appropriate.[4] And Marx and Engels both believed (most of the time) that the living standard of the proletariat would never rise above the level of mere subsistence, and that it would probably decline as traditional restraints were swept away.[5]

Avineri's attempt to endow Marx with pragmatic evolutionary tendencies works no better. Marx's system is apocalyptic. Social change *must* involve violent revolution both because the ruling classes cannot give up their power and because the revolutionary experience is necessary if the worker is to be transformed into a new man.[6] In their last years both Marx and Engels retreated somewhat, but these were *ad hoc* deviations and were completely incompatible with the architectonic of their system in its mature form.

Another of Avineri's arguments must be sharply contested. It is true, as he asserts, that underlying Marx's historical materialism was a philosophic anthropology. It is true, too, that neither Marx nor Engels regarded the interplay between the "forces" and "mode" of production as the only factor to be taken into account in explaining a particular historical event or even a given national history. It is quite another thing, however, for Avineri to assert that Marx was willing to attach major significance to a whole range of non-economic factors, including the autochthonous development of independent urban centers in northern Europe, as sources of the development of capitalism. First of all, the evidence on which Avineri bases this assertion is very flimsy. Secondly, his interpretation runs counter to the overwhelming thrust of Marx's thought.

Avineri and Jordan are both trying to rescue Marx's thought from the rigid interpretation placed upon it by some of his supposed disciples. Each is a serious scholar, and both contribute to our understanding. However, both have pushed their arguments too far. For example, if we accept Avineri's interpretation, Marx is transformed into an

[1] Moscow, 1956, p. 168.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

[3] Notably, in *The Class Struggles in France*. See Karl Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1951, p. 203. See, in the same volume, Engels' introduction to the *Civil War in France*, p. 440, and *The Housing Question*, p. 556.
[4] Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, pp. 103-4.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 43; 345-46; 400-04; 419; 424-45. Also *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chicago, Charles H. Kerr, 1924, pp. 706-7 and *passim*.
[6] See, for example, *The German Ideology*, New York, International Publishers, 1947, p. 69.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eclectic thinker offering a diverse set of relatively unintegrated propositions on a variety of subjects. In this view, Marx's historical analysis pointed to a number of factors which might be of importance in understanding the course of human development, but Marx made no real attempt to construct a theoretical scheme indicating why he chose these variables and what weight he would give them.

The conventional wisdom, on the other hand, presents Marx as a Promethean—the last thinker who attempted to construct a system which would encompass man's evolving place in the universe in one grand design. We may criticize his metaphysics, and his social analysis may suffer from his attempt to universalize the West European experience (something he began to realize only late in life), but given the power of his mind we have learned more from his errors than from the little truths of lesser men.

I, for one, prefer the conventional wisdom.

Politics in Eastern Europe

PAUL LENDVAI: *Eagles in Cobwebs. Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans.* Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1969.
GHITA IONESCU: *The Politics of the European Communist States.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1967.
JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS: *Economic Development of Communist Rumania.* Cambridge, Mass., and London, MIT Press, 1967.

Reviewed by Viktor Meier

"DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL pressures, aspirations and circumstances have created a wholly new situation to which universally applicable concepts of 'communism' in general or studies on the basis of purely ideological perspectives have scarcely any relevance today." With this sentence Paul Lendvai opens his excellent book on nationalism and communism in the Balkan countries. Lendvai does not ignore the important role played by ideological factors, but his account makes it abundantly clear that considerations of a purely power-political and traditional nature are far more decisive in shaping the international as well as the domestic policies of the Balkan regimes. Recent developments demonstrate that, even under Communist rule, each of the countries in this region exhibits traditional national characteristics—both positive and negative—in its political life. For the most part it is history, and no longer sociology and political science, which furnishes us with a key to an understanding of the developments in Southeast Europe.

For all its painstaking scholarship, Lendvai's book is lively and written with the flair of a journalist intimately familiar with the area and the peoples he writes about. He was raised in Budapest and worked as a newspaperman in Hungary until the Revolution of 1956, when he fled to Vienna. Since that time, Mr. Lendvai has established himself as a highly knowledgeable authority on Eastern Europe, which he visits regularly as a correspondent for a number of Western newspapers. Unfortunately, space limitations preclude comprehensive comments on his book. Suffice it to say that his observations reveal a sure-handed grasp of the history of that complex and turbulent part of the world, and that his conclusions are therefore re-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freshingly realistic and devoid of the kind of confusion that characterizes the approach of so many other writers in this field. For example, while many observers consider the central problem facing Yugoslavia today to be the development of democratic institutions, Mr. Lendvai recognizes—rightly, in the reviewer's opinion—that the future of Yugoslavia depends much more on the solution of its age-old nationality question. Similarly, while many writers tend to portray the situation in Rumania in rather simplified terms, contrasting Bucharest's independent foreign policy with its alleged "neo-Stalinist" domestic regime, Lendvai clearly sees that the promotion of national independence tends to bring about a high degree of national unity and spirit on the home front as well.

IN MANY RESPECTS, Ghita Ionescu's study of *The Politics of the European Communist States* stands in contrast to Lendvai's book. One must, of course, take into account that it was published two years earlier, and that therefore many observations seem outdated. In fact, this is the second time that Mr. Ionescu has found himself outpaced by developments. His excellent book, *Communism in Rumania*, which appeared in 1964, ended at the very point when Rumania embarked upon a new foreign policy. His present study, which deals mainly with manifestations of dissent in East European countries, is equally comprehensive, but ends just at the moment when these manifestations were entering a new and critical phase.

The inauspicious timing of *The Politics of the European Communist States* is, of course, something for which the author can hardly be held responsible. Far more serious, however, is Mr. Ionescu's failure to discern certain developments which had emerged—however incipiently—during the time the book was being written. The fault, it would seem, lies with the author's general approach. Instead of using—as in his first book—the traditional tools of an historian, Mr. Ionescu apparently fell prey to the current vogue of "system construction," in this case of a political-sociological nature. Among the many errors committed by those who follow this method is the tendency to overemphasize certain formal phenomena at the expense of those for which no "full-proof" documentation can be adduced, but of which the writer should nevertheless be aware. To give one example, Ionescu dwells at length on the resignation, in 1966, of the Slovenian government. While this was certainly an important event, it was not even connected with the major issues which dominated Slovenian political life at that time: specifically, Slovenia's relationship to the Yugoslav state as a whole; the role of the revived "National Front" and its relationship to the Communist Party; the position of the Catholic Church; and, finally, the question of the so-called "informal group," *i.e.*, the five or six people who held all the positions of power in the republic and defended them against outsiders and newcomers. Bound by his system, the author ignored basic issues that are to a large extent rooted in *traditional* Slovenian politics and concentrated instead on the purely formal phenomenon of a Communist government's resignation.

JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS, long known as an excellent analyst of Communist economics, completed his study of the *Economic Development of Communist Rumania* in 1967. The volume is the result of extensive research, some of it conducted in Rumania itself, and must be regarded as a standard work on the subject. The problems examined by Montias are still operative today, especially those of a largely political character, and it is to his credit that he is as concerned with these as he is with economic factors *per se*. The basic problem, the author holds, is whether the new Rumania will be able to build an economy that is up-to-date and capable of meeting international competition. Considering the political pressure that is being exerted on Rumania by the USSR, a strong economy is undoubtedly of crucial importance to the continued success of Bucharest's policy of independence.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews in Brief

Children of the Party

ANITA GALLIUSSI: *I Figli del Partito.* Florence, Vallecchi Publishers, 1966.

A GAP IN THE historiography of the world Communist movement has been filled by the publication in Italy of this autobiographical account by Anita Galliussi. Anita was the daughter of Communist militant Santin Galliussi, an Udine mechanic imprisoned by the Fascists in 1931 after his capture on a conspiratorial mission for the illegal Italian Communist Party.

Equipped by the party with false names and forged Swiss passports, Anita, then aged six, and her mother Mira crossed the border into France. For a few happy months they were reunited in Paris with Santin, who had managed to escape; but soon he was sent to Italy on another mission and was recaptured. Mother and daughter then joined the hundreds of other Comintern wives, widows, and children who in the early 1930's found refuge, work and education in the Soviet Union.

As Ignazio Silone notes in his introduction, the Comintern organization MOPR (Relief for Revolutionaries), which initially saw to the care and education of the children, served a political as well as a humanitarian purpose. The presence of the children in the USSR freed Moscow's trusted agents from worry—but it also afforded an extra guarantee of their loyalty. Moreover, Moscow used its schools for foreign youth to train a new generation of cadres in absolute obedience to Stalin and the Fatherland of the Revolution. According to various sources, the number of boys and girls of many nationalities "raised" by the Soviet Communist Party eventually reached a total of around 10,000. Among later arrivals were thousands of Spanish children orphaned in the civil war and —after World War II—the sons and daughters of Greek Communist partisans who fought under Markos.

Despite this large number of potential witnesses, Anita Galliussi has produced the only firsthand account known to the reviewer describing the experiences of the foreign "children of the party" in the Soviet Union. It is a profoundly human document, of interest alike to historians, educators and psychologists. Soon after her arrival in Moscow, Anita was separated from her mother and sent to a special primary school for the children of foreign Communists. Her mother (who first worked in a ball-bearing factory and was later assigned as a typist to Radio Moscow) could only visit Anita at the school two or three times a year. Called the Elena Stassova Institute (after the President of MOPR, a veteran Polish Communist), the school became home to more than 100 youngsters ranging from kindergarten-age to 14 years. Anita's schoolmates included the children of Togliatti, Luigi Longo, Anna Pauker, Tito, the Spanish revolutionary Dolores Ibarruri, the German Communist martyr Stenzer, Brazilian party leader Carlos Prestes, and the *London Daily Worker's* William Rust. There were also Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Indians, and Pakistani, as well as Nilly—a little Negro boy from America, not further identified by the author.

The atmosphere of her primary school years is conveyed in this extract from Anita's journal:

The echo of events that shook the world outside reached us only in a muted way, but it occupied us nevertheless. We heard of the Reichstag fire, Hitler's rise to power in Germany . . . the difficulties of collectivization and industrialization. . . . Many things, though, remained obscure. One Sunday, returning from the circus, I saw in many windows [the sign] *"Chistka"* [1]. . . . I did not understand why the citizens of Ivanovo wanted . . . to have a cleanup, and I put the question to our young teacher Liubov Petrovna. . . .

"The slogan means that we have to clean up, not the premises, but the ranks of our party organizations. . . . The *chistka* is now in progress in all the party cells, and every member must engage in complete and frank self-criticism . . .; he must confess everything about himself . . ., his origins, his errors of the past, the wrong attitudes assumed by his closest relatives. . . ."

On that occasion I perceived how important and honorable it was to come from a family of workers or poor peasants and how dangerous to have been born in families belonging to other social classes.

World War II was well underway by the time Anita completed her secondary studies—with honors. She was then summoned by none other than Ercoli, alias Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Section of the Comintern, and informed of her selection to attend a training course for young Communists destined for partisan and postwar responsibilities in their native countries. The assignment took Anita to an out-of-the-way location in the Bashkir Republic, where the course was conducted under elaborate security measures (including cover names for the school and

[1] "*Chistka*" has two meanings: "cleanup" and "purge."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all the students). During this time she underwent intensive political instruction and guerrilla warfare training.

After a year Anita was called back to Moscow to become Togliatti's secretary. This was three months after the dissolution of the Comintern, an announcement which the young conspirators found almost as hard to understand as the news four years earlier of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. By the time she joined Togliatti's staff, the various national sections of the Comintern had been removed from their spacious headquarters and relocated, separately and secretly, in old buildings throughout Moscow. According to Anita, almost no one knew that they had even survived.

After Togliatti returned to the liberated portion of Italy, Anita was sent to a radio-teletype school on the outskirts of Moscow, where she learned to send and receive Morse code and to build and repair her own transmitter.

The war was over by the time Anita and her mother finally got the call to go back to Italy. They had been in Russia more than 13 of Anita's 20 years. When they reached their home in Udine, they learned that Santin had been dead for two years. Released from prison as a dying man early in 1943, probably because the authorities did not want another Communist martyr on their hands, he had died a few days after being paroled to his brother's home.

In Rome, Anita learned that her conspiratoral career was to enter a new phase. The last pages of her account describe a summons from Togliatti, who had meanwhile become Minister of Justice. In a meeting at party headquarters, he delivered her instructions:

The task with which the party entrusts you calls for the greatest secrecy, seriousness and isolation. You must not be seen with the comrades of the party but live apart completely. At the proper time I will introduce you to a comrade who will be in charge of your work. We must be ready for everything. . . .

Anita chose to end her account at this point, probably since the rest of her story has become public knowledge. From press accounts of her defection in the early 1950's, we know that Togliatti assigned her an important role in the "underground" party organization which was training cadres in the techniques of seizing power by force. The mendacity of the party and of its viceroys in Moscow led to Anita's progressive disillusionment, as she carried out her furtive duties in a free environment. Ordered to pursue and spy upon Giulio Seniga, the dissident assistant of party leader Secchia, she ended by renouncing her past and marrying the apostate comrade she was supposed to bring to party justice. Today she helps Seniga run the Milan publishing house "Azione Comune," established to support democratic socialism and to oppose the Italian Communist Party.

Left unsaid but implicit in the author's admirably controlled and unpolemical pages is a profound sense of anguish at the betrayal of young people like herself and idealistic militants like her father. Anita had just turned seven when she last saw her father in Paris: "What counted most was the marvelous, unbelievable feeling to be sitting once again between mama and papa, squeezed tightly into the taxi on the way from the station." What else mattered? Why did he have to disappear, on whose orders, for what elusive ends, worn down and sacrificed by long years in prison? "I dedicate this book to my father," Anita writes in her foreword, "and to all the militants, unkown and forgotten by the bureaucracies of state and party, who have given their lives to the cause of freedom and brotherhood among peoples."

George C. Wynne

A Voice from the Ukraine

IVAN DZYUBA: *Internationalism or Russification?* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

THE AUTHOR of this book, Ivan Dzyuba, is a gifted young literary critic and writer who has been in the forefront of intellectural ferment in his native Ukraine. He has incurred the wrath of the authorities by calling for freedom of expression in literature and by challenging the principles of "socialist realism." The authorities vilify him in the press and at official meetings, threaten him with expulsion from the Ukrainian Writers' Union, and once barred him from publishing anything for over three years (1965-68).

Dzyuba's previous writings were primarily exercises in literary criticism, but in *Internationalism or Russification?* he tackles the whole gamut of questions relating to Moscow's nationalities policy in the Ukraine and, by projection, in other non-Russian republics. Dzyuba originally submitted this treatise as a protest to Ukrainian party and government leaders in the wake of the mass arrests that took place in the Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1965. When the petition proved to be utterly unavailing, a copy of it found its way to the West, where it has since been published in both Ukrainian and English.

Dzyuba's main thesis is that Lenin's formulation and later application (in the early 1920's) of Soviet nationalities policy was, on the whole, correct and realistic, and that Stalin and his successors—including the present regime—deliberately abandoned it. He supports this contention with numerous quotations from Lenin's works and from stenographic reports and resolutions of party congresses, comparing them point by point with actual Soviet practice, which he bluntly describes as nothing more than an "extensive process of Russification" (p. 47). He asserts that Ukrainian unrest is much more widespread than appearances would indicate, and that this is the result of Moscow's policy of encouraging "Russian great-power chauvinism" while at the same time suppressing any manifestation of "local nationalism," no matter how innocent it may be.

Unless a serious policy reorientation is undertaken, Dzyuba warns, the Soviet Union is condemned to remain a police state: "in the fiftieth, the seventy-fifth, and the hundredth year of Soviet rule you will still be sacking people because of literary evenings; you will still be smuggling tape-recorders into places where friends meet . . .; you will still be arresting people for reading books . . ." (p. 212). He urges the Soviet leaders to permit "open and honest discussion of all unsolved questions, all accumulated mistakes, all painful problems" (p. 27), emphasizing that mere declarations about "proletarian internationalism" are not enough. In short, the Soviet leaders must realize that the constituent nations of the USSR are permanent realities—that they have a positive role to play, and that instead of pursuing a

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy of national obliteration, the government should strive to comprehend and encourage "the unique value of each national life and of its inexhaustible possibilities" (p. 48).

Not all the blame is laid at the door of Moscow; the Ukrainian power elite also gets its share of it. Mr. Dzyuba castigates the Ukrainian leadership in Kiev for being "unconcerned" about the situation and for failing "to fulfill its duties towards the Ukrainian people in whose name it acts, whose money it spends and to whom it is accountable" (p. 201).

Mr. Dzyuba's book is well-written, original in approach, and intellectually provocative. The author uses a large body of data to demonstrate the nature and mechanics of Moscow's assimilatory and discriminatory policies in education, publishing, professional training, administration, population resettlement, etc.; much information is revealed here for the first time in the West. At the same time, the book is lively, lucid and sprinkled with humor and biting satire. A literary critic, Dzyuba also demonstrates his skill as a keen and persuasive political analyst. Yet, his book is more than a scholarly treatise; it is also a courageous and articulate statement of the author's personal beliefs and convictions. It is a scathing indictment of the Soviet power elite in both Moscow and Kiev, but it is also a cogent and realistic proposal of an alternative policy

Stephen D. Olynyk

The Economics of Politics

MICHAEL GAMARNIKOW: *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968.

IN RETROSPECT it might appear surprising that Stalinist methods of economic planning survived the dictator by more than a decade. Yet, despite the shackles of an entirely irrational system of economic management, the East European economics patterned on the Soviet model achieved a rapid rate of industrialization during the 1950's and into the early 1960's. The diversification of industrial production proceeded apace, and "coal and steel" communism was gradually superseded by an industrial structure that placed increasing stress on consumer goods and export industries. Eventually, however, the Stalinist system's built-in compulsions toward reckless investment and disregard of cost made themselves felt —first and conspicuously in the advanced industrial economies of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. In both countries industrial expansion came to a halt, or a near halt, in 1962-63.

Mr. Gamarnikow sums up the disastrous consequences of Stalinist extravagance that made the reshaping of the economic mechanism imperative. As he points out, the need for a basic change in the principles of economic management was recognized in the USSR as well as in East Europe. It was in 1962 that Liberman first aired his thesis advocating the adoption of the profit motive as the regulator of enterprise activities. In the author's view, the guarded support that Khrushchev gave to Liberman's ideas at the Central Committee Plenum late in 1962 was an important boost to reform sentiment in the dependent countries.

In a chapter entitled "The Revisionist Tide Overruns Eastern Europe," the author describes the various ways in which individual countries approached the problem of overhauling their obsolete planning machinery. Notwithstanding the reluctance of the majority of the bloc countries to relax central controls (with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, insofar as the later stages of their reforms were concerned), the reform programs were adopted one by one. East Germany made the start; a blueprint published in 1963 was implemented the next year. The Kosygin reform in the USSR and measures in Poland (correctly labeled by the author as fragmentary reforms) followed in 1965. More sweeping reform concepts developed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, requiring lengthier preparation, were initiated respectively in 1965 and 1968.

While the author provides a thorough review of the course of these reforms, some aspects of his interpretation invite criticism. Apparently he regards all the reform concepts as the product of economic revisionism; whether they are limited in scope or more ambitious attempts to activate a market mechanism, they represent for him "the second phase of destalinization" (p. 15). The author states himself that his thesis does not apply to the neo-Stalinist Ulbricht. Yet, is it correct to qualify the Gomulka of the 1960's—or for that matter Kosygin—as a protagonist of destalinization?

Further, the author fails to draw sufficient distinction between reforms in the Soviet-type economies on the one hand and in Yugoslavia on the other. In Yugoslavia decentralization has implied democratization—through the dismantling of the powers of the central authorities and the devolution of decision-making to the workers' councils. In the Soviet orbit, decentralization has simply meant the shift of decision-making from the planning bureaucracy to the managers; it is a reform of the methods of economic administration. The principle of one-man management remains, and, as before, the manager is responsible to the central authorities. The enhancement of his powers in relation to the party apparatus might in the course of time affect party policy, but from the point of view of society at large, it only incurs a shift within the ruling elite.

In asking "Who Pays for the Economic Reforms?," the author raises a relevant question. He argues that the price reforms which accompanied the economic programs have increased costs of raw materials and equipment. By implication, wages are left as the only essential cost element which can yield economies. This suggests that the authorities are looking to the redeployment of manpower as the main means to rationalize production. Shutting down high-cost plants and streamlining industrial production as a whole will require the dismissal of superfluous labor. The possible consequences of such a drive are foreshadowed by the findings of Western efficiency experts with respect to an important Polish mechanical works employing more than 20.000 workers. According to the experts' report, the factory could achieve its present output with 55 percent of its labor force if it used up-to-date methods of production. The prospect of mass unemployment—at least as a temporary phenomenon—following in the wake of the reforms presents the governments of the Soviet bloc with a specific political problem. They will hardly be inclined to soften the impact by imitating Yugoslavia's policy of encouraging the migration of workers to job markets in the capitalist countries.

Mr. Gamarnikow offers a realistic appraisal of the obstructions that stand

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the way of achieving a market mechanism within the Soviet-type economy. Scarcities of raw materials and basic consumer goods, in combination with the continued overstraining of resources, preclude the introduction of free prices. It is manifest that wage controls will not be abandoned. And, as the author sums it up, "the profit motive cannot be fully meaningful within the framework of a system of arbitrarily set prices and wages" (p. 77). Thus it is somewhat surprising to have him state elsewhere (p. 65): "Nevertheless, the overall trend of Soviet economic pragmatism leads unmistakably away from central planning based on directives from above, and toward a market economy where the chief incentive will be profit." On the basis of his own analysis, it is hard to accept this contradictory conclusion.

The question of whether resource allocation through prices and the market is compatible with central planning has been contested ever since the famous discussion between Oskar Lange and Mieses, the exponent of orthodox liberalism. It must be remembered, moreover, that the feasibility of a market economy in the Soviet orbit rests by no means on purely economic considerations. The struggle between neo-Stalinists and supporters of the new economic model in Czechoslovakia made this clear enough even before the Soviet invasion. Russian armor provided an extra—and incontestable—"counterargument" to many features of the reform. While the invasion was directed primarily against political liberalization, it seems fair to surmise that Moscow's overt hostility to changes in the political sphere also involved fear of the potential political consequences of the economic innovations conceived in the Czechoslovak model. At any rate, that model has now been watered down to suit Kremlin tastes.

George Kemeny

China's Revolution

STEPHEN PAN AND RAYMOND J. DE JAEGHER: *Peking's Red Guard: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.* New York, Twin Circle Publishing Co. Inc., 1968.

THROWN TOGETHER in apparent haste at the end of 1967 ("There is no sign that the Peking authorities will abandon the Proletarian Cultural Revolution"), this work relies for major documentation upon up-to-the-minute, often highly speculative Western press reports about contemporary events in China. It may be true that "cases of meningitis and encephalitis . . . often connected with mass movements" have become more widespread recently, or that "Lo Jui-ch'ing . . . is presumably dead." It is considerably less likely that opposition forces were at any time gathering in the hills "giving the Mao-Lin faction the same kind of medicine as Mao administered to the Nationalists from 1945 to 1949," or that "one faction [in Kwangtung] supports T'ao Chu." And the authors are patently wrong in asserting that "Peking has frequently denied that the Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a power struggle among the leaders of the party", or that "The Red Guards are using the . . . three essays of Mao (*lao san p'ien*) as a guide to the Proletarian Cultural Revolution."

General readers for whom the book was written will be somewhat confused by inconsistent spellings (*e.g.*, Tsao Ti-chu, Tsao Ti-chiu, Tao Ti-chiu), misled by some translations ("Mao Tse-tungism" for the regime's official doctrine—this Red Guard variant was actually criticized as a deviation), and bored by the authors' unremitting attempts to demonstrate that "China is *now in a state of great confusion and* disorder." Unfortunately, those who stick it out to the bitter end can look forward only to numerous non-sequitur conclusions. "Unless Mao Tse-tung has actually lost his mind, he and his followers would not commit national suicide by fighting with the United States." But after all, who knows? "One cannot just use common sense to predict the decisions and actions of the Communists because the Communists, especially the Maoists, have their own sense of logic . . ."

Gordon Bennett

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

The Comintern and the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

TO THE EDITORS: In his recent article "The Comintern and the Genealogy of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'"* (May-June 1969), Dr. William Korey raises a vital question for all of us who have spent our lives studying the history of the international Communist movement —namely, how much do the Russian Communist leaders learn from their own past experience? The implication of Korey's article is that they learn a great deal and that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" is based on their experience at the head of the Communist International. I would argue, on the contrary, that Soviet leaders have learned little, or perhaps even nothing, from Comintern history and that one must look elsewhere for the antecedents of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Dr. Korey rests his argument upon analogy. There are certainly superficial similarities between the phrases used in 1919 and those used in 1968. But any genuine connection between the two periods would have to rest on more substantial evidence. There are good reasons for doubting that a more solid case for his thesis could be constructed.

First, there are few outward signs that the Russians study the history of the Communist International. The institution and its leaders have long since been consigned to the "dustbin of history." According to Djilas and Dedijer, Stalin had nothing but contempt for the Comintern's efforts.[1] Most of the early participants in the Third International were sent to an early grave by Stalin's purges, and the organization itself was finally liquidated by Stalin's fiat in 1943. When in the early 1960's the Higher Party School of the Russian Communist Party undertook a three-volume study of the history of the international working-class movement, the editors devoted a scant 40 pages to the history of the Comintern.[2] Given the conspiracy of silence about the Comintern and the remoteness of the present Soviet leaders from its operations, it is unlikely that they would even be familiar with events in 1919.

Secondly, even if some such historical consciousness existed, the situations in 1919 and 1968, some 50 years apart, are not, in my opinion, sufficiently similar to warrant analogies. In 1968 the relationship between the Russian Communist Party and other Communist parties was fundamentally different from that in 1919. By 1968 there were impressively large and independent Communist parties throughout the world. Seven states had joined the Communist commonwealth with the help of the Red Army, and five without. The Soviet leaders could no longer pose as sole authorities on matters of revolutionary strategy and Marxist theory, but had to compete with China for that role, and the survival of international communism was no longer dependent on the survival of the Soviet state. The brief and unsuccessful effort to resurrect that pale replica of the Comintern, the Cominform, and the ill-fated Moscow Declaration of 1957 showed how much the situation had changed.

Finally, the interest of the Russians could hardly be served by reopening the history of the Comintern, for it is a veritable Pandora's box. In Eastern Europe—as contrasted with the Soviet Union—the memory of the Communist International is very vivid, and the historical record does not support the need for the kind of international solidarity it represented. On the contrary, the East European Communist parties can and do use the Comintern experience—for example, by quoting the 1943 statement on its dissolution—as proof of the need for independence and thus as a weapon against the Brezhnev Doctrine.[3]

There is one possible argument in support of Dr. Korey's thesis that he does not explore—namely, that Communists use history in an unhistorical way. It is entirely possible that Soviet

* N.B. Due to a proofreading error, "genealogy" was misspelled in the title of Dr. Korey's article as originally published —Eds.

[1] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations With Stalin*, New York, 1962, pp. 80-81; V. Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, London, 1953, pp. 284, 301.

[2] *Istoriia mezhdunarodnovo rabochevo i natsionalno-osvoboditelnovo dvizheniia*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962.

[3] See, for example, reference to the 1943 statement in the Hungarian Communist Party's comments on the 50th anniversary of the Comintern, translated and republished in *East Europe*, (New York), April 1969, p. 37.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders would cite irrelevant liturgical texts from past Comintern resolutions to give an historical veneer to policies that are not otherwise defensible. For years they have been using Lenin's works in this way. Whatever this rhetorical strategy, however, it seems apparent that the Brezhnev Doctrine is inspired by the more recent impact of developments in Yugoslavia in 1948 and Hungary in 1956—cases which, unlike the Comintern experience, were specifically cited as historical precedents for the alarm felt by the Russian leaders over Czech innovations.[4]

GEORGE D. JACKSON, JR.
Chairman, Dept. of History
Hoffstra University
Hempstead, N.Y.

MR. KOREY REPLIES: It is curious that in the year 1969 Prof. Jackson would argue that the Comintern has "long since been consigned to the 'dustbin of history'" and that "the interest of the Russians could hardly be served by reopening the history of the Comintern. . . ." The fact is that 1969 has been marked in the USSR by a remarkable outpouring of articles and speeches about the Communist International. In February, the theoretical party organ, *Kommunist*, carried a 6000-word article on the Comintern containing a number of hitherto unpublished documents; in March, *Voprosy istorii KPSS* carried a 4500-word article with additional new documents; and still more documents appeared in the April issue of *Kommunist*. Meantime *Izvestia* on March 2 published a lengthy piece on the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Comintern, and *Pravda* followed two days later with an even longer article. A few weeks earlier *Pravda* had reviewed at considerable length a new book on the pre-history of the Comintern.

In addition to all this attention in the press, there was a gala-like conference on the 50th anniversary of the Comintern, held in Moscow on March 25. Luminaries from both the Soviet Union and various foreign Communist parties assembled in the House of Unions to hear major addresses by top party ideologists Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev. Their themes, as indeed the themes of the various articles on the Comintern, were geared to demonstrate that "proletarian internationalism," a code phrase for the Brezhnev Doctrine, had its ideological and organizational roots in the early history of the Third International.

[4] See, for example, the Soviet reply to the Czech "Two Thousand Words," written by I. Alexandrov and published in *Pravda*, July 11, 1968. It has been translated and republished in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, (Los Angeles), July-October 1968, p. 245.

Revolution or Revolutions?

TO THE EDITORS: Parris H. Chang's article in the March-April 1969 issue ("Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet") strikes me as a most accurate assessment of China's recent political upheaval. However, while his article points to many facets of the Cultural Revolution, it fails to root out any historically accurate *raison d'être* for it.

As a starting point, let me quote from *The China Quarterly:*

The motive behind the GPCR has been explained by the Chinese many times, and there is no reason not to accept their explanation at face value. Put simply, it is rooted in the obsessive fear of the aging leaders that unless a constant effort is made to keep the flame of revolution burning, the country is in danger of succumbing to the manifold temptations of "Revisionism." The main safeguard against this is to instill in the Chinese citizen the proper ideological outlook; for then he will never change his proletarian colors.

Consequently, there was a purge of men who "labor with their heads" (intellectuals); men who simply did not agree with Mao. Friction was no doubt brought to a head by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, which, apart from annoying the intellectuals, bred apathy, disillusionment, and dissatisfaction among large segments of Chinese society. In short, Mao's "socialist education" campaign of 1962 reflected the existence of a climate of public opinion which was opposed to himself and his aims. In fact, the object of the campaign was "educating men anew and reorganizing our revolutionary tasks," and herein lies my suspicion that what was originally a "rectification" campaign (*i.e.*, an attempt to keep the revolutionary flame burning) became involved with issues of power.

Mao had suffered obvious and severe defeats in domestic and foreign policy, and it was politically imperative that a rationale be advanced to explain these past failures and thus silence criticism. According to this rationale, failures and criticisms of party policies were largely the handiwork of "foreign and domestic class enemies," against whom it was necessary to launch a nationwide class struggle. From my viewpoint, this was shrewdness personified—it supplied the GPCR with an "excuse" and was a solution to Mao's personal sense of political insecurity as well. And this is to say something characteristic of Chinese communism: it stresses the infallibility of Mao's ideology. It can never be wrong, only its implementation may go astray. From Mao's point of view, then, a purge and a Cultural Revolution are one and the same; they are the necessary stimulus for the maintenance and extension of revolution. In fact, it may be more accurate to view this process as a calculated strategy for effective control and as a typical phenomenon of post-1949 Chinese Communist history. That is, from time to time China tenses under internal disturbances, then relaxes. This method has been a most effective psychological technique for the consolidation and extension of power.

Overall, the history of Chinese communism is one of cycles, each cycle being a more radical movement in some specific area of social, political, and economic life. This leads one to speculate that China continually gropes after those more rigorous, austere, and supercollectivized ideals of communism, and that this groping in the dark, as it were, produces both a fervor and a sense of frustration.

Finally, and this is the point which Chang has failed to appreciate, one wonders whether this flag-waving and little-red-book-shaking are characteristic of all Communist China. Could it be that this fanatical hero-worship of Mao and this fervent adherence to his thought are but surface demonstrations, forming a protective shell within which the Chinese are able to live as they have for centuries?

M. J. BOWEN
Secondary Teachers College
Melbourne, Australia

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR. CHANG REPLIES: Mr. Bowen criticizes my article in the March-April issue for having failed to "root out any historically accurate *raison d'être*" for the GPCR. However, that was not the purpose of my article. As Mr. Bowen can see, the article was meant to deal with the course of the GPCR since 1966 and the impact it had on the political structure of Communist China. Messrs. Harry Gelman, Richard Baum, Philip Bridgham and Charles Neuhauser have analysed various aspects of the genesis of the GPCR in this journal and elsewhere (see their articles, respectively, in *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, November-December, 1966, and No. 3, March-April, 1967, and in *The China Quarterly*, Nos. 29 and 32, 1967). Their efforts need not be duplicated.

I also strongly disagree with Mr. Bowen's assertion that the "fanatical hero-worship of Mao" and "fervent adherence to his thought" are merely "surface demonstrations." Rather, Mao's personality cult performs important functions: it has been used to legitimize the regime's authority and to set new "rules of the game" in Chinese politics, and as such it has had an enormous impact on China's political life. To miss this point is to miss one of the fundamentals of Chinese politics today.

Protest from Victor Louis

TO THE EDITORS: Your issue for September-October 1968, contains on p. 115 a short biography which I found inaccurate and obviously culled from various biased sources.

It seems to have been written with the intention of presenting me in the most unsympathetic light. For example, the time I served in prison camp, over nine years, is presented as punishment for the criminal charge of black marketeering when in reality I was arrested on political grounds and sentenced to 25 years; I was released, along with many serving similar sentences, in 1956. Similarly, the translation of "My Fair Lady", which was praised here [in the Soviet Union] by many as an attempt to bring a really good American show to the Russian public, is presented as a crime because it was made without the authors' permission. The Soviet Union does not subscribe to the World Copyright Convention, so I cannot be held responsible. By contrast, when I translated the stage version of "The Dairy of Anne Frank," the American authors were warmly enthusiastic about my work.

My name can be found on the contributors' list of a number of American publications—*Holiday, Parade* and *World War II* (put out by American Heritage Publications). Two of my books, *Sport in the USSR* and *Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union* (Lib. of Congress Cat. No. S 64-7503 and 65-16215 respectively) were published in England and articles of mine have appeared in newspapers literally all over the globe; why, then, shouldn't I call myself a professional journalist? On the other hand, I have never claimed that I am a trained linguist, nor would I dream of doing so. I was graduated from the Law Faculty of Moscow University.

There are other inaccuracies, too, but the part of your biographical sketch which really made me indignant was your groundless and illogical statement that I took the manuscript of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* to Western publishers. Nobody but *Grani* ever accused me of any such thing, and the letter by Solzhenitsyn on the subject which you print in the very same issue of your journal (p. 50) shows that he regarded *Grani's* statement as a provocation. You even misinterpreted the very letter you reprinted—saying that Solzhenitsyn demanded clarification of my possible relationship with the KGB. In fact the letter reads, "What does the Committee of State Security have to do with this?"

Indignant or not, I would not have written to you but for the fact that your publication is regarded as a reliable authority. When you quote and compile published facts which are not true, others will use your material and almost certainly distort the facts still further.

I am reminded of the children's game of Chinese Whispers, when a message is passed along the line and ends up often quite differently from the way it started. I feel I am entitled to stop this round before there is any more distortion, particularly with regard to the Solzhenitsyn story about which many people besides myself feel strongly.

VICTOR LOUIS
Moscow, USSR

IN REPLY: Since Mr. Louis' letter is the result of a recent encounter we had in Moscow, I thought it best to reply to it in person.

I first met Victor Louis on August 4, 1969, and then again a few days later. I found him pleasant and affable, but I was rather taken aback when he told me at the very outset that he had been about to enter a $25,000 libel suit against *Problems of Communism* for having defamed him in a Biographical Note published in the September-October 1968 issue.

I asked Mr. Louis to tell me precisely which passages in the Note he found so objectionable. In reply, he cited two assertions: first, that he had been "arrested on charges of black-marketeering," whereas he had actually been imprisoned on political grounds; and second, that in 1968 he was "purveying an unauthorized manuscript [of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*] to Western publishers," which he said was untrue. I told him that if this was the case, we would be glad to publish a letter from him to that effect, as well as an editorial statement acknowledging our error, thus obviating the need for any protracted legal proceedings between himself and the US Government. As our readers can see, Mr. Louis accepted my proposal. On behalf of *Problems of Communism*, therefore, I should now like to withdraw and apologize for the two allegations referred to above. As for Mr. Louis' further allegation that we presented his translation of *My Fair Lady* as a "crime," I wish to point out that the Note merely said that it was done "without the authors' permission." If Mr. Louis is unhappy about the connotation of this phrase, I might add that the authors of *My Fair Lady* had even more cause for unhappiness. But he is certainly correct in claiming that he was within his legal rights in translating and staging the play without the authors' consent.

So much for the specific charges. Now let me turn to some of the other matters mentioned by Mr. Louis as well as to the matters he has not touched upon at all. To begin with, I am struck—as have been many others before me—by Mr. Louis' pained incredulity at the thought that anyone would question his claim to being just an ordinary "professional journalist." There are many professional Soviet journalists in Moscow, but none of them was eager to see me after I had

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been denounced in *Pravda* (August 6, 1969) as a "key intelligence agent" (on the fanciful ground that I had gathered intelligence information while lunching with Czechoslovak writers in Prague in the summer of 1968). Mr. Louis, however, seemed to have no qualms about getting together with me, even insisting that I visit him at his dacha in an environ of Moscow which foreigners are forbidden to enter. And surely no professional Soviet journalist would think of offering—as Mr. Louis did in his personal conversations with me—to *write* for a magazine repeatedly described by the Soviet press (most recently in the August 16 issue of *Izvestia*) as "one of the key instruments for subversive activity against the Soviet Union and other socialist states."

To my knowledge, Mr. Louis is the only Soviet citizen (and assuredly the only Soviet *journalist*) who owns three cars, all of foreign manufacture; whose two published books are sold for hard currency in the USSR; whose wife is nominal sales representative for Western commercial enterprises (the US firm Planet Associates, Ltd., and Hako-Werke, a West German firm dealing in snow-removal and cleaning equipment); who maintains bank accounts in hard currencies in the United States and in Western Europe; and who—again *unlike any other Soviet journalist*—is a frequent visitor to major capitals throughout the world, including, most recently, Taipei (Taiwan). Why, then, be so discomfited by the fact that many of us wonder who or what enables him to lead such a charmed and lucrative life?

Mr. Louis claims that he is a "professional journalist." Was it in this capacity, one wonders, that he was allowed by Soviet authorities to interview Alliluyeva's children shortly after her defection to the West in the summer of 1967 and (in her own words) to "photograph every room in my apartment . . ., remove family photographs locked in my desk,"[1] somehow obtain a copy of her manuscript—and then offer the manuscript and the pictures, along with his own commentary, to numerous West European publishers? And what professional journalist, once embarked upon such an enterprise, would claim that his material was furnished to him by "Alliluyeva's family," even though—as Mrs. Alliluyeva notes—her "children had never known of the manuscript's existence and there was no copy of it in my home"? Is it also in keeping with the ethics of a professional journalist to refer—again in Alliluyeva's words—to "conversations with my former husbands, although from the text it was clearly evident that he hadn't even met them," and to be so oblivious to reality as to cite "an interview with my aunt, Anna Redens, who had been dead for a long time?"[2] In his letter, Mr. Louis passes over in silence not only the entire Alliluyeva affair but also his curious relationship to the defected writer, Valeri Tarsis. Would it be too much to suggest that, under these circumstances, his "indignation" does not seem altogether credible?

Finally, as a graduate of the Law Faculty of Moscow University, Mr. Louis should understand why it is puzzling to see him freely engaging in activities which, when engaged in by others, have brought severe penalties down upon their heads. Within the past few years, dozens of writers have been sentenced under Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and Article 190-1 ("defamation of the Soviet state") of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR for writing and disseminating works considered no less inimical to the Soviet regime than the writings of Svetlana Alliluyeva and Valeri Tarsis. Yet for some reason, Mr. Louis is not only permitted to disseminate these works, but even—in the course of his peripatetic activities—to profit from them as well. According to Article 153, "activity as a commercial middleman carried on by private persons as a form of business for the purpose of enrichment" is punished by "deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years with confiscation of property." Yet Mr. Louis' private business ventures continue to flourish without incurring the wrath of the authorities.

In fact, if one were to apply rigorous legalistic criteria to Mr. Louis' activities, one would probably come up with a few more violations—*e.g.*, of Article 136, which prescribes one year's imprisonment for "violation of inviolability of a citizen's dwelling space" (the case of Mrs. Alliluyeva's apartment); or of Article 208: "Acquisition or transfer of property known to have been criminally acquired" (Mrs. Alliluyeva's manuscript), punished by six months in jail. His most recent article in the *London Evening News* (September 16), which virtually accused the USSR of contemplating a preemptive nuclear war against Communist China (see box on p. 40), would also seem to be a violation of Soviet law—*in* this case again of Article 191-1: for couldn't so sensational a charge be easily regarded as a "falsehood derogatory to the Soviet state and social system"?

It is not my intention, of course, to portray Mr. Louis as a "criminal." Most of his entrepreneurial activities, in fact, would strike a person living in a non-Communist country as perfectly sound and normal. Nor do I in the least question his right to aspire to the trappings of comfort and affluence. As for using newsmen as instruments in an international "war of nerves" (as in the case of the article on Moscow *vs.* Peking), this is a practice that is hardly restricted to Communist countries. Furthermore, I repeat, I find Mr. Louis personally quite charming, and rather regret not having been able to visit him at his dacha. My only point is that Mr. Louis cannot expect to have his cake and relish it, too. As long as he engages in activities that are patently denied to his fellow citizens, and so long as he refrains from explaining his seemingly privileged status in Soviet society, his claim to being "only a professional journalist" will continue to be a puzzle to all concerned.

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG

[1] Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, New York, Harper & Row, 1969, p. 336.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 339.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index to Vol. XVIII

Annual indices for Volumes IV-XVII appear in the November-December issues (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing to the right of the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

Housing in the USSR
Cities and Towns, by Donald B. Barry ... 3
The Countryside, by Karl-Eugen Wädekin ... 3
Documents ... 3, 4-5
Are the Generals Taking Over?, by Thomas W. Wolfe ... 4-5
Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle, by Maury Lisann ... 6

EASTERN EUROPE

Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, and the German Problem, by Melvin Croan ... 1
Rumania Today, by J. F. Brown
I. Towards "Integration" ... 1
II. The Strategy of Defiance ... 2
Czechoslovakia's Youth, by Anita Dasbach ... 2
Political Patterns and Economic Reforms, by Michael Gamarnikow ... 2
Czechoslovakia: Agony of a Nation
The Politics of Retrenchment, by Jan Provaznik ... 4-5
The Vagaries of Law, by Otto Ulc ... 4-5
The "New Socialism"
I. Philosophy in Search of Reality, by Peter Ludz ... 4-5
II. The End of an Illusion?, by J. H. Huizinga ... 4-5
Budapest 1956: Prague 1968
I. Parallels and Contrasts, by Bela K. Kiraly ... 4-5
II. Spokesmen of Revolution, by Tamas Aczel ... 4-5
Yugoslavia Today
The Evolution of a System, by Paul Shoup ... 4-5
From a Reporter's Notebook, by Christopher Bird ... 4-5

CHINA

Mao's Great Purge: A Poltical Balance Sheet, by Parris H. Chang ... 2
Mao, Marx, and the Future Society, by Lloyd Eastman ... 3
China in Flux
The Second Decade of Maoist Rule, by Parris H. Chang ... 6
The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution, by Richard M. Pfeffer ... 6
The New Role of the Military, by Stephen A. Sims ... 6
Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle, by Maury Lisann ... 6

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Moscow and the Search for Unity, by J. P. Sontag ... 1
North Korea: Profile of a Garrison State, by B. C. Koh ... 1

HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

The Comintern and the Genealogy of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," by William Korey ... 3

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK REVIEWS

Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village, by William Hinton; *China: The Other Communism*, by K. S. Karol; *Journey Through China*, by Jules Roy; *Political Participation in Communist China*, by James R. Townsend; *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*, by A. Doak Barnett; *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, by Franz Schurmann; *The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary*, by Theodore H. E. Chen; *China After Mao*, by A. Doak Barnett—Richard L. Walker 1

The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History, by Walter Laqueur; *The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917-1967*, by Walter Laqueur; *Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium*, Richard Pipes, Ed.—John Lukacs 1

Power in the Kremlin, by Michel Tatu—Robert Conquest 1

Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, by Leonard Schapiro—Harold Shukman 1

Prominent Personalities in the USSR, Edward L. Crowley, Andrew J. Lebed, and Heinrich E. Schultz, Eds.—Maurice Friedberg 1

Science and Ideology in Soviet Society, George Fischer, Ed.; *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927-1932*, by Loren R. Graham—Allen Kassof 1

Law in the Soviet Society, Wayne R. Leave, Ed.—Bernard Rudden 1

Privatproduzenten in der sowjetischen Landwirtschaft, by Karl-Eugen Wädekin—Luba O. Richter 1

The School and the State in the USSR, by Herbert C. Rudman—Harold J. Noah 1

The Making of a Workers' Revolution, by Allen K. Wildman; *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, by Solomon M. Schwarz; *Russia in Revolution, 1890-1918*, by Lionel Kochan; *Witnesses of the Russian Revolution*, Roger Pethybridge, Ed.—Vera Broido 2

The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, by Robert Conquest—William J. Parente 2

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, by Samuel B. Griffith, II; *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath*, by Alexander George; *The Role of The Chinese Army*, by John Gittings—Raymond L. Garthoff 2

Memoirs 1925-1950, by George F. Kennan—Melvin Croan 2

The Extraordinary Decade, by P. V. Annenkov; *Russian Writers and Society, 1825-1904*, by Ronald Hingley; *Red Virgin Soil*, by Robert A. Maguire—Edward J. Brown 3

The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, by George Lichtheim; *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR*, Robert Conquest, Ed.—J. Bandyopadhyaya 3

Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, by Adam B. Ulam; *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy*, by Herbert S. Dinerstein—Tibor Szamuely 3

The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives, by Michael P. Gehlen; *International Relations among Communist*, Robert H. McNeal, Ed.; *The Communist States and the West*, Adam Bromke and Phillip E. Uren, Eds.—William Zimmerman 3

Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, by Ivan Maisky; *The Fall of Berlin*, by Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov; *June 22, 1941*, by A. M. Nekrich—R. Kolkowicz 3

The China Reader (I: *Imperial China*, II: *Republican China*, III: *Communist China*), Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Eds.—Harold C. Hinton 3

History of the International, 1864-1914, by Julius Braunthal—Jane Degras 3

The Young Stalin: The Early Years of an Elusive Revolutionary, by Edward Ellis Smith—William J. Parente 3

Stalin, by Raffaello Uboldi—Francis B. Randall 3

Industrial Workers in the USSR, Robert Conquest, Ed.—Jay B. Sorenson 3

Soviet Foreign Aid, by Marshall I. Goldman—Leon Herman 3

Juggernaut, by Malcolm Mackintosh—Thomas W. Wolfe 3

The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic, by Stephen Fischer-Galati—Andrew Gyorgy 3

Prague Spring, by Z. A. B. Zeman; *Prague—200 Days*, by Harry Schwartz; *Czechoslovakia, 1968*, by Philip Windsor and A. Roberts; *Czech Black Book*, Robert Little, Ed; *The Voices*, by Joseph Wechsberg—Cary O. Fisher 4-5

Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, Robert Conquest, Ed.; *Ethic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, Erich Goldhagen, Ed.; *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics*, by R. Vaidyanath—Violet Conolly 4-5

Encounters with Lenin, by Nikolai Valentinov—Alexander Dallin 4-5

From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940, by George F. Kennan—Vladimir Petrov 4-5

Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, Morton Halperin, Ed.—Raymond L. Garthoff 4-5

Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966, by Andres Suarez—Melvin Croan 4-5

History in Communist China, Albert Feuerwerker, Ed.; *The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions: A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History*, by James P. Harrison—John Wilson Lewis 6

Mao Tse-tung, by Stuart Schram; *Chou En-Lai: China's Gray Eminence*, by Kai-yu Hsu; *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History*, by Lyman B. Van Slyke—John E. Rue 6

China In The Throes of the Cultural Revolution, by Louis Barcata; *This is Communist China*, by Robert Trumbull and the staff of *Yomiuri Shimbun; Chinese Communism in Crisis*, by Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish; *Revolutionary Immortality*, by Robert Jay Lifton—Stanley Karnow 6

Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, by Charles B. McLane; *An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin*, by Charles B. McLane; *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, by Arnold C. Brackman—Leonard Bushkoff 6

Cuba, The Making of a Revolution, by Ramon Eduardo Ruiz; *The Economic Transformation of Cuba*, by Edward Boorstein; *Castro, the Kremlin and Communism in Latin America*, by D. Bruce Jackson—Carmelo Mesa-Lago 6

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans, by Paul Lendvai; *The Politics of the European Communist States*, by Ghita Ionescu; *Economic Development of Communist Rumania*, by John Michael Montias—Viktor Meier 6
The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, by Shlomo Avineri; *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism*, by Z. A. Jordan—Stanley Rothman 6
I Figli del Partito, by Anita Galliussi—George G. Wynne 6
Internationalism or Russification? by Ivan Dzyuba—Stephen D. Olynyk 6
Peking's Red Guard: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, by Stephen Pan and Raymond J. de Jaegher—Gordon A. Bennett 6
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, by Michael Gamarnikow—George Kemeny 6

CONTRIBUTOR'S INDEX

Aczel, Tamas—Spokesmen of Revolution 4-5
Bandyopadhyaya, J.—review 3
Barry, Donald B.—Cities and Towns 3
Bird, Christopher—From a Reporter's Notebook 4-5
Broido, Vera—review 2
Brown, Edward J.—review 3
Brown, J. F.—Rumania Today (in 2 parts) 1, 2
Chang, Parris H.—Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet 2
The Second Decade of Communist Rule 6
Conolly, Violet—review 4-5
Conquest, Robert—review 1
Croan, Melvin—Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, and the German Problem 1
reviews 2, 4-5
Dallin, Alexander—review 4-5
Dasbach, Anita—Czechoslovakia's Youth 2
Degras, Jane—review 3
Eastman, Lloyd—Mao, Marx, and the Future Society 3
Fisher, Cary O.—review 4-5
Friedberg, Maurice—review 1
Gamarnikow, Michael—Political Patterns and Economic Reforms 2
Garthoff, Raymond L.—reviews 2, 4-5
Gyorgy, Andrew—review 3
Herman, Leon—review 3
Hinton, Harold C.—review 3
Huizinga, J. H.—The End of an Illusion? 4-5
Kassof, Allen—review 1
Kiraly, Bela K.—Parallels and Contrasts 4-5
Koh, B. C.—North Korea: Profile of a Garrison State 1
Kolkowicz, Roman—review 3
Korey, William—The Comintern and the Genealogy of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" 3
Lisann, Maury—Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle 6
Ludz, Peter—Philosophy in Search of Reality 4-5
Lukacs, John—review 1
Noah, Harold J.—review 1
Parente, William J.—review 2, 3
Petrov, Vladimir—review 4-5
Pfeffer, Richard M.—The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution 6
Provaznik, Jan—The Politics of Retrenchment 4-5
Randall, Francis B.—review 3
Richter, Luba O.—review 1
Rudden, Bernard—review 1
Shoup, Paul—The Evolution of a System 4-5
Shukman, Harold—review 1
Sims, Stephen A.—The New Role of the Military 6
Sontag, J. P.—Moscow and the Search for Unity 1
Sorenson, Jay B.—review 3
Szamuely, Tibor—review 3
Ulc, Otto—The Vagaries of Law 4-5
Wädekin, Karl-Eugen—The Countryside 3
Walker, Richard L.—review 1
Wolfe, Thomas W.—Are The Generals Taking Over? 4-5
Zimmerman, William—review 3

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED